

Cycles of Reform?  
A Summary of Trends Since World War II

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Much of our lives are dominated by cycles. Some come from the basic celestial mechanics of the solar system: night and day, lunar tides, the annual seasons. Others are social conventions: weeks and weekends, monthly billings, annual repetitions of holidays and other customs. Cycles are even genetically engineered into our bodies. The female reproductive and wake/sleep cycles are the most obvious examples. Given the prominence of these natural and social cycles, it is not surprising that people have searched for and posited cyclical patterns in many other aspects of life.

One large group of cyclical theories are those that apply cycles to history. At one extreme are various cosmological cycles of existence such as the Aztec beliefs about the successive birth and destruction of previous worlds (Cairns, 1962 and Ross, 1975). Somewhat more modest and more based on observation than the cosmological theories are growth-and-decay theories that posit an organic life cycle for civilizations and nations (Spengler, 1926-28 and Toynbee, 1947-1957). Downright maidenly by comparison are various theories of historical cycles within countries and societies. It is with these theories that we will mainly deal.

Two major types of cyclical theories have been posited for the United States: economic and political. The economic cycles are best known and well established with data and theory (Burns and Mitchell, 1946; Burns, 1965). The most prominent of these is the basic business cycle, the rhythmic repetition of expansions and contractions which have characterized the United States and other industrial, free market economies since the early 1800s. From 1854 to 1961 these cycles averaged 49 months with extremes from 17 months to 101 months. As one can see by the dispersion of cycle lengths, the business cycles are not rigidly periodic such as the solar and calendar cycles. The business cycle is internally driven by the complex interaction of economic

forces. Neither its timing nor magnitude is simply or precisely fixed. In particular it can be disrupted by exogenous shocks such as wars (as could even solar cycles given some great cosmic catastrophe). Despite these irregularities, the business cycle is a powerful force in shaping short-term economic conditions. In addition, changes in various social conditions from the marriage rate to alcohol consumption have been related to the business cycle (Thomas, 1925 and Sorokin, 1928). Besides the basic business cycle other economic cycles exist for particular sectors such as construction and longer general cycles such as the Kuznets cycles of major and minor business cycles (wheel within wheels!) and more conjectural Kondratieff cycles lasting over 50 year periods have been advanced.

Political cycles are generally much less established than economic cycles. Certain cycles are well known. National elections of course fall every two years. While this pattern is not surprising and perhaps uninteresting since it is a simple function of constitutional mandate (Article I, Sections 2 and 5; Article II, Sections 1; and Amendment 17), it dramatically influences political activity, media coverage, and even the economy (Tufte, 1978). In addition to this mechanical regularity there are the well-established patterns of voter turnout increasing for presidential elections and falling for mid-term elections and the loss of the president's party of House seats during mid-term elections (Campbell, 1960 and Tufte, 1975).

Covering a longer time span are the realignment/maintaining election cycle and the succession of party systems. V.O. Key (1955; 1959) first noted that American history was marked by a series of critical elections in which new partisan coalitions were forged. These coalitions and the electoral division of the voters tended to maintain themselves through successive elections until a new critical election and realignment occurred. Key's model

has been expanded, modified, and refined by later authors (primarily by adding the concept of deviating elections to denote temporary electoral reverses of the dominant party based on personalities or other transitory factors rather than an enduring realignment). Key and most other early writers on realignment (MacRae and Meldrum, 1960; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1966) did not discuss the repeating nature of realignments and therefore did not consider cyclical explanations. Starting with Sellers (1965), however, most authors (Pomper, 1967; Jahnige, 1970; Burnham, 1970; Andersen, 1979; Petrocik, 1981; Hamburg, 1982) described this political pattern as a cycle. Two main explanations have been offered for the repetition. The change/disequilibrium model most fully articulated by Burnham (1970) argues that social and economic change builds up a backlog of problems that can not be handled by the existing party system. Either the new problems are crosscutting issues which the parties find difficult to handle because of the intra-party divisions or the problems simply represent topics that the existing party leadership is unconcerned about or unfamiliar with and therefore fails to handle. Eventually, the accumulation of new problems forces a rupture in the existing electoral system and a new alignment of issues, groups, and parties is formed. These new groups will then deal with the unresolved problems, but will eventually be overcome by future problems with which they will be unable to cope.

The second explanation, the mobilized political generation model, argues that realignments are basically the result of a large number of new voters being mobilized to vote for a new leader/party (Andersen, 1979; Petrocik, 1981; Hamburg, 1982; Baker, 1985). Once this group is motivated to vote and establishes a habit of voting for the dominant party, they continue to follow their partisan voting throughout their lives. Over time, however,

the mobilized cohort ages and dies off. They are fairly successful in passing on their partisan affiliation to their children, but these children inherit the party label without the intensity of attachment that their mobilized parents felt. Thus realignment is a period effect that creates a political generation and this generation eventually passes on. With the generation of intense partisans in gradual numerical decline, the population is once again open to a realignment. These two models are not mutually exclusive and one might argue that the passing of the mobilized political generation eases the way for the realignment necessitated by the combination of social change and political inertia.

When realignment occurs, there is usually an accompanying change in the party system, such as the demise of the Federalists and Whigs and the rise of the Republicans. This is not inevitable however. As in in the case of the New Deal realignment, parties can change their coalitions and their positions as dominant and secondary party without leading to the demise of one of the parties or even a basic turnover of their leadership.<sup>1</sup>

While political scientists have been advancing the realignment/maintaining election cycle, historians have been advocating a somewhat similar political cycle, a cycle of reform. Historians have long noted that there have been alternating periods of reform and reaction in American history. Some historians have merely described the alternating periods without

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1 As political scientists and others who have been looking for the next realignment to occur since the mid-1960's begin to despair over its coming, two schools of thought have developed that suggest that the realignment cycle is a historic phenomena and no longer operational. One school argues that the party system has weakened to such an extent that no realignment comparable to those of the Civil War, 1890s, or New Deal can occur. They believe that dealignment is occurring instead (Burnham, 1970 and Ladd, 1980). A second school believes that parties and governments have become more attuned to public needs and desires and respond to them as they occur. This should eliminate the need for the kind of political gridlock that triggers realignments (Burnstein, 1984).

suggesting that a repetitive pattern was involved and have offered particularistic explanations for each of the successive rises and falls (Goldman, 1952; Hofstadter, 1955). Another group headed by the Schlesingers (Schlesinger, 1939; 1949; Schelisinger, Jr., 1980; 1984; Faulkner, 1939; Carleton, 1948; Forcey, 1961; Reichley, 1971; Mitchell, 1983), have explicitly argued that these alternating periods form a cycle. (Closely related to these general cycles of reform models are models of student activism that certain sociologists have studied (Altbach, 1974; Levine, 1980; Hoge, Luna, and Miller, 1981.)

Even the advocates of the cycle of reform model have been hard pressed to identify the dynamic that drives the cycle. The most common explanation is organic, that society, like an animal, has a natural alteration between periods of rest and action (Schlesinger, 1939; 1949; Carleton, 1948; and especially Schelisinger, Jr., 1980). The authors describe the public as becoming fatigued or worn-out by reform and then resting until restored energy or boredom pushes society into a new reform surge. Others offer an institutional fossilization model (Schlesinger, 1949; Mitchell, 1983). They argue that once the reform movement wins it begins to switch its energies from idealism and change to maintaining power, administration, and defending its record. The problem with this theory is that it is hard to reconcile with the rest/action model. If reform movements peter out and become lethargic, then why would one have to turn to conservatives for quietude and a respite? Finally, numerous authors (Schlesinger, 1949; Reichley, 1970; Forcey, 1961) mention the role of great leaders in the rise of reform movements. None however explain why such leaders would appear periodically. Actually, if we accept the appearance of great, innovative leaders as a consequence of a reform movement's ascendancy--as being called forth by the times, then we

might see great leaders as a natural part of the reform cycle, but as an effect not a cause. Finally, two possible causes for reform cycles have been considered, but rejected. The succession of generations is found lacking since the length of generations (i.e., the average time it takes for half the adult population to turnover) has nearly doubled over the last two centuries, but cycles have been vary stable around 16-17 years throughout this period (Schlesinger, 1939; 1949). Also, authors have been unable to identify any simple association between the business cycle and reform movements (Schlesinger, 1949).

The cycle of reform historians further believe that there is a strong progressive element in the oscillations. The periods of reform move society upwards in a liberal direction while the periods of reaction generally accept the reforms of the previous reformist surge. As a result, each reactionary period is essentially a plateau and each liberal period an upward incline. This of course fits in with the rest/action explanation of the reform cycle. Because liberalism moves forward during periods of reform and basically holds its own during reactions, society moves upward in a liberal direction. Each reform surge and each reactionary respite are higher than their respective prior counterpart. Three slight variations of this basic model are graphed in Figure 1.

The theory of reform cycles is attractive because of the analogies to such well-known cycles as night-and-day and the seasons and because it helps to explain the intricate meanderings of history. Yet in none of the literature is there anything close to proof that true repetitive cycles exist (as have been provided for the business cycle for example). One of the key tests of a valid scientific hypothesis is its ability to predict behavior. Using the observed length of reform cycles through 1931, Schlesinger in 1939

predicted a conservative phase starting in 1947 or 1948 and then in 1949 predicted:

We may expect the recession from liberalism which began in 1947 to last till 1962, with a possible margin of a year or two in one direction or the other. The next conservative epoch will then be due around 1978.

While not amounting to proof of a law of politics, three solid predictions in a row recommend further study of the reform cycle model.

To explore the reform cycle theory we examined 335 time trends during the post World War II period that involved questions that tapped the liberal/conservative continuum. (For details of the selection of these questions see Smith, 1982.) As Table 1 documents, on abortions, race relations, sexual morality, tolerance of social and political deviants, women's rights, and other topics support for liberalism increased. Overall 51 percent of the time series showed some shift in the liberal direction, 29 percent had a conservative tilt, and the remaining 20 percent were either constant or bounced around showing no net direction. Liberal and conservative trends both averaged 1.4% per annum, but liberal trends had a slightly stronger linear association with time (an average  $r^2$  with time of .62 for liberal trends and .54 for conservative trends).

This liberal edge was not constant through the post World War II period. While we do not currently have enough time trends to study in detail changes before 1960, we can compare trends before and after the early 1970s. A preliminary analysis of items that have readings both before and after the early seventies showed less liberal movement in the seventies and eighties than earlier. Nearly 90% of items with a liberal trend for the entire time series showed a lower slope in the seventies and eighties than earlier. Yet the seventies did not see a wholesale reversal of previous liberal gains. Very few trends reversed direction from the liberal to the conservative.



The two most common patterns were 1) for liberal trends to continue, but at a slower pace and 2) for liberal trends to be replaced with constant, no change trends. Figure 2 shows two racial trends that slowed their liberal advance (RACSCHOL - favoring one school system for all races and RACPRES - willingness to vote for a black president), one that seems to have reached a liberal plateau (RACMAR - opposing state laws prohibiting racial intermarriage), and one that is still moving upwards at an undiminished pace (RACSEG - neighborhood open housing). In Figure 3 we see examples of abortion and tolerance trends that further illustrate the shift from liberal trends to constant, no change patterns.

Overall this pattern fits the reform cycle model very well. There is a general liberal advancement and the conservative period is marked more by the slowing of liberal growth rather than by the reversal of liberal trends into a conservative direction.

The data also indicate that change was not uniform in all areas. In the areas of social control, anti-communism, religious attachment and beliefs, and, to a lesser extent, government spending there have been conservative trends. In other areas such as abortion and civil liberties there has been an end to liberal growth, but no conservative movement. Finally, in several areas (especially racial tolerance and feminism) support for liberal positions has continued to increase. These differences reflect the diversity of topics that we have hung on the liberal-conservative continuum. Students of the business cycle have long noted that particular industries will completely skip certain business cycles, go throughout the cycle especially early or late, or have much greater (or smaller) swings than the economy as a whole. These deviations from the general pattern are common and are due to special circumstances impacting on these industries. These deviations from the general pattern are of course of interest, but so is the general pattern itself.

Since our data, like Schlesinger's three predictions, seem to support the reform cycle model, we should continue to examine this hypothesis. One way is to extend the time series back into the Eisenhower years when a similar conservative period existed. While poll trends from the period prior to the mid-1960s are much skimpier than in more recent years, we have identified enough additional time series to move our analysis back to the forties with some precision. Second, modelling the changes in the time series to explain the individual and aggregate level forces that have fueled the trends (and particularly changes in the trends) would be important. In particular the application of cohort-education models should identify the role that political generations have played in the process. Finally, we should start to give more detailed attention to the mechanisms that may drive the periodicity in the reform movements. Consider the four following factors which have been offered by various authors as explanations for periodical, political patterns:

1. An alteration of rest and action - natural to humans and perhaps the movements and societies they create.
2. The accumulation of problems which cannot be handled in a steady, incremental fashion, but must be resolved in reformist surges.
3. The succession of political generations.
4. Societal equilibrium - reform movements eventually go too far and conservatives stand pat too long. The rational desires of the public keep moving both back towards some long term trend line that is established by basic socio-economic changes in society.

Whether one of these, some combination, or other factors accounts for a cycle of reform is unknown. We do not know if there's a real cycle to explain. But by developing these and possibly other theories and framing appropriate tests of their validity, we will be able to advance our understanding of history and social change in general and perhaps discover whether there are cycles of reform.

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TABLE 1  
SUMMARY OF TRENDS<sup>a</sup>

Item	Liberal Response	Years	Number of Points	Trend (change per annum)		
				Liberal Direction	Constant	Nonlinear
Abortions for defects	Allow	1962-1984	18	.0121		
Abortions for mother's health	Allow	1962-1984	17	.0059		
Abortions for unwanted pregnancy	Allow	1965-1984	15	.0205		
Abortions for poor	Allow	1962-1984	17	.0184		
Abortions for raped	Allow	1965-1984	12	.0075		
Abortions for unmarried	Allow	1965-1984	12	.0112		
Church attendance	Infrequent	1964-1984	12	.0093		
Ideal number of children	Fewer	1941-1983	28	.0092		
Communist teach college	Yes	1954-1984	9	.0146		
Atheist teach college	Yes	1954-1984	9	.0128		
Vote for woman president	Yes	1936-1983	20	.0106		
Woman working	Approve	1936-1983	13	.0126		
Marijuana	Legalize	1969-1984	13	.0083		
Hunting	Don't hunt	1959-1984	7	.0057		
Euthanasia	Approve	1947-1983	9	.0069		
Atheist book in library	Allow	1954-1984	10	.0102		
Communist book in library	Allow	1954-1984	10	.0123		
Gun ownership	No	1959-1984	22	.0029		
Birth control information	Permit	1959-1983	11	.0084		
Police hit abusive	No	1968-1984	8	.0061		
Pornography an outlet	Yes	1970-1984	8	.0162		
After-life	None	1944-1984	16	.0018		
Ban on school prayers	Support	1963-1983	7	.0083		
Premarital sex	Not always wrong	1972-1983	8	.0093		
Having black to dinner	Yes	1963-1984	12	.0138		
Object to school with a few blacks	No	1958-1983	20	.0074		
Object to school half black	No	1958-1983	20	.0114		
Object to school mostly black	No	1958-1983	20	.0038		
Neighborhood integrated	Yes	1966-1984	24	.0142		
Miscegenation laws	No	1963-1984	13	.0137		
Vote for black president	Yes	1958-1983	17	.0171		
Blacks shouldn't push	Disagree	1963-1984	13	.0094		
School integration	Yes	1942-1984	18	.0152		
Neighborhood segregation	Disagree	1963-1984	10	.0134		
Russia	Not dislike	1953-1983	16	.0051		
Sex education	Approve	1965-1983	10	.0087		
Atheist speak	Allow	1954-1984	10	.0109		
Communist speak	Allow	1954-1984	10	.0120		
Birth control information for teenagers	Allow	1974-1983	5	.0109		
Wiretapping	Disapprove	1969-1983	7	.0150		
Homosexual teach college	Allow	1973-1984	7	.0089		
Educational spending	Too little	1971-1984	22	.0033		
Black to home	Have had	1973-1984	7	.0067		
Open housing	Favor	1973-1984	7	.0130		
Homosexual to speak	Allow	1973-1984	7	.0060		
Spending for foreign aid	Too little	1971-1984	22	.0013		
School busing	Favor	1970-1983	11	.0035		
Women not suited for politics	Disagree	1974-1983	7	.0139		
Women should stay home	Disagree	1974-1983	6	.0143		
Homosexual book in library	Allow	1973-1984	7	.0044		
Police hit escapee	No	1968-1984	8	.0017		

<sup>a</sup>For details see Smith, 1982.

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Item	Liberal Response	Years	Number of Points	Trend (change per annum)		
				Liberal Direction	Constant Nonlinear	Conservative Direction
Women's rights	Equal roles	1972-1982	6	.0064		
Urban unrest	Solve cause	1968-1976	5	.0142		
Government guarantee jobs for all (5 points)	Yes	1956-1973	4	.0077		
Government Medical Care (5 points)	Agree	1964-1973	3	.0195		
Government Medical Care (agree/disagree)	Yes	1956-1973	3	.0132		
Government Medical Care (7 points)	Agree	1964-1973	3	.0265		
Government help blacks (agree/disagree)	Yes	1970-1978	6	.0040		
Desegregation vs. segregation	Agree	1964-1973	3	.0184		
Open housing	Desegregation	1964-1978	6	.0107		
Government help desegregate hotels/restaurants	Yes	1964-1976	5	.0195		
Busing	Yes	1964-1972	4	.0230		
Legal abortions	Favor	1972-1980	4	.0167		
Airline strikes	Always legal	1975-1981	6	.0071		
Religious preference	Allow	1966-1976	4	.0095		
Vote for atheist president	None	1963-1971	12	.0027		
Vote for Baptist president	Yes	1958-1978	4	.0105		
Bible	Yes	1958-1967	4	.0026		
Bible	Not inerrant	1963-1984	6	.0142		
Bible	Not inerrant	1964-1984	4	.0034		
Bible	Not inerrant	1952-1965	2	.0031		
Black neighbor	Not concerned	1963-1978	4	.0175		
Brown vs. Board of Education	Approve of	1954-1961	11	.0117		
Vote for Catholic president	Yes	1937-1978	19	.0104		
Wage/Price controls	For	1965-1971	10	.0168		
Wage/Price controls	For	1971-1973	4	.0764		
Wage/Price controls	For	1974-1981	10	.0566		
Price controls	For	1974-1979	4	.0091		
Outlaw Communists	No	1940-1942	3	.1047		
Change political system	Yes	1973-1979	3	.0085		
Ease divorce laws	Yes	1945-1966	2	.0020		
Ease divorce laws	Yes	1960-1978	2	.0127		
Vote for divorced president	Yes	1952-1978	8	.0055		
Return to draft	No	1977-1979	2	.0426		
Spending on drug control	Too much	1972-1976	3	.0221		
Drinks too much	Have problem	1974-1984	6	.0104		
Drinking in family	Have problem	1950-1981	8	.0030		
Popular election of President	For	1948-1980	16	.0030		
Environment protection	Do more	1973-1982	9	.0063		
Epileptics insane	No	1949-1979	5	.0075		
Epileptic friend of child	Allow	1949-1979	5	.0102		
Epileptic employment	For	1949-1979	5	.0101		
Ever watch X-rated movie	Yes	1971-1977	2	.0083		
Limit campaign contributions	Yes	1965-1972	6	.0039		
Women in politics	OK	1952-1972	2	.0053		
Business regulation	Regulate closely	1955-1961	2	.0100		
Blacks move into neighborhood	Not move out	1958-1978	7	.0133		
Nude plays	Not object	1969-1973	2	.0393		
Statehood for Hawaii	For	1940-1958	15	.0119		
Change political system	Yes	1939-1971	3	.0082		
Internationalist vs. isolationist	Internationalist	1974-1982	6	.0093		

TABLE 1(Continued)

Item	Liberal Response	Years	Number of Points	Trend (change per annum)		
				Liberal Direction	Constant Nonlinear	Conservative Direction
Feather-bedding	Allow	1943-1973	9	.0071		
Vote for Jewish president	Yes	1937-1978	10	.0112		
McCarthy	Dislike	1953-1955	16	.0671		
National service for women	Yes	1982-1984	2	.0139		
Consumer protection	Business greedy	1968-1979	7	.0085		
Spending for Social Security	Too little	1982-1984	2	.0237		
Draft	End	1974-1980	4	.0453		
Prohibition	Against	1936-1981	44	.0045		
Big business	Too big	1959-1981	12	.0125		
Big business	Too big	1959-1981	12	.0137		
Big business	Break-up	1959-1981	12	.0101		
Own railroads	Favor	1938-1973	2	.0015		
Nude Magazine	Not object	1969-1973	2	.0442		
Pray daily	No	1952-1984	6	.0091		
Premarital sex	Not wicked	1939-1943	2	.0085		
Premarital sex	Not wrong	1969-1973	2	.0521		
Business profits	Too much	1965-1981	9	.0185		
Business profits	Anti-business	1968-1981	13	.0314		
Business profits	Anti-business	1946-1979	10	.0079		
Child invites black friend home	Not object	1963-1978	5	.0146		
Hire whites first	No	1944-1972	5	.0189		
Blacks as intelligent	Yes	1942-1968	10	.0150		
Integrate streetcars/buses	Yes	1942-1970	5	.0114		
Integrate transportation	Yes	1957-1961	2	.0152		
Inter-racial marriage	OK	1958-1978	4	.0171		
Miscegenation	Legal	1965-1970	2	.0264		
Family inter-racial marriage	Not concerned	1963-1978	5	.0166		
Admit Red China to UN	Yes	1954-1971	19	.0141		
Open shops	favors	1941-1961	3	.0093		
Spending on military	Too much	1961-1973	2	.0277		
Spending on farms	Too little	1961-1973	3	.0169		
Spending on health	Too little	1961-1973	2	.0070		
Church attendance	Never	1970-1982	6	.0033		
Church attendance	Never	1952-1968	8	.0017		
Spending on space	Too much	1961-1973	3	.0273		
World problems	Concerned	1956-1960	3	.0166		
Free speech	Favor	1943-1954	4	.0144		
Teacher's strike	Allow	1965-1979	6	.0062		
Topless waitress	Not object	1969-1973	2	.0390		
Quit UN if Red China joins	No	1955-1971	11	.0124		
Union shop	Favor	1939-1949	3	.0130		
Lower vote to 18	Yes	1939-1970	25	.0098		
Speeches against democracy	Not forbid	1940-1976	4	.0078		
Speeches against democracy	Allow	1940-1976	4	.0085		
Suicide if terminal	Approve	1977-1983	4	.0165		
Black neighbor of same SES	Not object	1942-1972	11	.0137		
Reborn opposite sex	Like to	1946-1975	3	.0043		
Catholic/Protestant marriage	Approve	1968-1978	2	.0104		
Talk against Jews	Not heard	1940-1959	15	.0264		
Jew/Non-Jew marriage	Approve	1968-1978	2	.0103		
Open shop	Against	1946-1949	2	.0212		
Home safe/secure	Yes	1972-1982	5	.0030		
Women in politics	Approve	1974-1982	3	.0141		



TABLE 1 (Continued)

Item	Liberal Response	Years	Number of Points	Trend (change per annum)			
				Liberal Direction	Constant	Nonlinear	Conservative Direction
Women work if few jobs	Approve	1945-1977	2	.0080			
Socialist teach college	Allow	1954-1974	4	.0126			
Direct election of president	For	1948-1980	16	.0030			
Socialist book in library	Allow	1954-1974	4	.0184			
Socialist make speech	Allow	1954-1974	4	.0095			
Militarist teach in college	Allow	1976-1984	5	.0068			
Militarist make speech	Allow	1976-1984	5	.0046			
Poll tax	Against	1940-1953	6	.0065			
NAACP	Favorable towards	1965-1973	3	.0206			
Universal military training	Approve	1946-1966	9	.0031			
Strikes by police	Allow	1965-1981	6	.0045			
Spending for welfare	Too little	1971-1984	22	.0031			
Blacks move next door	Not move	1958-1978	7	.0175			
Religion the answer	No	1957-1981	3	.0084			
Religious training for child	Not want	1952-1978	3	.0035			
Importance of religion	Not important	1952-1984	8	.0068			
Religious training	Had none	1952-1978	3	.0053			
Church attendance	Not last week	1939-1984	72	.0004			
Spending on crime	Too much	1972-1976	3	.0201			
Homosexual relations	Not always wrong	1973-1984	7			X	
Police hit murderer	No	1968-1984	8			X	
Pornography	For adults	1973-1984	7			X	
Abortions (72 Wording)	Never forbidden	1972-1978	3			X	
Compulsory arbitration	Don't arbitrate	1967-1972	4			X	
Religious preference	None	1972-1984	12			X	
Wage Controls	For	1974-1979	4			X	
Equal pay for sexes	For	1954-1962	2			X	
ERA	For	1977-1982	2			X	
Flouride	For	1952-1956	3			X	
National service for men	Yes	1982-1984	2			X	
Premarital sex	Not lose respect	1950-1953	2			X	
Premarital sex	Not wrong	1937-1959	2			X	
Read Bible last month	Not read	1939-1943	3			X	
Sex education	Teach	1943-1951	2			X	
Spending on roads	Too little	1961-1973	3			X	
Youth curfew	Oppose	1958-1965	2			X	
Suicide if dishonored	Approve	1977-1983	4			X	
Suicide if tired of living	Approve	1977-1983	4			X	
Change gender	Like to	1955-1970	3			X	
Racist make speech	Allow	1976-1984	5			X	
Racist teach in college	Allow	1976-1984	5			X	
Unionshop	Not open	1946-1949	2			X	
Spending for colleges	Too little	1972-1976	3			X	
Spending on welfare	Too little	1972-1976	3			X	
Political ideology	Like to	1972-1982	8				X
Police hitting	No	1968-1984	8				X
Party identification	Democratic	1956-1984	25				X
Police hit assailant	No	1968-1984	8				X
Extramarital sex	Not always wrong	1970-1984	9				X
Spending for crime control	Too much	1971-1984	22				X
Spending for drug addiction	Too little	1971-1984	22				X
Spending for blacks	Too little	1973-1984	11				X
X-rated movie	Seen	1973-1984	7				X

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Item	Liberal Response	Years	Number of Points	Trend (change per annum)			
				Liberal Direction	Constant	Nonlinear	Conservative Direction
Civilian Conservation Corp	For	1957-1976	7			X	
Birth control from clinics	For	1940-1947	4			X	
Alcohol	Uses	1939-1984	30			X	
Drunkenness	Increasing	1938-1958	5			X	
ERA	For	1975-1982	6			X	
Free press	For	1943-1953	4			X	
God	Believe in	1944-1967	7			X	
State lotteries	For	1936-1964	7			X	
Metric system	Adopt	1965-1977	5			X	
National presidential primary	For	1952-1981	14			X	
Public utility strike	Allow	1946-1947	5			X	
Read Bible last year	Not read	1942-1978	6			X	
Religious influence	Not increasing	1957-1983	16			X	
Railroad strike	Approve	1966-1981	6			X	
Women wear shorts	Approve	1939-1961	4			X	
Socialist paper	Permit	1956-1957	3			X	
Spending on education	Too little	1961-1973	3			X	
World problems	Concerned	1968-1980	4			X	
Universal military training	Anti	1945-1947	6			X	
Spending on UN	Too little	1972-1976	3			X	
Work with other nations	Yes	1953-1969	4			X	
Quit UN	No	1951-1982	9			X	
Suicide if bankrupt	Approve	1977-1983	4			X	
Militarist book in library	Allow	1976-1984	5			X	
Racist book in library	Allow	1976-1984	5			X	
Abortion for any reason	Allow	1977-1984	6			X	
Closed shop	Approve	1939-1949	7			X	
Medical care	Public	1973-1979	8			X	
Divorce laws	Easier	1968-1983	8			X	
Getting ahead	Luck/other	1973-1984	7			X	
Federal aid to schools (agree/disagree)	Agree	1964-1973	3			X	
Spending for arms	Too much	1971-1984	22			X	
Spending on water pollution	Too little	1972-1976	3			X	
Government guarantee jobs for all (7 points)	Yes	1972-1982	8				-.0069
Government help blacks (5 points)	Agree	1956-1973	4				-.0040
Government help blacks (7 points)	Yes	1970-1982	8				-.0048
Spending for military bases	Too much	1972-1976	3				-.0149
Return to draft	No	1980-1984	5				-.0971
Housing of elderly	In children's home	1957-1984	8				-.0089
Gun registration	Favor	1959-1984	19				-.0012
Pornography informs	Agree	1970-1984	8				-.0021
Pornography attacks morals	Disagree	1970-1984	8				-.0047
Communism	Not worst government	1973-1984	7				-.0144
Hitting	Disapprove	1968-1984	8				-.0048
Hit robber	Disapprove	1968-1984	8				-.0033
Spending for cities	Too little	1971-1984	22				-.0045
Spending for environment	Too little	1971-1984	22				-.0050
Spending for health	Too little	1971-1984	22				-.0041
Spending for space	Too much	1971-1984	23				-.0237
Capital punishment	Oppose	1953-1984	29				-.0031
Pistol	Doesn't own	1959-1984	15				-.0041
Pornography causes rape	No	1970-1984	8				-.0049

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Item	Liberal Response	Years	Number of Points	Trend (change per annum)		
				Liberal Direction	Constant	Nonlinear
Taxes Not too high	1947-1984	25			-.0030	
Hit women beater	No	1968-1984	8			-.0066
Hit demonstrator	No	1968-1984	8			-.0008
Courts Not tougher	1965-1984	17			-.0144	
United Nations	Remain in	1951-1983	16			-.0026
Federal aid to schools (5 points)	Yes	1956-1973	4			-.0046
Rights of criminals	Protect	1970-1978	5			-.0082
Keep utilities/housing private	Disagree	1956-1973	4			-.0053
Government too powerful	No	1964-1980	8			-.0194
Federal government help school integration	Yes	1964-1978	7			-.0126
Compulsory arbitration	Don't arbitrate	1965-1967	3			-.0179
Spending for air pollution	Too little	1972-1976	3			-.0225
Alaska's statehood	For	1949-1958	12			-.0060
Birchers	Dislike	1965-1973	3			-.0072
Spending for blacks	Too little	1972-1976	3			-.0199
Regulate business	More	1961-1966	4			-.0144
Cloture	For	1947-1964	4			-.0083
Cloture	For	1947-1964	6			-.0056
Wage/Price controls	For	1950-1965	6			-.0254
Wage/Price controls	For	1974-1980	2			-.0067
Outlaw Communists	No	1941-1950	9			-.0103
Tax more or cut more	Tax more	1975-1982	6			-.0063
Current justice deters crime	Yes	1967-1982	6			-.0058
ERA	For	1975-1981	5			-.0084
Flouride	For	1966-1972	3			-.0054
Business regulation	Better off	1966-1981	4			-.0110
Business regulation	Not too far	1964-1981	4			-.0133
KKK	Dislike	1965-1979	4			-.0077
Spending for mass transport	Too little	1972-1976	3			-.0164
Media strikes	Allow	1953-1966	3			-.0053
Metric system	Adopt	1975-1981	5			-.0113
Consumer protection	More effort	1974-1982	9			-.0285
Consumer protection	More regulation	1970-1981	3			-.0124
Outlaw pistols	For	1959-1981	5			-.0085
Own banks	Favor	1936-1955	17			-.0136
Own electric companies	Favor	1937-1955	21			-.0175
Own coal mines	Favor	1936-1953	12			-.0047
Own railroads	Favor	1936-1955	20			-.0063
Find all communists	Protect innocent	1953-1973	3			-.0300
Government jobs for communists	Allow	1948-1950	3			-.0620
Register communists	No	1945-1953	4			-.0149
Register communists	No	1948-1950	3			-.0529
Communists talk on radio	Yes	1946-1963	7			-.0096
Communists talk on radio	Yes	1943-1948	3			-.0250
Society's direction	Wrong way	1973-1983	10			-.0146
Spending for roads	Too little	1972-1976	3			-.0213
Grace at meals	Doesn't say	1947-1962	2			-.0125
Spending for slums	Too little	1972-1976	3			-.0303
Socialist paper	Permit	1943-1954	4			-.0088
Spending on foreign aid	Too little	1961-1973	3			-.0032
Taft-Hartley Law	Repeal	1947-1948	3			-.0486
Taft-Hartley Law	Do away with	1948-1952	4			-.0228

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Item	Liberal Response	Years	Points	Trend (change per annum)		
				Number of Liberal Direction	Constant Nonlinear	Conservative Direction
Taft-Hartley Law	Disapprove	1947-1949	4			-.0893
Teacher's strike	Allow	1970-1981	7			-.0031
Unions help	Yes	1966-1976	5			-.0068
Union regulation	Too strict	1948-1976	13			-.0019
Union shop	Favor	1965-1967	5			-.0184
Religious attachment	Not strong	1974-1984	9			-.0050
Government do more	Agree	1975-1984	3			-.0123
Government pay for medical care	Agree	1975-1984	3			-.0059
Special treatment for Blacks	Agree	1975-1984	3			-.0265
Government help poor	Agree	1975-1984	3			-.0109
Universal military training	Approve	1942-1945	12			-.0076
Spending for parks	Too little	1972-1976	3			-.0248
Universal military training	Anti	1938-1947	12			-.0353
Universal military training	Anti	1947-1950	7			-.0214
Federal aid to schools	Favor	1955-1961	5			-.0193
Business regulation	Not enough	1942-1946	4			-.0128
Political ideology	Liberal	1973-1984	10			-.0069
National service	Favor	1969-1981	6			-.0071
Work if rich	No	1969-1984	8			-.0067
Active in world affairs	Yes	1945-1983	25			-.0025
Strikes by firemen	Approve	1975-1981	5			-.0196
Strikes by police	Allow	1974-1981	6			-.0156
Redistribute wealth	For	1973-1984	5			-.0087
Afraid to go out	Yes	1965-1984	17			-.0067
Spending for military	Too much	1960-1983	17			-.0069

FIGURE 3:  
Trends on Abortion and Tolerance




FIGURE 2:  
Trends on Race Relations

