

Attitude Constraint as a Function of Non-Affective Dimensions

Tom W. Smith


National Opinion Research Center
University of Chicago

GSS Methodological Report No. 24

December, 1982

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This research was done for the General Social Survey project directed by James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith. The project is funded by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. SES-8118731.



Social scientists and survey researchers are increasingly coming to the conclusion that simple affective measures of attitudes often yield simplistic and erroneous results. Both theoretically and empirically survey analysts have acknowledged that attitudes have other dimensions besides affect, or one's positive/negative orientation towards the issue in question. There is less consensus over just what alternative dimensions there are and how they can be best operationalized, but a general sense that one needs to measure the meaningfulness of the expressed attitude. Among specific dimensions that have been proposed are 1) reasons for one's position (the why), 2) the importance, centrality, involvement, or concern about the issue, 3) information and knowledge about the issue, 4) salience, and 5) behavioral consequences and committed action. The emerging consensus is that one must take into account these various aspects if one is to really understand the structure of opinion on an issue and if one is going to measure attitudes rather than non-attitudes.

The issue of the meaningfulness of expressed opinion has been raised in many guises. Early survey researchers talked about attitude crystallization (e.g. Katz, 1940 and Cantril, 1944) and George Gallup (1947) proposed a quintamimensional plan of question design to measure five dimensions: 1) familiarity, 2) open-ended opinion, 3) closed-ended opinion, 4) reason why, and 5) intensity. Later Philip Converse argued that many expressed opinions to survey questions were really nonattitudes that should be filtered out (Converse, 1964, for a review of the extensive literature see Smith, 1981). By the late seventies there was a slowly spreading consensus that techniques had to be developed to separate uninformed, trivial opinions from firm, committed positions. Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser (1981) conducted a series of experiments on "passionate attitudes" and attitude

crystallization and Yankelovich, Skelly, and White (1981) developed a mushiness index to identify volatile issues and individuals.

The recent splay of work on non-affective dimensions of attitudes is very promising, but still limited and exploratory. While numerous attempts have been made to distinguish meaningful opinion,¹ little systematic work has been carried out on what auxillary dimensions are important and how these dimensions can be reliably measured. We have become aware of the problem and have begun to try out solutions but have not sufficiently studied the matter or the efficacy of our mostly untested solutions to come up with a thorough knowledge of the problem or a robust and verified solution. This paper expands the current work on multidimensional attitude measurements by testing the utility of several auxillary measures.

As part of the methodological research program of the National Data Program for the Social Sciences, experiments in multidimensional scales were designed as part of the 1982 General Social Survey. The General Social Survey is a multistage, full probability sampling of the adult population of the contiguous United States (Davis and Smith, 1982). To study the role of non-affective dimensions of measuring attitudes we developed a series of auxillary measures to illuminate the opinions expressed on standard affective questions. Non-affective dimensions were added to two questions: a single item on support/opposition to the equal rights amendment (ERA) and a seven part scale on abortion attitudes (See Appendix: Question Wordings). Among the large number of dimensions that had been proposed as candidates for discriminating between attitudes we selected four: a measure of centrality as operationalized by an evaluation of the importance of the issue to the respondent, a self-evaluation of the amount of information possessed about the issue, an indicator of volatility as measured by the stated committment to the

respondent's opinion, and open ended questions asking either why a respondent favored or opposed ERA or asking the respondent to name arguments for and against abortions.

While we believed that these indicators were among the most promising discriminators, we did not include other promising candidates. In choosing the dimensions to try we were guided by the existing literature, especially the work of Schuman and Presser (1981) and Yankelovich, Skelly, and White (1981). Intensity was not used since it is not clearly a separate dimension (Suchman, 1950. p. 253; Schuman and Presser, 1981, p. 256, n.5.; and Peabody, 1962). Saliency was passed over since an experiment on the 1978 GSS showed that a saliency measure (how often people think about an issue) did not differentiate the association between feminist and abortion attitudes. Knowledge items were excluded from the initial list because of the difficulty of framing appropriate parallel questions without extensive pretesting. Further research on the 1983 GSS will employ an alternative measure of centrality (degree of concern), a saliency measure similar to the 1978 indicator, and a committed action item based on the measure employed by Schuman and Presser (1981, p. 240).

Table 1 shows that there was significant variation in respondent evaluations of issue importance, availability of information, and firmness. Both issues were rated similarly on importance with a plurality rating the issues as "important".² People feel that they are better informed about

² Compared to 13 items rated with an identical measure in a 1973 NORC survey these two items rated less important than all of these questions. The issues with the percentage rating them as one of the most important were: governmental medical care--38.8%; the Soviet Union--31.7%; military intervention against Communists--30.4%; aid to poor--29.5%; income redistribution--23.7%; school desegregation--21.5%; marijuana--19.5%; residential segregation--18.2%, pornography--17.4%; spying on radicals--16.7%, and helping blacks--15.6%. While any direct comparison is tenuous, these figures suggest that ERA and abortion may not be among the most central of issues.

abortion attitudes than on ERA, but this may well be a function of the differing ways that attitudes towards the two issues were measured.

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF ERA AND ABORTION MEASURES
OF IMPORTANCE, INFORMATION, AND FIRMNES

| Importance | Abortion | ERA |
|-------------------------------|----------|--------|
| One of the Most Important | 12.8% | 9.5% |
| Important | 42.2 | 43.0 |
| Not Very Important | 31.2 | 34.4 |
| Not Important At All | 13.8 | 13.1 |
| | (1482) | (1476) |
| Information | | |
| Have Needed Information | 24.7% | 12.8% |
| Have Most | 21.1 | 17.7 |
| Have Some | 31.5 | 40.5 |
| Have Very Little | 22.7 | 29.0 |
| | (1490) | (1490) |
| Firmness | | |
| Very Likely to Change Opinion | 2.3% | 3.5% |
| Somewhat Likely | 11.9 | 20.7 |
| Somewhat Unlikely | 22.2 | 29.6 |
| Very Unlikely | 63.6 | 46.1 |
| | (1453) | (1439) |

TABLE 2
INTER-ITEM ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN NON-AFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS

Gamma/Probability

| | ERA Importance | ERA Firmness | ERA Information | Abortion Importance | Abortion Firmness | Abortion Information |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| ERA Importance | | .102/.000 | .131/.000 | .280/.000 | .021/.062 | .033/.000 |
| ERA Firmness | | | .290/.000 | .013/.000 | .310/.000 | .183/.000 |
| ERA Information | | | | .129/.000 | .132/.000 | .597/.000 |
| Abortion Importance | | | | | .233/.000 | .315/.000 |
| Abortion Firmness | | | | | | .333/.000 |

From Table 2 we see that there are moderate associations amongst the six items. The strongest associations are between the parallel items (e.g.

importance on ERA and abortion) which average .396. The correlation between the information items is particularly high (.597), suggesting either that information inputs tend to be similar across related topics or that some common reference is being used to supply a response. The correlations between items within issues averaged .294 for abortion and .174 for ERA. Excluding the associations between parallel items the associations across topics is a modest .085. The associations were low in part because of several curvilinear associations. There was a tendency for people who rated an issue as either one of the most important or not important at all to report the highest levels of information and the most firmness. For example, the proportion saying they were unlikely to change their opinion on ERA was 73.0% for those rating it as one of the most important, 45.5% for important, 34.4% for not very important, and 60.3% for not important at all. As we will see below, we suspect that this results from a tendency, especially on the ERA importance item, for people to rate an issue as not important not because of their lack of concern or interest in the issue, but rather as an expression of their rejection of the issue.

The inter-item associations between our auxiliary measures are not impressively large. As Schuman and Presser (1981, p. 257) found using specific intensity measures on four issues and three general intensity measures, there was enough unique variance in intensity for specific issues that general measures were poor substitutes for issue specific measures and there was likewise only moderate association between the specific intensity measures. As Converse (1964) has noted, here are varying issue publics that are interested in and involved with some topics and not others. On the other hand, the measures over these two topics do show some association. Part may result from the closeness of the ERA and abortion issues. With more remote

issues, say nuclear disarmament and civil rights there may be little or no associations across the meaningfulness measures. Part may result from use of a common referent to evaluate responses. We might suspect that the comparatively high association between the information questions may come from the fact that part of their evaluation is not based on specific consideration of the amount of information they have on ERA or abortion, but on general media consumption such as how often they read the paper. The associations between newspaper use and the information items are quite modest (.1-.2) however. Basically we feel that there are probably moderate associations across meaningfulness measures. While not uniformly involved and informed about all issues, there is a general tendency for people either to follow politics or ignore political matters and this orientation underwrites moderate association across different topics. For example, we could ask specific knowledge questions about an issue that would clearly tap information about that issue only, but knowledge scores across issues would still probably correlate since people tend to fall into low and high informed groups. That is, while people will be knowledgeable on some topics and unknowledgable on others, there will be a tendency to have high or low scores across topics. Similar situations probably exist for other dimensions such as volatility, salience, and centrality. There are probably general orientations that would lead to a modicum of correlations between most issues. (But take the example of farm subsidies and mass transit. We would expect that two mutually exclusive groups, farms and urbanites, would have high interest/information about the issues respectively. We might expect to find no or even negative associations between our meaningfulness measures.)

Within topics the inter-item associations also indicate substantial independence between the measures. The centrality indicator may have a

validity problem but even with firmness and information there are only moderate associations (.29-.33). We suspect that there may be an underlying dimension, "meaningfulness," that is tapped by these and other subdimensions (possibly salience and knowledge). These individual indicators only imperfectly measure it. It is possible, however, that there are really separate, but perhaps not totally unrelated dimensions. Firmness may measure something distinct from the more cognitively oriented information and knowledge measures.

The associations between the non-affective measure and the affective measure are basically curvilinear. People who were either strongly opposed or strongly in favor of the ERA or who ranked high or low on the abortion scale tended to report high information and firmness. When the ERA and abortion items are recoded into extreme vs. moderate opinion we find moderate to substantial associations between the issues and information and firmness (.22-.57). The measure of the importance of the ERA item showed a decidedly different pattern however. It had a substantial association with ERA (.60), with those opposing the ERA tending to rate it as unimportant. As noted above, we suspected that their importance rating might not have been an independent evaluation of the centrality of the item. We suspect that many opponents of the ERA used this item to re-express their opposition. We believe that they were trying to say that the ERA itself was unimportant (unnecessary, not worthwhile, etc.), rather than whether the ERA issue or controversy was important to them (an issue they were involved with, concerned about, worked up over). This inference is supported by the low correlation with other non-affective measures noted above. In addition, an examination of the open ended items about the ERA and the items on knowing what the ERA meant and having heard or read about the ERA, did not indicate that those who

strongly opposed the ERA and thought it was an unimportant issue were especially uninformed, apathetic, or inarticulate about the ERA. We thus suspect that the importance measure of ERA has been partly confounded with the affective measure.

The non-affective dimensions employed here have face validity as items for discriminating the meaningfulness of attitudes and a good, but not extensive, track record. To evaluate the success of these measures we examined their impact on attitude constraint. People with real attitudes on such related issues as ERA and abortion should show associations (attitude constraint) between the attitudes. If the non-affective dimensions were discriminating along the attitude-nonattitude continuum, then there should be less constraint for the less informed, less centrally involved, and less firmly attached (or some combination of these) and higher associations for informed, interested, and firm.

TABLE 3
THE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN ERA AND ABORTION ATTITUDES
WITH CONTROL FOR NON-AFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS

| A. | ERA Importance | | | | ERA Firm | | | | ERA Information | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------|
| | + | 2 | 3 | - | - | 2 | 3 | + | + | 2 | 3 | - | |
| | 1 | | | 4 | 1 | | | 4 | 1 | | | 4 | |
| ERA x ABORT ^a | .146 (137) | .291 (606) | .139 (472) | .190 (154) | .077 (48) | .067 (272) | .251 (406) | .294 (631) | .362 (186) | .304 (257) | .158 (587) | .176 (346) | |
| B. | Abortion Importance | | | | Abortion Firmness | | | | Abortion Information | | | | |
| ERA x ABORT | + | | | - | - | | | + | + | | | - | |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
| | .205 (179) | .296 (584) | .187 (432) | .176 (175) | .282 (33) | .021 (155) | .137 (300) | .264 (867) | .351 (353) | .222 (307) | .189 (434) | .124 (279) | |
| C. | Importance | High | Med. | Low | High | Med. | Low | High | Med. | Low | High | Med. | Low |
| | Information | High | High | High | Low | Low | Low | High | High | High | Low | Low | Low |
| | Firmness | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | High | High | High | High | High | High |
| ERA x Abort | .281 (140) | .235 (187) | .057 (89) | -.024 (136) | .029 (174) | .220 (133) | .432 (142) | .476 (104) | .281 (67) | .419 (52) | .323 (57) | -.198 (34) | |

^a ERA combines responses from those who heard about the ERA and those who had not. Don't knows were excluded. ABORT is an additive scale of the seven abortion questions with Don't knows coded at the midpoint of each item. Parallel analysis was also conducted using only those who reported having heard or read about the ERA and using an abortion scale that excluded all Don't knows. Results were very similar to those reported above.

Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C give the basic results. Looking at the individual items in table 3A we see that with the exception of importance of the ERA they all discriminate moderately well. In table 3B the situation is clarified further by combining the parallel items (e.g. ERA and abortion importance) into trichotomies or dichotomies. In this form even importance shows consistent and notable discrimination. Finally, Table 3C simultaneously controls for the three parallel measures used in Table 3B. Overall there is a strong association between importance, information, and firmness and the association between ERA and abortion. The strongest associations (.476 and .432) occur for the two cases in which none of the low conditions (i.e. uninformed, not as important, changeable) prevail. For cases with one low condition the average gamma was .31; for cases with two low conditions the average was -.034; and for the single case with all conditions low the gamma was .220. Given the total lack of any inter-item association shown by people low on any two dimensions we find it rather surprising that a significant reversal occurs among those with low information, firmness, and importance. This may only reflect an idiosyncrasy in our data or a singularity for these variables. It is also possible that the correlation is the product of correlated error such as a response set. Despite this anomaly the overall pattern is clear. A combination of measures of information, importance, and firmness can discriminate between respondents and define groups with substantial associations between ERA and abortion and other groups for which there were no associations at all.

Next we looked at three general measures that might also specify the strength of the association between ERA and abortion: education, interviewer evaluation of respondent comprehension, and respondent's report of interest in politics. As Table 4 shows each appears to discriminate in a fashion similar to the meaningfulness dimensions. All three measures indicate that the less

TABLE 4

The Association Between ERA and Abortion with Controls for Education, Comprehension, and Political Interest

| A. Education | Less than High School | High School | Some College | College Degree |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| ERA x ABORT | .143 | .264 | .208 | .372 |
| B. Comprehension | Not Good | | | Good |
| ERA x ABORT | .030 | | | .268 |
| C. Political Interest | Only Now and Then or Less | Some of the Time | Most of the Time | |
| ERA x ABORT | .117 | .304 | .268 | |

interested and less educated have lower attitude constraint. Multivariate analysis (not shown) indicated, however, that the political interest effect was not independent of education. Education and comprehension had separate effects, but the college educated/not comprehending group was virtually an empty cell.

Controlling for education and meaningfulness showed that both had independent effects on attitude constraint (Table 5). Among the college

TABLE 5

The Association Between ERA and Abortion with Controls for Meaningfulness^a and Education

| Education = | LTHS | HS | College | LTHS | HS | College | LTHS | HS | College |
|------------------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|---------|------|-------|---------|
| Meaningfulness = | Low | Low | Low | Med. | Med. | Med. | High | High | High |
| ERA x ABORT | -.135 | .130 | .278 | .349 | .248 | .285 | .315 | .403 | .519 |
| | (173) | (332) | (60) | (133) | (279) | (89) | (51) | (131) | (63) |

^aMeaningfulness groups = those in the low category for two or more of the indicators in the low group, those in the low category on one group in the medium group, and those low on no categories in the high group.

educated with meaningful opinion there is a substantial association of .52 while at the other end the association between the ERA and abortion for those without a high school diploma and no meaningful opinion was an insignificant -.135.

In addition to examining the impact of non-affective dimensions on attitude constraint we looked at their influence on the scaling of the seven part abortion question. Information, firmness, and importance were all related to better Guttman scaling of the items. Among those high on all three dimensions the coefficients of reproductability and scalability were .965 and .903, while for those low on all these dimensions the coefficients were .914 and .719.

Also on the abortion scale we checked to see if the non-affective dimensions would discriminate associations between abortion attitudes and the main explanatory variables. The literature on abortion suggests that among the best predictors of abortion attitudes were education, age, church attendance, and ideal number of children. The results once again indicated the discriminatory power of these indicators. For those high on all three measures the average association with these predictors was .347, with two high and one low it averaged .193, with one high and two low it was .202, and with all three low the average relationship was .130. (I could look at multiple regression models and compare the r^2 under these conditions.)

Next we looked at the association of ERA and abortion attitudes with two related attitude scales: a four item feminism scale and a question on divorce laws. For these items we cannot use the combined parallel indicators of the non-affective dimensions as when comparing the ERA and abortion association, but can combine the three separate dimensions, information, importance, and firmness. For feminism by abortion the association when all

auxillary dimensions were high was .400, when two were high it was .331, when one was high .196, and when none were high .196. Similarly the associations between ERA and feminism were: all high = .668, two high = .303, one high = .177, and none high = .171. We tried the item on how easy laws on divorce should be because Schuman and Presser (1981, pp. 265-266) examined the association between abortion and a similar divorce question with controls for importance. They failed to find any attenuation of attitude constraint as importance declined. Our analysis confirms this result (the association between abortion and divorce laws was .364 for those in the top importance category and .363, .272, and .347 in the categories for declining importance). However, when all three measures were combined (as above) the non-affective measures did discriminate on the constraint between the attitudes. For abortion and divorce law the associations were: all high = .532, two high = .263, one high = .263, and none high = .260. For ERA and divorce laws the associations were: all high = .475, two high = .253, one high = .213, and none high = .195. While these differences show more of a dichotomy than in the cases of ERA and abortion and feminism and ERA or abortion, they do indicate that even when one indicator does not discriminate the three together can still accomplish the same ends.

Next we examined the open-ended responses to the questions asking why people support/oppose the ERA and inquiring about reasons they had heard for and against abortion. These items were included in the experiment primarily to provide depth in the interpretation of the structure of opinion on ERA and abortion, but we also examined them to see if they could be used to discriminate the magnitude of associations. Almost everyone was able to give at least one reason for their ERA opinion (5.6 percent gave none-almost all people who had no opinion on ERA), 43.2 percent gave one reason, 33.2 percent

two reasons, and 18.0 percent three or more reasons. Giving reasons for and against abortion was somewhat harder for respondents. On reasons against abortion 12.0 percent named none, 39.6 percent one reason, 33.7 percent two reasons, and 14.6 percent three or more reasons. On reasons for abortions, 17.2 percent named none, 27.2 percent one, 25.8 percent two, and 29.8 percent three or more. People who were for and against abortion did not differ in their ability to name an anti-abortion argument (respectively 88.4 percent and 88.9 percent), but people opposed to abortion were less able to cite an argument for abortion than those favoring abortion (respectively 77.3 percent and 90.9 percent). We looked to see if attitude constraint varied by two factors (1) number of reasons mentioned and (2) whether general or specific reasons were given. On ERA no clear association existed between number of issues and attitudes constraint. On abortion, however, those who could not name a reason had essentially no association between their ERA and abortion attitude. The association was not regular, however. Those with one reason had the strongest association with those having two or more reasons had slightly weaker associations (pro-abortion reasons: none = .104, one = .331, two = .207, three+ = .219; anti-abortion reasons: none = .059, one = .301, two = .203, three+ = .254). Looking at the differences between general and specific reasons on abortion³ (the ERA question did not lend itself to such classification), we see that people who selected general reasons had greater attitude constraint than those who favored specific reasons (anti-abortion-general reason = .304, specific reason = .185; pro-abortion-general reason =

³For pro-abortion reasons the general responses were "women's right," "control over own body," and "freedom/right to choose." For anti-abortion the general responses were "abortions are killing, murder," "taking a life," "unborn alive," "unborn may be a person," and "right to life." The complete codes are in Davis and Smith, 1982, pp. 335-336.


.374, specific reason = .204). This may reflect a more ideological form of thinking by the former while the selection of specific reasons may indicate more particularistic cognitive patterns. A more detailed analysis using combination of specific and general responses to all of three possible reasons did not show any additional consistent pattern.

In the preceding sections we have shown that non-affective dimensions such as importance, information, firmness and open-ended questions can discriminate the attitude constraint between two related measures. The items work both when the auxiliary measures are available for both of the associated attitudes and when they are available for only one measure. Similarly the non-affective dimensions also specify the intra-item scalability on abortion and the strength of associations between predictors variables (including demographics) and the attitudes. Undoubtedly the measures used here are far from optimum. We have indicated possible problems with the importance items. Additionally random measurement error undoubtedly is present in all measures. With more reliable measures we should be able to separate out even greater differences in the level of attitude constraint. Further work is currently underway to extend these indicators to two more issues (feminism and race relations) and comparing them to other measures of meaningfulness (an alternative measure of centrality, a saliency indicator, and an item on committed action).


There are at least three conflicting explanations for the lower attitude constraint evidenced by people low on the meaningfulness measures. The nonattitude explanation as formulated by Converse suggests that people are prone to express attitudes on issues about which they really have no affective preference (and little or no information or interest on which to make effective judgments). In line with Converse's expectations we constructed the

non-affective measures to segregate these nonattitudes. A second interpretation is that the lower associations are not caused by nonattitudes, but by eccentric ideologues who associate issues in nontraditional fashions like the U.S. Labor Party. Thirdly, there may be issue specific attitude holders who have well-formulated positions on specific issues but do not draw any connection between the issues being associated, such as farmers who oppose big government but favor more farm supports. While both eccentric ideologues and particularistic attitude holders are undoubtedly two of the major explanations for less than perfect associations between attitudes, there is no reason to assume that such groups would necessarily rank low on information, importance, or firmness. On the other hand respondents who describe themselves as uninformed, who rate the issue as unimportant, who consider their opinion as changeable, and who are less able to name pros or cons on an issue are practically self-defined as nonattitude holders (except for the fact that they had expressed an attitude). It appears that the lower attitude constraint specified by the meaningfulness dimension not only isolates groups with little association between issues, but defines groups that have little meaningful opinion on the individual issues either.

While considerable more development is needed it appears that measures of nonaffective dimension can be constructed to separate expressed attitudes into thoughtful, considered opinion and the "capricious constructions" and "very ad hoc feelings" that Converse labelled nonattitudes. By evaluating these separate dimension of attitudes we should better understand the nature and prevalence of attitude constraint, the process of attitude formation and change, and the nexus between attitudes and behaviors.



APPENDIX
Question Wordings



13. A. Why do you (favor/oppose) the Equal Rights Amendment?
PROBE EACH RESPONSE FOR CLARITY AND PROBE FOR ADDITIONAL REASONS.

B. Why is that--why do you have no opinion on the Equal Rights Amendment?

PROBE: What are some of the reasons you feel that way?
PROBE FOR CLARITY AND PROBE "What other reasons?"

QUESTION 13 CONTINUED

13. C. How important is the Equal Rights Amendment issue to you--would you say it is...

- one of the most important, 1
- important, 2
- not very important, or 3
- not important at all?. 4
- Don't know 8

D. How much information do you have about the Equal Rights Amendment --do you have...

- all of the information you need, 1
- most of the information, 2
- some information, or 3
- very little information? 4
- Don't know 8

E. How firm are you about (your opinion on/the way you feel about) the Equal Rights Amendment--would you say you are very likely to change (your opinion), somewhat likely to change, somewhat unlikely to change or very unlikely to change your opinion?

- Very likely to change. 1
- Somewhat likely to change. . . . 2
- Somewhat unlikely to change. . . 3
- Very unlikely to change. 4
- Don't know 8

96. Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if . . .
READ EACH STATEMENT, AND CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH.

| Yes | No | Don't know |
|-----|----|------------|
|-----|----|------------|

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby? | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| B. If she is married and does not want any more children? | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| C. If the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy? | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| D. If the family has very low income and cannot afford any more children? | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| E. If she became pregnant as a result of rape? | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| F. If she is not married and does not want to marry the man? | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| G. The woman wants it for any reason? | 1 | 2 | 8 |

97. As far as you've heard what are the main arguments in favor of abortions? PROBE EACH RESPONSE FOR CLARITY. PROBE FOR ADDITIONAL REASONS.

98. And, as far as you've heard, what are the main arguments against abortions? PROBE FOR CLARITY AND PROBE FOR ADDITIONAL REASONS.

99. How important is the abortion issue to you--would you say it is . . .

- one of the most important, 1
 - important, 2
 - not very important, or. . 3
 - not important at all? . . 4
 - Don't know 8
-

100. How much information do you have about the abortion issue?
Do you have . . .

- all of the information you need, . 1
 - most of the information, 2
 - some information, or 3
 - very little information? 4
 - Don't know 8
-

101. How firm are you about your opinion on abortion--would you say
you are very likely to change your opinion, somewhat likely to
change, somewhat unlikely to change, or very unlikely to change
your opinion?

- Very likley to change 1
- Somewhat likely to change 2
- Somewhat unlikely to change 3
- Very unlikely to change? 4
- Don't Know 8

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