Counting Flocks and Lost Sheep:

Trends in Religious Preference Since World War II

By

Tom W. Smith

National Opinion Research Center
University of Chicago

GSS Social Change Report No. 26

February, 1988

Revised January, 1991

This research was done for the General Social Survey project directed by James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith. The project is funded by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. SES87-18467.

Over the last several decades, major changes have been occurring in the religious preference of the American public. Because the changes have been of the slow-and-steady type, they have attracted relatively little attention. In addition, the

tracking of these trends have been hampered by various factors: the complexity of religious preference to due the splitting and merging of denominations, confusion between like-named faiths, and related definitional matters; the lack of government statistics (the First Amendment has been interpreted to forbid the Census from collecting information on religious affiliation and, as we shall see below, the only time that the Census asked affiliation was in a 1957 Current Population Survey); and a maze of methodological artifacts, both within and between survey organizations that have measured religious preference. After the definitional issues are sorted out and the artifacts weeded out as best as we can, the basic trends are reasonably apparent although some important details remain uncertain.

We can also get a handle on the demographic processes (natural increase, net migration, and religious mobility) that produce the basic trends. While a complete model of the population growth of religions is not possible from the existing data, it is possible to compare and contrast how these various factors have contributed to the changes in religious preferences.

Trends in Religious Preference

Cross-Sectional Surveys

Tables 1 and 2 show the three best time series available on religious preference with data from Gallup, the Survey Research Center's (SRC) American National Election studies (including some ancillary Minor Election studies), and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). As the table notes and question wording listings make clear, there are many variations in how these preferences were measured, both across and within houses, and, as we explore the data further, we will discuss additional variations in measurement.

Table 3 shows the basic trends reported by each series. In terms of direction, there is complete agreement. Gallup, SRC/Election, and NORC show significant increases in the proportion Catholic and None and significant declines in the proportion Protestant and Jewish. NORC and SRC/Election show significant variation in the proportion Other, but with no net direction or trend, while Gallup shows a significant increase in Other.

1 The house time series do show some disagreement on the magnitude of the change, with Gallup and SRC/Election showing greater Protestant decline and more Catholic and No Religion growth than the NORC series. Overall SRC/Election and NORC agree the best on the average proportions, while SRC/Election and Gallup match the closest on slopes. Figure 1, showing trends in the proportion Protestant, indicates that NORC tended to match the Gallup time

series until the mid-seventies while the SRC/Election series showed more Protestants that the other two. Since the mid-1970s, NORC and SRC/Election have generally followed one another while both exceeded the Gallup figures. The Gallup and SRC/Election series remain roughly parallel throughout the period. This difference is also indicated by the better fit that Gallup and SRC/Election have between the proportion Protestant and time (r2s of .84-.85 for Gallup and .73 for SRC/Election) than NORC has (r2=.54). The similarity of the Gallup and SRC/Election trends might be interpreted to mean that they are providing more consistent (and thus better) estimates of the changing proportion Protestant. However, the differences in the average proportion Protestant show that consistent differences separate them (Gallup = .621; SRC/Election = .692) and that at best, these houses agree only on the relative level of change. They corroborate one another only if we accept that a systematic, but consistent bias is operating. To try to determine the best estimate of the trend in the proportion Protestant (as well as for the other religious categories), we 1) compare all three series to the 1957 Current Population Survey, 2) closely examined differences in measurement methods, and 3) used multivariate regression to try to control for the differences resulting from measurement variation.

Table 4 compares Gallup, SRC/Election, and NORC to the Census. Both because of its large sample size (35,000 households covering over 75,000 adults) and the excellence of its field and sample procedures, one would normally accept the CPS as the best available estimate. By this standard, NORC does the best with Gallup next and SRC/Election furthest from the mark (Table 4, Census vs. ____). One might question, however, whether the Census actually is the best estimate, since it had no experience in collecting religious data.

The second procedure was to look for measurement variation in and between the time series. Two approaches were used. First, the measurement attributes of each of the data points (e.g., question wording, coding procedures, sample technique, etc.) were examined and likely sources of variation were identified both from the small literature on religious measurement and the much larger general literature on survey measurement. Second, the data points were examined for outliers and when such deviations were detected, the measurement properties of the surveys in question were examined for sources of variation. These two procedures identified several sources of measurement variation involving 1) category definitions, 2) question wording, 3) coding, 4) sampling, 5) weighting, and 6) house.

Category Definitions

Following the practice employed by the vast majority of

surveys, we classified major religions as Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Other, and None (no religion). Protestant was defined broadly to include all post-Reformation Christian churches, including such denominations as Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Roman Catholic excludes such churches as the Polish National Catholic Church and the Old Catholic Churches. Jewish included all branches of traditional Judaism (e.g. Hasidic, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform). Other covered pre-Reformation, non-Catholic churches such as the Eastern Orthodox and Coptic, non-Christian faiths (except Jewish), and miscellaneous other religious and quasi-religious affiliations. None included agnostics, atheists, non-believers, those with no religious preference, and similar designations. Most surveys either followed this classification or their categories could be collapsed into these groups.

In a number of instances, however, there was some slippage between the Protestant and Other group with some smaller and some less traditional Protestant groups being coded in with Other. Such occurred on NORC survey 4239 (1976), 5051 (1973-74), and partially on GSS73. Similar differences may have occurred on GSS72, NORC4179 (1973), and NORC876 (1966), but no coding documentation exists to confirm that the suspiciously larger proportion of Others results from an expanded definition of Other. Similarly we suspect that the large variation in the proportions Other on Gallup (especially between the 4% in 1976 and the 1% in 1978) results from definitional shifts, although we found no documentation indicating a change.2 Some similar slip page may occur between the Roman Catholic and Other categories, especially involving the Eastern Rite Catholics, but we found no direct evidence of any variation from this source and an analysis comparing questions that used "Roman Catholic" vs. those that used the broader "Catholic" showed no difference (see discussion below). In sum, in at least a few situations, and perhaps in others, the Protestant proportion was deflated by the coding of some sects into Other. In those cases where we can study the problem, the net loss seems to be between .01 and .02, although it might go as high as .03.

Question Wording

Over two dozen different question wordings were used in the Gallup, NORC, SRC/Election, and CPS surveys. We examined those variations and came up with seven variations that might have influenced religious preference. The first, and probably most obvious difference, is between questions that ask about church membership rather than the broader religious preference or affiliation. Membership covers a notably smaller segment of the adult population (see discussion below), does not always match preference (Roof, 1980), and is not necessarily proportional to

preference. Because of these differences and because only three of our data points involved this variation, we have excluded membership questions from our analysis.

Second, we compare questions that asked "preference" (e.g., "Is your religious preference Protestant..."), that simply asked for one's religion (e.g., "Are you Protestant..." and "What is your religion?"), and that were unstructured, giving only a topic and some precoded categories, but no question wording (e.g., "Religion" and "Religion of Respondent"). Work by Taylor and McCourt (1976) suggests that religious preferences may differ from actual affiliation, although their evidence is open to alternative interpretations.3

Third, we examined whether the mentioning of specific religions (e.g. Is your reference Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or something else?") led to differences with questions that did not mention specific religions (e.g., "May I ask your religion?" and "What is your religious preference?"). Presumably the unmentioned versions solicit many more responses of specific denominations (e.g. Episcopalian) that have to be coded by the interviewer, while in the mentioned version the respondent usually does the coding. This may lead to some differences between the Protestant and Other categories and possibly between these categories and None.

Fourth, we looked at questions that referred to "Catholics" vs. "Roman Catholics" (excluding questions that did not mention religions). Here the anticipation was that Catholic might attract more responses than Roman Catholic.

Fifth, among questions that mention religions, we considered whether None was mentioned as an option (e.g., "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant...or no religion?" and the more ambiguous "Is your religious preference Protestant...or something else?") or not mentioned (e.g. "Is your religious preference Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?" and "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant...or some other religion?"). We expected more Nones when this category was explicitly offered.

Sixth, we expected that questions that mentioned only the three major religions (e.g., "Is your religious preference Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?) would receive fewer Others than those that either mentioned Other explicitly (e.g., "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion?") or those that mentioned no religions (e.g., "May I ask your religion?"). In turn, we expected that the explicit mentions would yield more Others than wordings with no mentions.

Finally, in a comparison that was suggested by the pattern of responses, we looked at two question wordings (each used only once) that emphasized the present ("What is your own religious preference now?" and "What is your religious preference at this time?" rather than using a general, non- specific time reference (e.g., "Are you

a Protestant..." and "What is your religious preference?"). The questions that emphasize the present would of course tend to capture short-term affiliations rather than previous and perhaps more latent affiliations. In particular, this seems to influence the religious preference indicated by lapsed practitioners.

Coding

In general, coding is simple and straight-forward since precodes existed for the five major categories. The only important issue is whether a separate precode was provided for None or if this category was only coded from verbatim remarks. We would expect the proportion None to be reduced if it was not precoded.

Sampling

Broadly speaking, all of the samples used can be divided into two categories: probability sampling with quotas and full-probability sampling. The Gallup surveys are all quota (block quota since 1950), the CPS and SRC/Election surveys are full-probability, and NORC is a mixture of both. Sampling theory indicates that full-probability designs are superior to block quotas, yielding more reliable estimates, although empirical comparisons (Stephenson, 1979) typically find little differences between the two.

To assess the differences between block quota and full-probability samples, we used the experimental comparisons conducted on the 1975 and 1976 GSSs. In both years, half of the cases were fielded as block quota and half were full-probability. Table 5 compares the weighted and unweighted distributions for these two experiments combined. Both distributions show significant differences with block quota samples yielding more Catholics and Nones, while full-probability samples report more Protestants and Jews. This difference basically has significance for trends only in the case of NORC, since SRC/Election and Gallup remain consistently either full probability or block quota. In addition, it offers a possible explanation for some of the house differences that we will be discussing below.

Weighting

Except for the CPS, all surveys examined selected one respondent per household, thus by design underrepresenting people in households with a large number of adults. To give all members of the household population an equal probability of selection, one must weight by the number of eligible respondents in the household. Typically, this adjustment makes little difference (Stephenson, 1978), but for variables that are correlated with the number of

adults in households, such as marital status, it can have a notable impact.

In fact, weighting actually has little impact on the religious distributions. It slightly reduces the proportion Protestant (from an unweighted 63.8% to a weighted 63.0% for the pooled 1972-1987 GSSs), slightly increases Catholics (from 25.4% to 26.5%) and has no impact (0.1%) on Other, Jews, and Nones. Minor as it is, the Protestant/Catholic shift appears to be real, replicating both across time and sampling methods. The SRC/Election figures are all unweighted. The Gallup figures are not explicitly documented, but at least since the early 1960s, published Gallup figures are usually weighted, although not with a number of adults weight (Gaertner, 1976). NORC figures in Table 2 are unweighted except for the 73-74 Continuous National Surveys (which utilize both a post-stratification and a number of adults weight). In addition, weighted figures were available for the GSS. Since weighting is generally consistent within house, it has little impact on time series (remember that it has little impact in general). At a later point, however, we will employ an adjustment that will convert NORC unweighted, block quota samples into estimated levels of weighted full-probability surveys and compare these with the weighted GSSs as an alternative measure of the time series.

House Effects

In addition to the measurement differences that we can separate and compare, there are differences that are intrinsic to the individual organizations ("houses"). These cover a host of house specific attributes such as the sample frame used, interviewing style, verification procedures, and so forth. We can not individually analyze these factors and instead are left with treating them as a composite house effect.4

Multivariate Analysis of Religious Preference

Our basic approach was to introduce the measurement variables discussed in the previous sections to see how controlling for them affected the relationship between time and religious preference.5 The dependent variable in each regression was the proportion with each of the five religious preferences. We tried introducing year and month as separate variables, but since month was never significantly related to any of the religious preferences, we ultimately decimalized month and combined it with year in a single, linear measure of time. We also combined the measures of the wording and coding of None into one variable that distinguished measurements that facilitated or promoted None from other wordings and codings. Finally, since the variables that distinguished between Catholic and Roman Catholic and between mentioning Others

and not mentioning them never were significantly related in any of the models we tested, we dropped them from the final model.6 That left the following variables:

1) Time (year and month of survey)
2) House (NORC vs. Not NORC)
3) Sample (Full Probability vs. Block Quota)
4) "Preference" (preference/is-are/no wording)
5) Religions Mentioned (list of religions read/not read)
6) None (High=None mentioned; Medium=not mentioned, but precoded; Low=not mentioned, not precoded)

Table 6 shows that the proportion Protestant has declined with time. It is higher when the organization is not NORC and when the question does not mention religions, lower when the question promotes Nones, and unrelated to sample or "preference" wording. The association with Nones is a bit tentative however since the relationship was significant in only two of four models when this variable was constructed in different ways. Next, we see that the proportion Catholic has increased over time. It is higher when block quota sampling is used and when Nones are promoted, lower when the organization is not NORC and when religions are mentioned, and related to "preference." As in the Protestant case the relationship with None is questionable because it is not robust across alternative formulations. Third, the proportion Jewish decreases over time. It is higher when the question does not ask for "preference", lower when religions are mentioned, and unrelated to organization, sample, or the measurement of Nones. Fourth, the proportion Other shows no significant relationship with time. It is higher when Nones are not promoted, lower when "preference" is used and when the organization is NORC, and unassociated with sample or mentioning religions. The sample and preference association vary in their significance among models, however, and the r2 is the lowest for Other of all religious affiliations. Finally, the proportion None has grown over time. It is higher when the question does not ask for "preference" and when Nones are promoted and is unrelated to organization, sample, or mention wording. Only the time and None measurement variables are robust however.

Overall, we see that each of the measurement variables has the influence on the religious preferences expected. NORC, primarily in the fifties and sixties, got more Protestants and fewer Catholics than SRC/Election for house reasons, net of the sample and other measurement differences that we have been able to control for. Block quota samples capture more Catholics, a result that is consistent with the experimental differences reported earlier. The use of the "preferences" wording decreases the Jewish proportion and may have an impact on Others. We believe that the former

association may result from the differential response of cultural or ethnic Jews vs. religious Jews to religion questions. Similarly, the Jewish proportion is higher when "Jewish" is explicitly mentioned. We believe that ethnic Jews who do not practice their religion are more inclined to report a "Jewish" affiliation when their group is mentioned and when the question avoids phrases like "religious preference" (Lazerwitz and Harrison, 1980 and Dashefsky and Shapiro, 1974). Without these versions, some of this group falls into the None category. Questions that mention religions also attract more Catholics and decrease the number of Protestants. The attraction of Catholics is consistent with the previously reported results that suggest there is a group of lapsed Catholics who prefer their original Catholic religion, but who, because of differences with the Catholic Church over its marriage and/or divorce doctrines, are not current Catholics. Last, we see the wordings and codings that promote Nones significantly increase those mentioned, while decreasing the mentions of Catholics and Others. The Table 6 suggests that Protestants are also increased by the promotion of Nones, but, as noted above, neither this association nor the association with Catholics is especially robust.

The impact of these measurement variations on religious trends can be illustrated by comparing the unstandardized b's when only time and religious affiliations are regressed with the slopes in the models described above. Table 7 shows that Protestant decline and Catholic growth were underestimated because of the measurement variation. While the uncontrolled slopes (changes in proportion per annum) show a divergence of .0038 between Protestants (-.00238) and Catholic (+.00104), the controlled slopes indicate that the true level of divergence was about .00418 or about 24% greater. This difference comes mostly from the changes in the Catholic slope on NORC studies (uncontrolled = +.00121 vs. controlled = +.00195). Changes between the controlled and uncontrolled rate of change for Jews, Others, and Nones are relatively minor. One can interpret this to mean the measurement variation distorted the true change in religious preference overtime and that this distortion has been greater for NORC than for SRC/Election. This suggests that the raw NORC time trends presented earlier may be less valid than the more similar SRC/Election and Gallup trends.7 This analysis does not address the issue as to which series comes closest to the true values and does not directly counter the indication from the CPS that the NORC surveys most closely matched the Census.

Counting Lost Sheep

Because of its relevance to the grand secularization theory, probably no change in religious preference is so scrutinized as the change in the proportion without any religious preference, the

Nones. Secularization theory contends that religious behaviors and beliefs wane with modernization (Hammond, 1985; Hadden, 1987, Wuthnow, 1976). While widely accepted among social scientists, secularization theory has been challenged by some researchers who argue that little empirical evidence exists for this predicted social change (Greeley, 1972; 1989; Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick, 1983) and that religion fulfills crucial human needs that cannot be satisfied by secular society (Greeley, 1972; Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). Since the proportion None is a solid (but single) indicator of the degree of secularization and its trends, scholars have tracked it to access the validity of the secularization theory (Root and McKinney, 1987; Greeley and Hout, 1987; Glenn, 1987). Unfortunately, as some of the previous discussion has indicated, determining whether the proportion without any religious preference has been increasing is hampered by muddled measurement. Changes in question wordings and coding procedures have led to many artificial shifts in distributions. Both NORC and the Election studies have altered their wordings so that the wordings used in recent years are more likely to encourage "nones" than older wordings (Tables 8 and 9). Comparison of Election studies in 1966-1972 and NORC studies in 1976 suggest that adding a phrase covering those without religious preference (either "or something else" or "no religion") inflates "nones" by 1.5-2.0 percentage points. Similarly, the inclusion of a precoded category for "none" also increases their percentage. In 1945-46 and 1963, the addition of a precode appears to have significantly increased the percentage of "nones" on NORC surveys and increases on the Election studies in the percent "none" occurred between 1972 and 1974, when a precode was added, and between 1976 and 1978, when the precode category was broadened. Only the lack of an increase in the percent "none" in 1958 questions the impact of a precode. The shifts in question wording and precodes, put into serious question the otherwise impressive increase in "none" recorded in the Election studies from around 1-1.5% in 1956-1960 to 9% in 1982. Except for the rise from 1.2% in 1960 to 3.1% in 1968, all of the increases have occurred between surveys when the notable changes in question wording or precoding were made. This does not mean that no real changes in the % None have occurred since 1968, since the confounding of time and measurement makes either a possible explanation for the changes, but a measurement artifact explanation for all change since 1968 in the Election studies can not be ruled out.8

From the inspection of the three series (NORC, Gallup, and SRC/Election), we draw some general consensus on the true change in Nones:

1) Some traces exist on all three series of a small decline in the proportion from the late forties to the mid-fifties. The mid-to-late fifties show the lowest level of Nones

for each house over the entire period.

2) The proportion None then began to rise in the late fifties and early sixties and this growth accelerated in the late sixties and early seventies.

3) The proportion None then apparently leveled off in the 1970s (NORC finding a constant fit from 1974 on and SRC with no change from 1978 on). However, Gallup shows a continued growth in Nones in the 1970s and 1980s that is only marginally slower than in 1950s and 1960s (.0022 per annum for 1952-1978 and .0020 for 1978+).

4) The rate of increase during the sixties and seventies was about .0025 (NORC) to .0035 (Gallup) per annum. Given the very small starting base of Nones, this translated in a two to four fold increase.

5) Successive cohorts in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s had more Nones. The levelling-off in the 1980s was at least partly a result of the aging of the baby boomers. Aging in general reduces Nones and as the baby boomers moved from their 20s to their 30s and 40s the aging effect and the changing age structure canceled out the boost to Nones from cohort succession (Greeley, 1989; Glenn, 1987).9

Trends in Major Protestant Denominations

Table 10 shows changes in denominational affiliations. For each of the houses, the time series are shorter and less dense than for major religions, SRC/Election starts in 1960, NORC has a first point in 1950, but the second observation does not appear until 1963, and Gallup begins in 1967. (And for the CPS the only point is in 1957). Categorical designation is also more of a problem than with the four major religions. Each house differed somewhat in what denominations they coded and these conventions all shifted over time. In addition, there is the problem of distinguishing confusing denominations with similar names and difficulties in implementing intended distinctions. For example, Gallup notes possible confusion between Southern Baptists and Baptists living in the South and between the United Church of Christ and the Churches of Christ (Gallup Report No. 259). SRC/Election has never been successful in separating the Missouri Synod Lutherans from other Lutherans and had a similar problem with the Southern Baptists until an explicit follow-up question was added in 1972. NORC, in turn, has had a problem in separating the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) from similarly named denominations and generic Christians. (For a more complete discussion of this

problem, see Smith, 1990b.)

Despite these problems, there seems to be less inter-house variation on the distribution of major Protestant denominations than on major religions. We looked in detail at the difference in 1964, 1970, 1976, 1982, and 1984 (to take advantage of the more detailed codes used by Gallup and NORC in the last year) and found that for the major denominations, the extreme difference between the three houses rarely exceeded 2 percentage points. When it did reach as high as 4 percentage points, the percentages reported for the outlier was usually a bit out-of-line from its own intra-house series. In addition, there seems to be little pattern to the differences with one house reporting slightly more of a particular denomination one year and slightly less in another year. In brief, there seems to be very little house bias in the distribution of major Protestant denominations. The one exception is the low percent that Gallup reports for Presbyterians in 1984-1986 which are about half of the NORC and SRC figures and also inconsistent with higher Gallup figures after 1986 (Table 11).

Except for Presbyterians, the three house time series also agree closely on trends. They basically show that Baptists have held their own while all other major denominations - Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians have shown slight-to-moderate declines (Table 11). Gallup however shows a much steeper (3 times +) drop-off for Presbyterians than either NORC or SRC. Of these the declining proportion of Methodists is the largest. They have fallen by 4 percentage points since the early 1960s. Church membership figures that we discuss later on suggest that the decline is due to falling membership in the United Methodist Church.

Next, we turn to changes in theological orientation based on the classification of denominations as Fundamentalist, Moderate, or Liberal. This procedure is difficult (see Smith, 1990b for details) and can be accomplished with reasonable accuracy only when fine-grain, denominational codes are available. That eliminates all available Gallup points prior to 1979, SRC/Election studies before 1972, and all but two NORC studies prior to 1984. Table 12A shows that for the 1964-1989 NORC series, there was a significant linear component with an annual increase of 0.3 percentage points in the percent Fundamentalist. This increase comes almost entirely from the 1964 point. If that point is eliminated, then the 1967-1989 trend is constant. Similarly, when GSS data are analyzed for 1972-1983 and for 1984-1989, there are no significant variation in the Fundamentalist/Liberal distribution. Likewise, the SRC/Election series for 1972-1988 fits a constant, no change model. We examined the 1964 point in some detail and while we found some possible reasons for an undercount of Fundamentalists, we were unable to blame the shifts clearly on measurement artifacts. Thus, while we have little reason to believe that there was an increase

in Fundamentalists since the late 1960s, there may have been some growth earlier in the sixties. This pattern flys in the face of the much ballyhooed talk of a New Christian Right, the rise of the Moral Majority, and the growth of televangelists. It is consistent, however, with the fact that the proportion of Americans believing in the inerrancy of the Bible declined from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies and has remained stable since (Smith, 1990c).

Trends in Religious Preference: A Cohort Approach

A second survey-based method for studying the changing religious affiliation of the American people is to ask contemporary respondents what religion they were raised in. Since this is a fixed attribute (one's religion, as we shall see later on, can change, but the religion of origin can not actually change), retrospective reports across different birth cohort can provide a measure of the religion of one's family of origin and more indirectly of parents and even approximately of adults in general since the beginning of this century (Davis and Smith, 1980; Smith and Klaeser, 1983). In addition, since these retrospective reports code actual denominations, they permit a more detailed tracing of changes in religious preferences. While potentially promising both to extend the time series of religious affiliations backwards past the late-1940s and to provide an alternative measure of changes in more recent years, this technique has its limitations and difficulties.

Recall of religion raised in can be errant because of various factors. First, the recall period averages about 30 years and can be over 60 years for the older respondents. Given the long period involved, memory decay could be notable. Test/Retest agreement on recall demographics averages 92% on the GSS over 1-2 month intervals (Smith and Stephenson, 1979), however. Second, the recall may be complicated by respondent's exposure to two or more religions, a situation especially likely when parents were from different religions. For parents with two different religions, we might expect the reports to balance out in the aggregate. However, if one parent followed a religion and the other parent had no religion, the child would generally be brought up in the former's religion and thus report on that religion. Only in a totally irreligious home is the child likely to have been without religious exposure (Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick, 1983). As a result, the proportion of parents with no religion should be systematically underestimated by this item. Third, the religion raised in question refers to the respondent's family of origin and more indirectly to his/her parents and not to a cross- section of adults as covered in the surveys previously analyzed. However, we are able, to a certain extent, to adjust the religion reports to

more closely match that population.

First, we excluded those who were raised outside of the United States. Second, we controlled for multiplicity of informants. In a family that has five children who are adults living in the United States, there are five people who could report on the religion of the parental home, but for an only child, only one person could report on the parental home. Thus, in the former case, the chance of getting a report on the parental home is five times greater than in the latter. We do not know how many actual surviving, adult children in the United States there are and have used the number of sibling ever born to the respondent's parents plus one (for the respondent) as our adjustment factor. This implicitly assumes that all siblings are potential respondents to the survey, a situation that is undoubtedly false and which is more likely to be in error for the elderly (due to the death and institutionalization of their siblings) and the very young (because many of their siblings are still minors). In addition, historical families have no chance of coverage if they were either childless or have no surviving children among the current adult population of the United States. (For details on such estimating problems, see Smith and Davis, 1980 and Smith and Klaeser, 1983.) All this cautions that these estimates are subject to various errors. In fact, however, the results appear to be robust. We tried various alternative techniques using alternative years, unweighted data, and data with only household weights and the basic pattern reported here remains unchanged.

Table 13 shows the estimates of parental religious affiliations based on retrospective reports of religion raised in. The first set of dates are years of birth and the date in parentheses represents the year the someone born in the mid-point of year cohort (1915, 1925, etc.) would be 16 years old. Thus for the cohort born in 1910-1919, we would take 1915 and add 16 to get 1931. This year is taken to represent (in a crude fashion) the reference year for parental religion. Or to put it another way, the religious affiliations reported in Table 13 are taken to represent that of the parental population for the reference year. Part A gives the estimates based on all years of the GSS. Part B gives estimates based on only the most recent (1984-87) GSSs. The former estimate is based on considerably more cases (except for the youngest cohort) and its results tend to be more regular, presumably because of less sampling variation. We present the 1984-87 GSS figures because subsequent more detailed religious breakdowns will be based on only surveys after 1983.10 Table 13A shows trends that generally agree with those indicated by the cross-sectional surveys. As Table 14 elaborates, there has been a linear increase in the percent Catholic and None, a linear decline in the proportion Protestant and Jewish and no change in the proportion Other. Except for Jews, the birth cohort data suggest

that the trends observed for the post World War II period from both these cohort figures and from the cross-section time series continued back to at least the beginning of the century. In the case of Jews, the figures suggest that their proportion increased until the years right after World War II and have since declined. Not only does the direction of the trends from the time series and cohorts agree, but the slopes are reasonably close (compare Tables 3, 7, and 14).

Definite differences do emerge between these two indicators, however. The cohort figures underestimate the proportion Protestants, overcount Catholics, and approximately agree on the number of Others and Jews. Probably the largest source of this discrepancy is the difference between the adult population sampled by the cross-section and the parental population reconstructed by the cohort approach. Nones seem to be underrepresented by a bit in the last two cohorts, probably as a result of the previously predicted undercount of non-religious parents. In sum, while the retrospective birth cohort approach can not fully reproduce the religious profile of past adult populations, it probably gives a fairly accurate measure of relative changes in religious affiliation and the trends it projects back prior to the advent of surveys on religion in the 1940s probably reflect the changes that were occurring during that earlier period.

Utilizing the more detailed denominational codes available on the religion raised in question, Table 15 shows trends within Protestantism. The percentages total up to the percent Protestant in Table 13, not to 100%. We will not go into a detailed analysis at this point, but note the following shifts:

1. Most denominations lost ground as the overall proportion Protestant declined. Mormons are the only group to increase consistently over the century.

2. Methodists and Southern Baptists switched their relative 1-2 rank around the early 1950s. Both faiths have been losing shares in recent years however.

3. Other Fundamentalists (i.e., besides the Southern Baptists) have lost a little ground, but not as much as small moderate and liberal denominations.

4. The larger moderate-to-liberal denominations have lost ground. The Methodists and Disciples of Christ show the largest declines. The Lutherans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Interdenominationals individually show instability due to sample variation, but generally held their own until perhaps the most recent period.

In Table 16, we see the trends across religions classified as Fundamentalist, Moderate, or Liberal (for details of these groups, see Smith, 1987). Fundamentalists held their share of the population over the period, moderates grew (basically the growth in Catholics more than off-setting declines among moderate Protestants), and Liberals declined (a drop in liberal Protestant affiliations being even greater than the rising proportion of Nones). None of these differences are very pronounced and the decline in the liberal wing may be exaggerated by the probable underestimate of Nones in the most recent birth cohort. In general, in terms of the Fundamentalist/Liberal balance within American religions, the picture is stability rather than redistribution.

Survey Measures of Church Membership

Another possible data source about religious trends are questions about group membership that ask about religions. There are two main types of membership information: 1) general questions about group memberships and 2) specific questions on church membership. There are several problems with the general, group membership items. First, they appear infrequently. Second, they are very variable in form and therefore results (Smith, 1990d; Taylor, 1975). Third, compared to questions focusing on church membership only, these questions significantly underreport memberships. This partly results from the usual underreporting that occurs on long, laundry list questions and partly from unclear and restricted definitions of religious/church memberships. Table 17 shows that the percent belonging to "church groups" varies from 6 to 50%. As Table 18 indicates, most of this variation is probably due to the way the questions were cast. Memberships are lowest when religion is not mentioned in the question, intermediate when it appears on a list but none of the groups are inquired about separately, and highest when each group on the list is subject to a specific query. Similarly, membership is lowest when it is restricted to religious groups besides the church or congregation as a whole and higher when simple church membership is counted. (Unfortunately incomplete documentation and vague categorization makes it hard to know how inclusive the church category was in several instances.)11 As a result of this measurement variation, little useful trend information is available about religious membership and active involvement from these questions.

A second way of studying religious trends by tracking church memberships uses specific, membership questions (Table 19). While much less problematic than the general, membership items, difficulties include 1) that there are far fewer data points on church memberships than on religious preferences, 2) that for many of the points, the proportion of those with a particular religious

preference who are members of each religion are not available, 3) that preferences and memberships do not always correspond (Roof, 1980)12, and 4) that there is some disagreement between NORC and Gallup over the proportion that are church members.

From the Gallup figures on membership in Table 19 and the religious preference figures in Table 1, we calculated the proportion of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews among church members in 1952, 1965, 1975, and 1985. (No information on Others was available.) Catholics have consistently had the highest proportion of members, Protestants have been in the middle, and Jews have always been the lowest. The relative levels have varied somewhat with the Catholic edge narrowing and then rebounding somewhat and the Jewish level bouncing around a lot due to sampling variation. On balance, the impact on trends appears to have been minimal. In terms of the three major religions, the change in preference from 1952 to 1985 was Protestant - 4.3 percentage points, Catholic + 6.2 percentage points, and Jew - 1.9 percentage points, while for members the figures were Protestant - 4.5 percentage points, Catholic + 5.6 percentage points, and Jew - 0.5 percentage points (Table 20).

Survey Measures of Church Attenders

A final survey-based way of assessing trends in religious affiliation is to track changes in church attendance. Various measures of church attendance have been asked virtually as long as religious affiliation. Gallup typically has asked "Did you, yourself, happen to attend church in the last seven days?" NORC has usually asked a less time specific question, "How often do you attend religious services?", with response categories running from more than once a week to never. SRC/Election has generally used subjective items such as "Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, or never?" The Gallup and NORC questions can be used to estimate the number of church goers in each religion, similar to what would occur if a sample of people were drawn from those attending religious services, a pew poll. (Some adjustment could be made with the SRC/Election surveys, but because of the qualitative nature of the attendance measure, it would be less precise and more relativistic.)

Gallup attendance breakdowns by major religions are available back to 1958, while NORC data begin in 1972. (For both houses, earlier data points exist, but the necessary crosstabulations are not available.) Table 21 shows that attendance among Catholics used to be higher than Protestants, but the difference has eroded over the last 30 years. Protestant church attendance has remained virtually unchanged, while Catholic attendance has fallen by 25 percentage points. (Fluctuations for Jews are most probably within sampling error.) In fact, as Andrew Greeley has noted (1985, p.

55; 1989), almost all of the decline in church attendance observed over the last 30+ years, can be attributed to the declining attendance of Catholics. Because of the changing attendance differential, trends in church attendance differ appreciably from trends in religious preference. According to Gallup, the proportion with a Protestant preference fell 11 percentage points from 1958 to 1986, while Catholics gained 3 percentage points (Table 1). The proportion of the population attending Protestant services in an average week dropped only 6.6 percentage points over this period, while the Catholic proportion dropped 4.6 percentage points (rather than increasing by 3 percentage points). In terms of ratios, the Protestant to Catholic ratio in preferences fell from 2.9:1 in 1958 to 2.2:1 in 1986, while the attendance ratio actually rose from 1.7:1 in 1958 to 1.8:1 in 1986.

The shorter NORC/GSS series shows smaller differentials than Gallup between Catholic and Protestant attendance levels, but confirms the Gallup pattern that the differential has been declining in recent years.13

The difference between the religious affiliation of the general population and that of church attenders for 1984-1987 is shown in Table 22. Because of their lower than average attendance the proportion None, Other, and Jewish is lower than among affiliators than among all adults. The changing portions are particularly striking among theological groups (Table 22B). Within Protestantism we see that Fundamentalists, Mormons, Southern Baptists, and Presbyterians all increase their share while the relative losers are Liberals, Interdenominationals, Episcopalians, United Methodists, and Moderates. American Lutherans and Disciples of Christ held their positions.

Religious Trends in Church Membership

Besides the use of the time series analysis of cross-sectional surveys and the retrospective reports of religion raised in, the main source on changing religious affiliation is the church membership figures annually collected by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States (Jacquet, 1986). Compared to the methodological problems involved with working the membership data, the difficulties with the existing survey data are trivial. Many of the shortcomings of these data are well-known, but, if anything, these critiques have probably underestimated the problems.14 As Table 23 illustrates, the basic finding from all of the studies of membership is that 1) theologically liberal and moderate churches generally began to show declining memberships in the late sixties. (Only Catholics failed to show absolute drops in adherents.) 2) All Fundamentalist churches (with the exception of the fairly moderate Missouri Synod Lutherans) have shown continued growth, often at impressive rates. These huge growth

differentials seem to dispute the modest-to-nil increases in Fundamentalists reported in the preceding survey analysis.15 Some researchers have remarked about the apparent disjuncture, but have noted the apples-and-oranges nature of the comparisons. In particular, they have observed that survey reports usually refer to religious preferences, not to church memberships, and that the periods under reference are frequently not comparable.

Perhaps the biggest reason for the apparent discrepancies is a simple mathematical illusion. The Fundamentalist increases are generally from very small bases, so that the large proportional gains in members convert into fairly modest gains in their percentage of the general population. If we take the eight Fundamentalist denominations in Table 23 as representative of all Fundamentalist denominations in terms of their growth pattern (a big and unprovable assumption), we find that this group of denominations reported that membership increased from 15 million in 1960 to almost 25 million in 1985. The average increase for the eight individual denominations was 138% (respectively the changes from 1960 to 1985 were Lutheran-Missouri Synod 10%, Southern Baptist 49%, Church of the Nazarene 70%, Seventh Day Adventist 105%, Mormons 160%, Jehovah's Witness 192%, Church of God (Cleveland, TN.) 208%, and Assemblies of God 310%). However, the gain for these churches as a group was only 68%, less than 1/2 of the "average" of 138%. The overall average is much lower than the average of the separate rates because the biggest denominations (especially the Lutherans and Baptists) grew more slowly than the smaller churches. Averaging the eight growth rates gives equal weight to each denomination and thus allows the rapid reported expansion of the smaller churches to swamp the more slowly growing larger churches and in turn to exaggerate the growth of Fundamentalist as a social group.

Second, these growth rates do not tell us how the Fundamentalist share of the population has changed. To answer that we have to compare the Fundamentalists to some base and, as we shall see, the base we chose influences the answer. In 1960 they made up 13.2% of the inclusive membership of reporting churches and by 1985 it had risen to 17.8%, a relative increase of 35%. If we use the total population of the United States as the base, we find that these churches increased their share from 8.3% to 10.7%, a relative gain of 29%. Finally, using the total adult population as the base, we find that their proportion grew from 13.1% to 14.5%, a very modest relative increase of less than 11%.

Given the way that membership figures are defined, none of these bases is entirely appropriate. The inclusive membership figure is the sum of the individual membership statistics of reporting denominations, but of course excludes non-members, varies over time in its coverage, and includes a mix of adult and minor members that makes comparison to other populations difficult. The

total population base is clearly broader that what membership figures even potentially could add up to. It includes not only non-members of churches, but also groups, such as minors, who are not counted as potential members by many denominations. The total adult base matches that covered by surveys and allows for non-members to show up in the figures, but since the membership figures include (at least for some denominations) children, the numerator is potentially greater than the denominator. In sum, one can not in any exact fashion make the membership statistics directly comparable to the survey-based figures.

The differences between the survey and denominational counts, which seem striking at first glance, are actually probably quite small. To give two examples of relative agreement on trends, the membership figures show the United Methodists falling behind the Southern Baptists between 1965 and 1970 and the 1967 NORC survey confirms that Southern Baptists out-numbered United Methodists. Likewise, the switch in the relative rank of these two leading Protestant denominations is confirmed by the cohort analysis (Table 15). Second, the membership figures show an increase in the proportion Catholic from the 1950s to the 1960-80s, as does the time series and cohort analyses. In brief, while the church membership figures cover quite different populations with a considerably different (and more suspect) methodology, the differences between the results are often more apparent than real.

Determinants of Religious Trends

Religions gain or lose members because of imbalances in three pairs of processes: births and deaths, immigration and emigration, and conversion and disaffiliation. An absolute balance in all three pairs, or a net balance across these pairs will mean no absolute change. The relative gain or loss of a religion will of course depend on the performance of all other religions. While we lack sufficient demographic information on these factors to compute a simple, accounting summation of the six factors and the net change, we have some information on several of the factors and these can provide indicators as to why some religions have increased their share while others have fallen behind.

Fertility

Some religions follow God's first commandment to man, "Be fruitful and multiply," more assiduously than others and these fertility differentials tend to persist over time. Table 24 gives four fertility indicators: one of "past" differences, two of present differences, and one of "future" differences. The first column gives the number of children in respondent's family of origin using religion raised in. The second column shows what the

ideal number of children is thought to be. The third column gives the total expected number of children (those ever born + additional children expected). The last column gives the total number of children expected for those under 36. This can be considered as a short-term predictor of fertility's impact on future religious distributions since almost all of the children reported by these young adults will be minors (or not even born) and therefore are not yet, but soon to be, members of the adult population. With one exception, fertility declines as one goes from past, to ideal, to present, to "future". That is, people generally came from larger families than they intend to have and the families they intend to have are smaller than their ideal number of children. The difference between past and present levels of fertility reflects well-established historical trends. We suspect that the difference between past and ideal, and the expected number of children may be exaggerated since we expect that people will ultimately have more children that they expect to. In particular, the figures reported for young adults seem to be too low.

Putting this issue aside, what can we say about the relative growth of major religions? The patterns among religions on these four indicators is fairly complex. Catholics had high past fertility and the highest future fertility, but their edge over Protestants is slight and for all adults their current fertility is lower than Protestants. Jewish fertility is consistently lower than Catholic and Protestant fertility on all indicators. Others start out as the group with the highest parental fertility, but show lower than average current and "future" fertility. As we will discuss shortly, this large relative shift probably results from the fact that many Others are recent immigrants whose parental fertility was from another culture. Nones have relatively low fertility on all measures, but have fallen below Jews from the parental to the current generation. As we will see in the mobility section, this is partly the result of the fact that the high turnover in Nones across generations means that these are substantially different groups and thus more subject to changes in the fertility pattern. The slight fertility edge of Catholics over Protestants also shows up for most birth cohorts over this century as does the substantially lower fertility of Jews (Table 25).

The fertility indicators for major religions and major Protestant denominations are shown in Table 24B. The pattern is complex and as with major religions varies by indicator, but the general pattern is that more fundamentalist denominations tend to have higher fertility than moderate-to-liberal denominations. This pattern largely holds both for past birth cohorts (Table 25B) and for current fertility. The differential appears to be narrowing somewhat however.

We have no information on the relative mortality pattern of religions. We suspect that differences are small and in particular

unlikely to impact differentially on the relative rates of natural increase. Differences among these major religions in natural increase are probably mainly due to fertility differentials and mortality differences are probably smaller and have less impact than fertility differentials on relative natural increase. One bit of demographic information that sheds some light on the mortality issue (as well as on fertility) is the age structure of adults in religions. As Table 26 shows, there is a difference of almost 12 years in mean age. The older the group the higher its rate of mortality is likely to be in the near future and the less likely the group is to have more children. Among the youngest are the Nones and Interdenominationals, who are always relatively overrepresented among the young, adult life stage, and Others, who include many young immigrants. At the other end are most of the mainline moderate-to-liberal Protestant denominations and, at the very top, Jews.16

Migration

Immigration and emigration figures are not kept by religion, and inferences about religion based on the religious distribution of country of origin are unreliable in part because religious affiliation of the countries of origin is sometimes not known, but mainly because the religious profile of the home countries is often not typical of immigrants to the United States. For example, immigrants from Lebanon and the Far East tend to be drawn from the Christian minorities of those countries. For emigrants from the United States, the estimates of even their gross number are so uncertain that little can be inferred about their religion or anything else. However, some insights into the contribution of migration can be gained by examining Table 27 which shows the religious distribution of recent immigrant generations. In the first column, is the distribution of people who were born outside the country and who lived outside the country until at least age 16 before immigrating. Moving to the right we have those born outside the United States who immigrated before age 16, those born in the United States whose parents were born outside the country, those with all grandparents born outside the country, those with all native born grandparents, and finally the religious distribution of the whole population across all immigrant statuses.

Protestants heavily predominate among the fourth + generation, but their share falls rapidly until it levels-off at about 30% for the first and second generations. Catholics rise sharply from the fourth + generation, level-off in the second generation and fall slightly among the first generation. Jews follow the same pattern as Catholics. In both cases, this is the result of heavy Eastern and Southern European immigration from the 1890s to World War I. Others show a slow rise across generations, accelerating among the

first generation. This reflects the shifts in recent years to non-European sources of immigration. Finally, Nones show little variation across generations.

The bottom sections of Table 27 shows that among Protestants Fundamentalists (Fundamentalist and Southern Baptists) have been the most underrepresented among recent immigrants. Also, underrepresented are moderate Protestant denominations that are either American in origin (e.g. Disciples of Christ) or centered in America (Methodists). For these groups there are relatively few co-religionists outside the United States. While no Protestant denomination really gains because of immigration, those with many co-religionists outside the United States roughly hold their own (Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians).

The immigration status distributions indicate that immigration (and probably net migration as well) has strongly favored the growth of Catholics and Jews. Their immigration edge has diminished in recent years and while their share of immigrants is still above their share in the resident population, the differential is not as large as it used to be. The one group that has widened its immigrant differential recently is Others. Among Protestant denominations the pattern is fairly stable. No denomination is increasing its overall share because of immigration, and Fundamentalists and to a lesser extent other indigenous religions are in relative decline because of immigration.

Religious Mobility

Religions also grow and shrink from the conversion and disaffiliation of members. The magnitude of religious mobility depends on how it is measured. Mobility will be greater when 1) measured over a longer period, 2) detailed denominations are covered, and 3) gross rather than net changes are counted. Gross mobility (total number of religious changes or proportion having made one or more switches) will increase over time. (It can remain unchanged, but since some additional changes will almost always occur, it will normally marginally increase over time.) Net mobility (the percent whose current faith does not equal their original or base faith) can go up or down as duration increases, but will also tend to increase with duration. Mobility will also be higher as finer grain religious distinctions are used. A grouping by major religions will show less mobility than one that separated out all of the smaller Protestant denominations, since use of the generic Protestant category will cover-up all within Protestant mobility. Finally, gross mobility will show more change than net mobility since switches back to the religion of origin cancel out in net mobility, but count as additional changes for gross mobility.17

We can study net religious mobility from the religion raised

in to current religion (an average duration of a little over 30 years) and can utilize various finer or grosser categorization to classify religions. Table 28 shows the % reporting a (net) switch for various religious classifications. Switching between major religions is lowest at 14%, changes between the three Fundamentalist/Liberal groups are intermediate at 21%, and when we use all religions coded separately on the GSS, we get a maximum net mobility rate of 32%.

For 1988 only we can also look at gross religious mobility. By counting people who had ever changed from the religion they were raised in (even if they had since returned to their faith of origin), we find a gross mobility rate of nearly 36%.

Table 29 presents three measures of religious mobility. In the first column, the percent of people raised in a particular religion who are currently still members of that faith is shown. In the second column, the ratio of converts to disaffiliators is given. In the last column, the net change between the number raised in a religion and the number currently preferring that religion is shown. (This ratio has to be greater than one if net change is greater than 100%.) For example, 90.4% of respondents raised as Protestants are still Protestants. For every 10 disaffiliations there are only 7.05 converts so the number of current Protestants falls below the base total (97.2% of the base or a loses of -2.8 percentage points).

Among major religions Protestants, Catholics, and Jews all show net losses.18 (The figures for Jews show no change, but looking across all years indicates that their net change is 93%.) Each religion holds on to its members quite well, gains relatively few members from other religions, and loses more members (primarily to None) than it gains. Others have lower stability than the three Judeo-Christian faiths, but are also much more successful at gaining adherents than the other major groups. We suspect that the high turnover is associated with inter-marriage. Finally, Nones are very unstable, retaining only 45% of those raised without a religion. In part, this is because most in this group were probably not raised as explicit agnostics or atheists, but simply were not regularly exposed to any religion (Tamney, Powell, and Johnson, 1989). Thus for members of this group to switch probably does not mean the abandonment of a prior "faith" (as the switch of Catholic to Protestant would), but merely the initial adoption of a religion after having received no exposure as a child. Similarly, the large surplus of "converts" to "disaffiliators" does not reflect the organizational adoption of a non- or even anti-religious ideology, but only a lapse (either permanent or only temporary) in adherence to an organized religion (Hadaway, 1989).

Looking at major Protestant denominations we see that stability is quite variable, ranging from the Mormons who hold 91% of those raised in that faith to Liberals and the Inter-

denominationals who hold less than half. In terms of converts to disaffiliators, all of the main moderate-to-liberal denominations except United Methodists come out on the plus. The smaller Liberal and Moderate groups do not do as well however with both relatively low stability and negative turnover. Fundamentalists show a mixed pattern with Mormons winning big, the smaller Fundamentalist sects almost breaking even, and Southern Baptists having three loses for two gains. Looking at theological orientation we see that Moderates lose the most, with Fundamentalists showing smaller losses, and only Liberals showing net gains19 (due to Nones).20

In recent years, there seems to have been little change in the level of turnover. There has been no significant change from 1972-1987 as measured on the GSS in terms of major religions, major Protestant denominations, or Fundamentalist/Liberal orientation.21 Across birth cohorts however there is evidence that some forms of religious mobility have increased (Table 30). For major religions the turnover rate about doubles from those born prior to 1910 compared to those born in the 1940s. The rate then levels-off and declines. This decline is because of the confounding of cohort changes with life cycle. As we noted above, mobility will increase with duration and each succeeding birth cohort is about a decade older and thus has a longer mobility interval. Since most switching occurs when respondents are relatively young, this interval effect has little impact on the older cohorts. It probably slightly depresses the 1950-1959 cohort (which included respondents as young as 25) and most certainly causes the dip in the 1960 cohort which includes many 18 year olds and no one older than 27. The increased mobility among major religions does not appear to have occurred either within Protestantism nor across Fundamentalism/Liberalism since mobility shows no trend across cohorts for either all religions or theological groups (Table 28). It appears that the barriers between the three cultures that Herberg (1956) talked about have been coming down, but that the already high level of Protestant mixing has not increased.

Religious Mobility and Socialization

One factor influencing religious mobility is the degree of socialization into religion of origin (Bibby, 1978). We measure degree of socialization as the mean probability of one's parents attending church in a given week. As Table 31 shows, parental church attendance varies across religions. Catholics were the most faithful attendees followed by Fundamentalist Protestants, moderate-to-liberal Protestants, Jews, and lastly Nones (see also Tables 21 and 22). High church attendance is associated with high stability. For example, for the five major religions the association between frequent church attendance and staying in the same faith is .357 (gamma, prob. = .000).

For parents who attended church less than 38% of the time 79% of their children remained in the parental religion, for those who attended 39-85% of the time the retention rate was 90%, and for those who attended over 85% of the time the retention rate reached 91.5%. Interestingly enough this pattern reverses, as we might expect, for people raised without any religion. Parents who attended less were more likely to pass on their lack of religion. For parents who never attended church 50% currently report no religion. For parents who went up to 20% of the time 45% still have no religion and for parents who went more than 20% of the time 44% of their children remained without any religion. In brief, religious mobility varies with degree of exposure to the religion of origin. In general, more exposure (as measured by frequency of parental attendance of services) increases the likelihood that people raised in a religion will stay in that faith.

Religious Mobility and Inter-marriage

A second factor influencing religious mobility is the level of inter- marriage. The level of inter-marriage depends on how it is defined and measured. The finer religious distinctions employed, the more inter-marriage will be found. Also, more inter-marriage exists if one compares the religious origin of spouses rather than their current religion. As Table 32 shows, in 27% of current marriages, the spouses were raised in different major religions, 39% were from different theological inclinations, and fully 60% were raised in distinct denominations. Since much religious convergence occurs as the result of marriage, the exogamy rates for current religion are only about half as large, 15% for major religions, 18.5% for Fundamentalism/ Liberalism, and 40% for all religions.

Inter-marriage levels have shown little change in recent years (for all three classifications changes on the GSS from 1973 to 1987 have either been insignificant or have shown no clear linear trend), but some changes have occurred across birth and marriage cohorts.22 Table 33 indicates that exogamy across major religions has grown during this century.23 No notable changes have occurred across theological groups or across all religions, however. This result is similar to that reported above on religious mobility and indicates that while barriers between major religions (chiefly Protestantism and Catholicism) have lowered, the overall level of inter-marriage has not changed. It appears that the rising number of marriages between Protestants, Catholics and other major religions are replacing a comparable number of inter-denominational marriages among Protestants, so that the total volume of inter-marriages is not growing. In particular, McCutheon (1984) has found that inter-marriage increased for all major religions and for mainline Protestant denominations, but held constant for

fundamentalist denominations.

Inter-marriages account for a major share of religious mobility. When both spouses were raised in the same major religion, only 5% of respondents report a current religion different from their religion of origin, while when the partners were raised in different religions, 35.5% of respondents have switched religions. Similarly, when the spouses come from the same theological camp, only 11% have changed camps; while for mixed origins, the change level is 40%. Looking at those who changed their major religion, we find that 44% of the changers are married to someone raised in another faith, 19% are not currently married (separated, widowed, or divorced), 19% have never been married, and 18% are married to a spouse with their same religious background. For Fundamentalism/Liberalism, the switchers are 47% different backgrounds, 20% ex-married, 13% never married, and 20% same background. Given that some of the ex-marrieds may have changed religions to match their now ex-spouse, it appears that a majority of religious mobility occurs among people who have been married to someone raised in religion different from one's own.

The importance of religious inter-marriages on religious mobility is also shown by the fact that religious switchers mention marriage more often than any other single factor as the reason for they changed religious preferences (Roof, 1989)24

Religious Change on Balance

We lack sufficient details to count up net natural change, net migration, and net religious mobility to explain past, present, and possibly future patterns of religious change.25 We can, however, look across these three components and make some general observations about the sources of change for various religions and the likely balance across the components. In only one case does natural change, migration, and mobility combine to favor one major religion over the others. Others have the highest parental fertility, have been aided, especially recently, by immigration, and have gained from religious mobility. Nones have gained the most from religious mobility and show some gains from migration, but rank near the bottom on fertility. Since turnover is so high for the Nones, low fertility is not the serious impediment to sustained growth that it would be for other groups however. Catholics gain from immigration and, in the past at least, from fertility, but they have the largest loss of major religions from religious mobility. Protestants lose from immigration and religious turnover, and have relatively little gain/loss from fertility. Finally, Jews have fared the worst. Their fertility has been and remains very low, immigration remains a positive, but diminished source of growth (whether emigration to Israel is an important off-setting factor is unknown), and religious mobility is

producing a small, net loss.26 With religious mobility and immigration being relatively small factors for Jews, their growth depends heavily on their natural increase which is very low and below absolute replacement levels.

The pattern is also mixed for groups along the Fundamentalist/Liberal continuum. The Fundamentalists have relative high fertility, moderate mobility retention, and low immigration. Moderates are average on fertility, low on mobility, and quite high on immigration (mostly Catholics). Liberals are lowest on fertility, tops on net mobility change (mostly Nones), and receive no relative change from migration.

A simplified view of the balance between fertility and mobility (excluding migration) can be demonstrated by comparing the total number of children expected with the stability rate. Assuming that two children per respondent are needed for replacement, we see that Protestants with 2.36 (Table 24) children expected would need a stability rate of .86 to break even. Since Protestants have actually had a stability rate of .904 (Table 28), we see that births minus disaffiliation still leave Protestants with a net gain (approximately 2.13 children in their parents' religion). When converts are factored in, they make up for most of the losses from disaffiliations and their net gain becomes 2.30. Nones on the other hand have only 1.63 children expected and a low retention rate of only .454, so families of Nones produce only .74 children who are Nones to replace themselves. Nones have a very high number of "converts" however, and these push the gain per parental couple up to 2.44, above that of Protestants. The group that does best of all are Mormons. They have 3.58 children and retain 3.25 as Mormons. Since Mormons also gain from religious mobility, the net yield per parental couple is 3.87. In brief, fertility, retention, and conversion can combine together in various ways to determine a religion's growth rate.

Conclusion

Basic religious change has been glacial; slow, steady, and ultimately massive. The proportion Protestant has been declining throughout this century at about .003 per annum since WWII. Jews, who gained ground early in the century, have also been declining since the 1940s at about .0006 per annum. Catholics have been gaining ground throughout the century at about .0010-.0015 per annum. Others (most Orthodox and non-Judeo-Christian religions) have shown no clear increase, but appear to be gaining adherents over the last decade at least (Table 34). As a result of these changes, the ratio of Protestants to Catholics has fallen from over 4.1:1 around the turn of the century to about 2.7:1 today.

During this same period the proportion without any religious affiliation has also been rising. While the net trend has been

upwards at about .0014-.0027 per annum, it has not been a simple, monotonic increase and has varied by house. The number without religion appears to have dipped from the late forties to the late fifties before increasing until the mid 1970s. From then to the present the proportion None has apparently remained constant.27 Signs of a large and growing segment of token religionists or of the unchurched are limited. Church membership shows little change and church attendance among Protestants has remained stable for the last 30 years. Among Catholics, however, significant declines in mass attendance occurred as well as smaller slides in congregational membership.

Overall these indicators provide at best mixed support for the secularization hypothesis (Hammond, 1985; Hadden, 1987; Wuthnow, 1976). The secularizing changes has been 1) small in magnitude, 2) intermittent in time, and 3) restrictive in scope. However, whenever there has been change, it has been in the secular direction. This same complex pattern in general also holds for attitudinal and belief measures (Smith, 1990c).

A second much ballyhooed change has been the growth of Fundamentalist churches and more recently the rise of the New Religious Right. Despite the impressive evidence from church membership statistics, it does not appear that Fundamentalists have appreciably changed their share of the population either across generations or in recent years. This also is basically substantiated by attitudinal trends (Smith, 1990c). What has occurred in recent years is the politicization of the Fundamentalists into a powerful, organized force.

The typically down played changes in major religions and the exaggerated changes in Nones and Fundamentalists have resulted from a complex balancing of natural increase, net migration, and religious mobility. Religions have grown from a varying mixture of these factors and practically no faith has ranked either high or low on all three factors. More often than not, the demographic factors of births and deaths, and immigration and emigration rather than the winning or losing of souls, account for most church growth or decline. Religious mobility is an important process, but with the exception of gains for the Nones, its net impact has been moderate and slow acting.

Like other long-term structural changes (such as the shift to the Sun Belt, the decline in the manufacturing sector, or the aging of the population) religious redistribution has slowly, but surely changed the social profile of America. While changes to the right (rising Fundamentalism) and to the left (rising atheism) have both been accented in popular and scholarly works, the biggest changes have been occurring in the middle as the relative share of Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and now apparently Others has shifted over the last half century.28 In particular, the decline of mainline Protestant denominations is general and of United

Methodists in particular, has been draining the moderate middle, while Catholics have replenished the depleted center.

Table 1

Gallup Trends on Religious Preference,

1947-1989a

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None
1947	69%	20	5	1	6
1952	67%	25	4	1	2
1957b	70%	24	3	1	1
1962	70%	23	3	2	2
1966	68%	25	3	2	2
1967	67%	25	3	3	2
1970	65%	26	3	2	4
1971c	65%	26	3	2	4
1972	63%	26	2	4	5
1974	60%	27	2	5	6
1975d	61%	27	2	4	6
1976e	60%	28	2	4	6
1978f	60%	29	2	1	8
1979	59%	29	2	2	8
1980	61%	28	2	2	7
1981	59%	28	2	4	7
1982	57%	29	2	4	8
1983	56%	29	2	4	9
1984	57%	28	2	4	9
1985	57%	28	2	4	9
1986g	59%	27	2	4	8
1987h	57%	28	2	4	9
1988i	56%	28	2	4	10

Reported in Gallup's Religion in America (RIA) Series:

1. Gallup Opinion Index Nos. 70, 114, 130, 145, 184
2. Gallup Report Nos. 222, 236, 259
3. Religion in America, 1979-80. Princeton: Princeton Religion Research Center, 1982
4. Religion in America, 1982. Princeton: Princeton Religion Center, 1982
5. Carroll, Johnson, and Martin, 1977.
6. Religion in America: 1990. Princeton: Princeton Religious Research Center, 1990.

a The Gallup figures are compiled by pooling Gallup surveys from the indicated years. For 1947, 1952, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1975, and 1976 Roozen and Carroll (1979, p. 34) note that at least four surveys were used. For 1957 five surveys with 7,619 cases were used. Other information available are as indicated 1970 - 10 surveys, 16,523 cases (RIA No. 70); 1974 - 6,261 cases (RIA, No. 114); 1979, 41,521 cases (1982); 1981 - 19 surveys, approximately 29,000 cases (RIA, 1982); 1983 - 30,739 cases (RIA , No. 236); 1984 - 17 surveys, 29,216 cases (RIA No. 236), and 1986 - 6 surveys (4 personal), 8,292 cases (6,221 personal) (RIA, No. 259).

b The 1957 point usually published with the Gallup time series is actually from the Current Population Survey (Roozen and Carroll, 1979; p. 34). The above point is based on five Gallup surveys from the 1957. The 1957 figures in RIA, 1986, No. 259 are in error.

c Reported in RIA, 1976 No. 130. Maybe 1970.

d Reported in RIA, 1976, No. 130 Some later RIA's report 62% for Protestants.

e Reported in RIA, 1977-78, No. 145. Some later RIA's appear to repeat 1975 figures for 1976.

f Reported in RIA, 1979-80. RIA, 1981, No. 184 reports same figures for 1977-1978.

g Based on 6,221 personal interviews and 2,071 telephone interviews. For personal interviewers only Protestant figure is 58%. RIA, 1986, No. 259.

h Based on 14,147 cases according to Gallup and Castelli, 1989, p. 267, but see note i below. See also RIA, 1990, p. 32.

i Several different figures are given by Gallup for 1988. Gallup and Jones, 1989 p. 68 gives these proportions and n=15,460. RIA, 1990, p. 30 gives the same figures (although Other is not reported), and reports figures are based on 11 surveys with 14,147 cases according to RIA, 1990, p. 14,147, but note unlikely coincidence in note h above. RIA, 1990, p. 29 also gives figures for 1988/89 of Protestant=56%, Catholic=28%, Jew=2%, Other=4, and None=10% with n=17,917 and on p. 33 cites 1988 a Protestant figure of 57% based on 11 surveys which p. 32 seems to indicate had 15,460 cases.

Gallup Question Wordings on Religion, 1946-1988*

1. 1946-1948
   Are you a member of a church?
   If Yes:
   Which denomination? (PLEASE GET SPECIFIC DENOMINATION.)
   If No:
   What is your religious preference? (PLEASE GET SPECIFIC DENOMINATION IF POSSIBLE.)

2. 1949-1955
   What is your religious preference - Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?

   Protestant/Catholic/Jewish/Other _____**

3. 1955-1958
   What is your religious preference - Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?

   Protestant/Catholic/Jewish/Other _____/None ***

4. 1957-1966
   What is your religious preference - Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish?

   Protestant/Roman Catholic/Jewish/Other _____/None

5. 1966-1977
   What is your religious preference - Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish?

   Protestant/Catholic/Jewish/Eastern Orthodox/Other _____/None

6. 1977-1978
   What is your religious preference - Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish or Eastern Orthodox?

   Protestant/Catholic/Jewish/Eastern Orthodox/Other _____/None

7. 1978-1983
   What is your religious preference - Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish, or an Orthodox church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox church?

Protestant/Roman Catholic/Jewish/Orthodox Church/Other
_____/None

8. 1983-1988

What is your religious preference - Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, or an Orthodox Church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?

* These represent the standard Gallup wordings used in each of the indicated periods and do no cover all versions. The information prior to 1974 comes from Roper Center, 1975. Information since 1973 comes from a perusal of Gallup questionnaires and codebooks in GSS's Social Change Archive.

** These are the precoded categories. Additional categories such as "None" prior to 1955 were sometimes added during coding.

*** However the first Gallup survey in the 1955-58 period that I can definitely identify as precoding None is AIPO598 (5/1958). After that survey precoding of None appears regularly.

Table 2

NORC/SRC-Election Trends on
Religious Preference, 1943-1989

A. NORC

DATE	STUDY	PROT	CATH	JEW	OTH	NONE	CASES	WORD
1943.04	210	60.1	15.8	2.7	0.4	21.0	2466	9
1943.71	216	60.0	17.0	3.0	0.0	20.0	2448	9
1944.13	223	61.1	16.2	2.9	0.1	19.7	2536	9
1944.71	228	74.9	19.3	4.3	0.0	0.0	2549	10
1944.79	229	73.5	20.3	4.3	1.9	0.0	2564	10
1944.96	231	71.0	21.4	4.4	3.2	0.0	2471	10
1945.21	233	73.1	20.6	4.4	1.4	0.5	2504	10
1945.29	234	73.9	20.8	3.5	1.8	0.0	2494	10
1945.54	235	75.4	20.6	3.2	0.8	0.0	2572	10
1945.71	237	74.1	21.5	3.5	0.9	0.0	2533	10
1945.88	239	74.1	21.1	3.5	1.3	0.0	2540	10
1946.13	143	67.0	23.0	5.0	2.0	3.0	523	12
1946.21	141	69.0	22.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	1293	11

1946.38	142	68.0	23.0	4.0	1.0	4.0	1292	11
1946.63	243	73.0	20.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	2504	11
1946.71	144	71.7	21.0	4.3	0.2	2.8	1265	10
1948.13	155	70.0	22.0	5.0	1.0	2.0	1271	13
1948.21	156	69.0	23.0	4.0	1.0	3.0	1289	13
1948.29	157	71.0	20.0	6.0	1.0	2.0	1280	13
1948.46	158	73.0	19.0	4.0	1.0	3.0	1295	13
1948.46	159	70.0	20.0	5.0	1.0	4.0	1301	13
1948.54	160	67.0	23.0	5.0	1.0	4.0	1261	13
1948.79	161	68.0	21.0	6.0	1.0	4.0	1257	13
1949.21	164	69.0	23.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	1301	13
1950.29	280	67.0	24.0	4.0	1.0	4.0	1274	13
1951.21	300	66.0	25.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	1237	14
1951.29	302	64.0	26.0	4.0	3.0	3.0	1289	14
1952.38	325	67.0	26.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1265	14
1952.46	327	68.0	24.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	1285	14
1952.63	329	70.0	24.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	1297	13
1952.79	332	68.0	26.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	1306	13
1953.13	337	68.0	25.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1293	13
1952.29	339	70.0	24.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	1251	13
1953.38	340	68.0	25.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1265	13
1953.46	341	69.0	23.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	1291	13
1953.71	348	68.0	23.0	4.0	1.0	3.0	1262	13
1953.88	349	74.0	19.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1233	13
1954.04	351	69.0	22.0	5.0	1.0	3.0	1250	13
1954.88	365	70.0	23.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1201	13
1956.04	382	71.0	23.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	1238	13
1956.29	386	71.0	23.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	1224	13
1956.46	390	69.0	24.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1275	13
1956.71	393	68.0	25.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	1263	13
1956.96	401	72.0	23.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	1232	13
DATE	STUDY	PROT	CATH	JEW	OTH	NONE	CASES	WORD
1957.29	404	68.0	24.0	4.0	1.0	3.0	1279	13
1963.04	100	71.9	23.8	2.1	1.1	1.1	1482	15
1963.38	160	68.7	25.0	3.3	2.9	0.1	1515	15
1963.88	350	68.0	25.6	2.0	1.5	2.9	1379	15
1963.96	330	67.6	23.4	2.3	2.8	3.9	1550	15
1964.38	630	67.0	27.3	2.7	0.2	2.8	1428	15
1964.79	760	67.9	25.9	3.1	0.6	2.5	1975	1
1965.46	857	68.9	24.6	2.0	1.5	3.0	1468	15
1965.79	868	68.6	25.9	2.0	0.8	2.7	1518	15
1965.96	870	69.2	23.9	2.4	1.3	3.2	1482	15
1965.96	876	65.6	23.3	2.6	5.2	3.3	1482	15
1967.04	4011	66.7	25.5	3.0	2.0	2.8	1514	15
1967.21	4018	70.3	22.6	2.3	1.0	3.8	3091	1
1968.29	4050	70.8	22.6	2.1	1.2	3.3	1480	15
1970.04	4095	65.0	25.8	1.8	3.9	3.5	1495	15
1970.29	4100	65.5	23.8	1.6	2.8	6.3	1490	16

1970.71	4088	61.3	24.1	2.4	3.3	9.0	3018	19
1971.21	4119	67.2	23.5	2.1	2.3	4.9	1499	15
1972.21	GSS	64.1	25.7	3.4	1.7	5.2	1608	17
1972.88	5046	63.2	25.2	2.1	2.5	7.0	1461	17
1973.21	GSS	62.7	25.9	2.8	2.3	6.4	1500	17
1973.29	5047	60.0	28.4	2.4	4.2	5.0	723	18
1973.38	5047	62.2	25.8	3.1	3.9	5.0	647	18
1973.46	5047	57.7	31.4	2.9	4.0	4.0	644	18
1973.54	5047	60.1	27.3	3.0	4.0	5.5	616	18
1973.63	5047	60.5	25.2	3.3	4.6	6.4	644	18
1973.71	5047	61.3	25.8	3.2	4.2	5.5	631	18
1973.79	5047	60.5	28.9	2.7	3.0	4.9	688	18
1973.88	5047	59.9	28.1	2.3	4.3	5.4	700	18
1973.96	4179	61.3	26.4	2.1	3.4	6.7	1489	17
1974.04	5047	61.9	25.0	4.1	4.2	4.8	697	18
1974.13	5047	62.6	22.9	3.4	4.7	6.5	696	18
1974.21	5047	61.9	27.5	2.2	3.3	5.1	610	18
1974.21	GSS	64.3	25.4	3.0	0.5	6.8	1483	17
1974.38	5047	63.9	27.3	1.7	2.1	4.9	658	18
1975.21a	GSS	64.3	26.5	0.5	1.1	7.6	754	17
1975.21	GSS	66.8	22.2	2.6	0.8	7.6	734	17
1976.21	GSS	62.4	27.4	1.2	0.8	8.2	755	17
1976.21	GSS	64.7	24.7	2.4	1.2	7.0	742	17
1976.71	4329	63.2	24.5	1.6	4.4	6.3	1321	1
1977.21	GSS	65.9	24.5	2.3	1.2	6.1	1523	17
1978.21	4269	63.0	26.0	2.6	1.4	7.0	1509	17
1978.21	GSS	64.1	25.1	1.9	1.1	7.8	1528	17
1979.71	4294	60.1	26.3	2.7	1.3	9.6	1010	1
1980.21	GSS	64.0	24.7	2.2	2.0	7.2	1465	17
1982.21	GSS	64.6	24.4	2.5	1.3	7.3	1498	17
1983.21	GSS	60.8	27.5	2.7	1.6	7.3	1595	17
1984.21	GSS	63.8	25.7	1.8	1.4	7.3	1461	17
1985.21	GSS	62.5	26.7	2.1	1.6	7.1	1529	17
1986.21	GSS	62.8	25.8	2.6	2.0	6.7	1467	17
1987.21	GSS	65.1	24.2	1.4	2.1	7.1	1460	17
1988.21	GSS	61.2	25.9	2.0	2.8	8.0	1480	17
1989.21	GSS	63.3	25.2	1.5	2.2	7.8	1533	17

B. SRC/Election

DATE	STUDY	PROT	CATH	JEW	OTH	NONE	CASES	WORD
1948.88	1948	70.0	21.3	3.8	2.1	2.8	657	7
1951.46	1951	75.9	19.5	3.4	0.3	0.9	990	5
1952.88	1952	71.7	21.7	3.3	1.1	2.2	1787	5
1954.79	1954	75.3	19.1	3.0	1.4	1.2	1138	6
1956.88	1956	73.2	21.1	3.2	1.1	1.4	1759	5

1958.88	1958	73.7	21.2	3.0	0.8	1.3	1818	5
1960.71	1960	72.6	21.9	4.1	0.8	0.6	1378	5
1960.88	1960	74.4	20.1	3.4	0.9	1.2	1827	5
1962.88	1962	73.5	20.1	3.4	1.2	1.8	1295	8
1964.88	1964	70.4	22.2	2.9	0.9	3.6	1569	5
1966.88	1966	71.5	22.0	3.4	0.8	2.3	1274	4
1968.88	1968	71.6	21.9	2.7	0.7	3.1	1539	3
1970.88	1970	70.5	19.2	2.8	2.8	4.7	1502	21
1972.88	1972	68.6	23.8	2.4	1.0	4.3	2695	2
1974.88	1974	68.2	21.6	2.4	0.9	6.9	2500	2
1976.88	1976	65.2	24.6	2.4	1.4	6.4	2867	2
1978.88	1978	63.0	24.0	2.9	1.4	8.7	2285	2
1980.88	1980	63.1	23.4	3.2	1.3	9.0	1583	2
1982.88	1982	65.7	22.4	1.7	1.4	8.8	1402	2
1984.88	1984	62.0	26.0	2.4	1.4	8.2	2237	2
1986.88	1986	65.1	23.7	1.5	1.3	8.4	2153	2
1988.88	1988	65.1	23.9	1.5	0.8	8.7	2026	2

C. CPS (CENSUS)

DATE	STUDY	PROT	CATH	JEW	OTH	NONE	CASES	WORD
1957.21	1957	66.7	25.8	3.3	1.3	2.8	75000	20

a First points for 1975 and 1976 are for block quota sample, second points are for full probability sample.

Question Wordings

1. What is your religion?
2. Is your religious preference Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or something else?
3. Are you a Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish?
4. Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish?
5. Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?
6. Religion of Respondent
7. Religious Preference

8. Is your religious preference Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?

9. Are you a member of a church? IF YES: What denomination?

10. What denomination do your consider yourself?

11. Religion

12. Not given

13. What religion do you consider yourself?

14. May I ask you religion?

15. What is your religious preference?

16. What is your own religious preference now?

17. What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

18. What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion?

19. What is your religious preference at this time?

20. What is his religion - Baptist, Lutheran, etc.?a

21. Is your religious preference Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or something else.?

a Census publications also list "What is your religion?" as the wording. Perhaps this was used for informants while the one cited above was used in reference to other family members ("Religion...", 1957, p. 1; Mueller and Lane, 1972).

Table 3

Summary of Trends on Religious Preference
Average Proportion/Change per Annum

		Preferences				
Organ.	Dates	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None
Gallup	1947-89	.621/-.0038	.265/+.0018	.023/-.0006	.023/+.0008	.041/+.0024

Gallup	1952-89	.618/-.0043	.269/+.0016	.024/-.0009	.024/+.0009	.040/+.0027
SRC/Election	1948-88	.692/-.0034	.222/+.0012	.026/-.0005	.010/(+.0001)	.029/+.0024
NORCa	1946-89	.669/-.0021	.242/+.0010	.026/-.0007	.012/(+.0004)	.034/+.0014

a Excludes two data points in 1963, two in 1970, and one in 1979 that contained major variations in wording and coding. Changes per annum that are not statistically significant are in parentheses.

Table 4

Religious Distributions in 1957

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None
Census (CPS)	66.7%	25.8	3.3	1.3	2.8
NORC (1956)	70.2%	23.6	3.4	1.0	1.8
NORC (1957)	68.0%	24.0	4.0	1.0	3.0
SRC (1956)	73.2%	21.1	3.2	1.1	1.4
SRC (1958)	73.7%	21.2	3.0	0.8	1.3
Gallup (1957)	70.4%	24.3	3.3	1.4	0.9
NORC (1957ADJ)a	69.8%	21.2	---	---	2.5
NORC (1956ADJ)	72.1%	21.5	---	---	1.5

Census vs. _____ (Indexes of Dissimilarity)

NORC (1956)	3.6
NORC (1957)	2.2
SRC (1956)	6.5
SRC (1958)	7.0
Gallup (1957)	3.8
NORC (1957ADJ)	5.0
NORC (1956ADJ)	5.7

a Adjusted figures explained in note 7.

Table 5

Comparisons of Block Quota and Full-Probability Samples

(1975-76 GSS, Combined)

A. Unweighted

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None	N	Prob.
Block Quota	63.4%	27.0	0.9	0.9	7.9	1509	.002a
Full-Probability	65.7%	23.4	2.5	1.0	7.3	1476	

B. Weighted

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None	N	Prob.
Block Quota	62.4%	27.9	0.9	1.0	7.8	1597	.002
Full-Probability	65.1%	24.6	2.5	1.1	6.7	1388	

a Assuming SRS.

Table 6

Multiple Regression Analysis of Religious Preference

A.	Protestant		
	Variables	Beta	Prob.
	Time	-.829	.000
	Organization	.512	.000
	Sample	-.188	.083
	"Preference"	-.150	.119
	Religions Mentioned	.496	.000
	Nones	-.272	.001
		r2=.68	
B.	Catholic		
	Time	.779	.000
	Organization	-.588	.000
	Sample	.337	.011
	"Preference"	.093	.423
	Religions Mentioned	-.522	.000

	Nones	.404	.000
		r2=.54	
C.	Jewish		
	Time	-.728	.000
	Organization	-.157	.051
	Sample	-.025	.833
	"Preference"	.291	.007
	Religions Mentioned	-.389	.006
	Nones	.136	.138
		r2=.61	
D.	Other		
	Time	.087	.616
	Organization	-.620	.000
	Sample	-.286	.070
	"Preference"	-.339	.016
	Religions Mentioned	-.116	.519
	Nones	.437	.000
		r2=.33	
E.	None		
	Time	.896	.000
	Organization	.043	.489
	Sample	.136	.152
	"Preference"	.198	.021
	Religions Mentioned	-.126	.248
	Nones	-.182	.013
		r2=.76	

Table 7

Comparison of Bivariate and Multivariate Slope Coefficients

(Change in proportions per annum)

	Uncontrolled Time * Religion	Controlleda Time * Religion
A.	All Organizations	
	Protestants -.00238	-.00272
	Catholics +.00104	+.00146
	Jews -.00058	-.00055
	Others +.00025	+.00008 (n.s.)b

	Nones	+.00162	+.00173
B.	NORC		
	Protestants	-.00245	-.00224
	Catholics	+.00121	+.00195
	Jews	-.00062	-.00068
	Others	+.00035	+.00010 (n.s.)
	Nones	+.00151	+.00085
C.	SRC/Election		
	Protestants	-.00279	-.00320
	Catholics	+.00094	+.00103
	Jews	-.00043	-.00043
	Others	+.00003	+.00008 (n.s.)
	Nones	+.00223	+.00252

a See Table 6 for variables controlled for. For parts B and C organization is of course omitted.
b n.s. = not statistically significant at .05 level.

Table 8

Trends in % None in Selected NORC Surveys
Related to Changes in Coding and Question Wording

Date	Study	Question Wording	None Precoded	% None
9/1944	228	10	No	0.0%
10/1944	229	10	No	0.0
12/1944	231	10	No	0.0
3/1945	233	10	No	0.5
4/1945	234	10	No	0.0
7/1945	235	10	No	0.0
9/1945	237	10	No	0.0
11/1945	239	10	No	0.0
3/1946	141	11	Yes	3.0
5/1946	142	11	Yes	4.0
8/1946	243	11	Yes	2.0
9/1946	144	10	Yes	2.8
4/1957	404	13	Yes	3.0
1/1963	100	15	No	1.1
5/1963	160	15	No	0.1
11/1963	350	15	Yes	2.9

12/1963	330	15	Yes	3.9
4/1968	4050	15	Yes	3.3
1/1970	4095	15	Yes	3.5
4/1970	4100	16a	Yes	6.3
9/1970	4088	19b	Yes	9.0
3/1971	4119	15	Yes	4.9
3/1976	GSS-BQ	17c	Yes	7.7
9/1976	4239	1	Yes	6.3

a Wording likely to increase "nones" by addition of the phrase "now."
b Wording likely to increase "nones" by addition of the phrase "at this time."
c Wording likely to increase "nones" by addition of the phrase "or no religion."

Table 9

Trends in % None in American National Election Studies

Related to Changes in Coding and Question Wording

Date	Question Wording	None Precoded	% None
Fall/1952	5	Yes, "None"	2.2%
Fall/1956	5	No	1.4
Fall/1958	5	Yes, "None"	1.3
Fall/1960	5	No	1.2
Fall/1962	8	No	1.8
Fall/1964	5	No	3.6
Fall/1966	4	No	2.3
Fall/1968	3	No	3.1
Fall/1970	21*	No	4.7
Fall/1972	2*	No	4.3
Fall/1974	2*	Yes, "None"	6.9
Fall/1976	2*	Yes, "None"	6.4
Fall/1978	2*	Yes, "None, No preference"	8.7
Fall/1980	2*	Yes, "None, No preference"	9.0
Fall/1982	2*	Yes, "None, No preference"	8.8
Fall/1984	2*	Yes, "None, No preference"	8.2
Fall/1986	2*	Yes, "None, No preference"	8.4
Fall/1988	2*	Yes, "None, No preference"	8.7

*Question wordings likely to encourage "nones" by addition of the phrase "or something else."

Table 10

Trends in Protestant Denominations

A. SRC/Election

	1960	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988
Baptistd	21.3	21.5	20.0	21.2	24.0	10.1	11.4	9.4	8.3	8.8	9.5	9.0	8.8	7.6
All Bapt.	21.3	21.6	20.0	21.3	24.1	19.5	21.9	17.9	18.4	18.9	20.2	17.9	19.6	18.6
SBC	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	8.4	10.5	8.5	10.1	10.1	10.7	8.9	11.8	11.0
Methodistc	16.6	15.5	17.0	16.4	14.1	12.7	11.6	11.1	11.1	10.8	12.1	11.5	11.9	11.1
Lutherana	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.4	7.8	8.1	8.0	8.3	7.0	6.9	6.1	6.0	5.6	5.9
Presbyterian	7.3	4.7	5.1	6.0	4.3	5.5	4.4	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.9	4.3	4.2	4.3
Episcopalian	3.7	3.3	3.5	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.8	2.1	2.6	2.1	2.6
UCCb	3.1	3.3	2.4	1.6	2.3	2.5	2.0	2.5	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.4
DC	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.4	3.0	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.8	1.8	2.4	2.2	3.0	1.5
Reformed	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.6
Interdenom.	3.3	3.1	3.7	3.0	1.7	4.1	3.2	4.3	2.8	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.7	4.6
Fund.e	7.3	7.3	7.4	8.9	7.6	10.4	10.0	9.7	9.0	8.8	10.2	9.1	9.7	12.1
Mormon	0.3	1.1	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.5	2.2	1.5	2.4	1.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5
Liberalf	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.6
Otherg	1.1	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	1.0	0.8	1.2	1.3	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.1
Total	74.3	70.7	71.4	71.7	70.2	68.6	68.2	65.1	62.9	63.5	65.7	62.1	65.2	64.9

a Except Missouri Synod. However, as in the case of Southern Baptists (see note d), Missouri Synod Lutherans were almost never separately coded in early years and even in later years it appears that most were coded in the Lutheran category.
b Plus Congregational and Evangelical and Reformed.
c United Methodist, African Methodists, and United/Evangelical Brethren. Excludes Free Methodists.
d Excludes Primitive, Free Will, and Gospel Baptist. Southern Baptist not effectively separated until 1972. Slight decline in total Baptist appears to result from better coding to the fundamentalist Baptists. In 1970 these accounted for 0.3% and added to other Baptists yields 24.4%. In 1972 they were 3.1% and total Baptists were 22.6%.
e Mennonite, Amish, Church of the Brethren, Missionary, Church of God, Holiness, Nazarene, Free Methodist, Church of God in Christ, Plymouth Brethren, Pentecostal, Assemblies of God, Church of Christ, Salvation Army, Primitive, Free Will, and Gospel Baptists, Seventh Day Adventist, Missouri Synod Lutheran, Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and other fundamentalists.
f Unitarian, Universalist, and Quaker.
g Other unspecified, Spiritualist, and Unity.

Trends in Protestant Denominations (Continued)

B. NORC

Year	1950	1963	1963	1963	1964	1964	1964	1965	1965	1967	1967	1968	1970	1971	1972
Study	280	160	350	330	630	760	857	868	870	4011	4018	4050	4100	4119	GSS
Baptist	16	19.2	20.1	21.7	23.3	(18.9)	22.8	20.4	21.6	20.3	(22.8)	23.3	22.3	23.5	20.3
SBC	X	X	X	X	X	9.5	X	X	X	X	11.7	X	X	X	X
Am. Bapt.	X	X	X	X	X	4.7	X	X	X	X	6.2	X	X	X	X
Oth Bapt.	X	X	X	X	X	4.7	X	X	X	X	4.9	X	X	X	X
Methodist	13	14.5	13.6	13.2	13.7	11.2	13.5	15.8	14.1	13.1	(13.5)	14.3	12.6	13.3	13.5
Un. Meth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9.9	X	X	X	X
Free Meth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	0.9	X	X	X	X
Oth Meth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2.7	X	X	X	X
Lutheran	7	9.0	7.0	6.9	9.3	(9.7)	7.5	9.5	9.2	9.1	(7.3)	8.0	8.1	8.5	8.8
Am. Luth.	X	X	X	X	X	6.3	X	X	X	X	4.4	X	X	X	X
Mo. Synod	X	X	X	X	X	2.3	X	X	X	X	2.3	X	X	X	X
Oth Luth.	X	X	X	X	X	1.1	X	X	X	X	0.6	X	X	X	X
Pres.	8	5.4	4.7	4.8	6.1	5.9	5.6	5.5	5.4	4.9	6.1	5.2	4.5	4.4	4.9
Epis.	4	3.1	3.5	2.8	4.2	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.2	2.7	2.1	1.7	2.2
UCC/Cong.	X	1.9	1.8	1.9	3.5	3.6	1.1	2.0	1.9	3.3	2.7	2.8	3.4	2.3	X
DC	X	X	X	X	X	2.6	X	X	X	1.0	1.5	0.7	X	0.7	0.5
Other	19	15.6	17.1	16.3	7.5	13.0	15.5	12.5	13.7	12.0	14.2	13.8	12.4	12.8	12.2
	67	68.7	67.8	67.6	67.5	67.8	68.9	68.5	69.2	66.7	70.3	70.7	65.4	67.1	62.4

B. NORC Continued

YEAR	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1980	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
STUDY	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS	GSS
Baptist	20.5%	21.5%	20.5%	20.3%	20.8%	20.8%	21.6%	19.3%	19.1%	19.6%	21.4%	19.2%	21.8%	21.3%	20.0%
SBC	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	7.4	9.6	8.2	10.2	10.9	8.8
Am. Bapt.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	12.2	11.8	11.0	11.6	10.4	11.2
Oth Bapt.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						
Meth.	12.9	12.5	11.0	10.7	12.3	12.5	11.3	10.8	9.1	10.5	10.8	9.7	10.3	9.4	9.7
Un. Meth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8.1	7.8	7.1	7.9	7.4	7.6
Free Meth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2.4	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.0	2.1

Oth Meth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						
Lutheran	8.2	7.4	9.7	6.8	8.9	7.9	6.2	8.0	8.6	6.3	6.3	7.3	6.0	5.0	7.3
Am. Luth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2.7	2.4	3.4	2.9	1.8	2.6
Mo. Synod	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2.1	2.0	2.4	1.5	1.3	2.2
Oth Luth.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	1.5	1.9	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.6
Pres.	4.0	5.1	5.3	5.1	4.4	3.7	5.4	4.6	3.8	4.8	3.7	3.7	5.2	4.3	4.6
Epis.	2.8	2.7	3.1	3.2	2.2	2.4	3.0	3.1	2.4	1.8	2.8	2.4	2.0	2.1	2.8
UCC/Cong.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	x
DC	0.9	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.1	1.7	0.8	1.6	1.0	2.1	2.5	1.4	1.7	0.6	0.5
Other	12.1	12.5	13.2	14.5	15.1	14.1	15.4	16.5	16.2	17.4	15.3	17.5	17.9	18.4	18.5
Total	61.4	63.1	64.3	62.4	64.8	63.1	63.7	63.9	60.2	62.5	62.8	61.2	64.9	61.1	63.4

Trends in Protestant Denominations (Continued)

C. Gallup, 1967-1989

	1967	1969	1974	1975	1976	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Baptist	21%	20%	21%	20%	21%	19%	19%	19%	19%	19%	21%	20%	20%	20%
Methodist	14	14	14	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	9	10	9
Lutheran	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	5
Pres.	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	2
Epis.	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2
Other	16	--	9	15	13	18	17	20	18	16	13	16	17	20
Total	67	--	60	61	60	60	59	61	59	57	56	57	57	58

SOURCES: Gallup Reports Nos. 130, 145, 222, 236, 259 and RIA, 1990.

Trends in Protestant Denominations (Continued)

C. Gallup, 1967-1988

	1987	1988
Baptist	20%	20%
Methodist	9	10

Lutheran	6	6
Presbyterian	3	4
Episcopalian	2	2
Other	17	14
Total	57	56

D. Gallup, 1979-1988

	1979	1983	1984	1986	1988
Southern Baptist	8%	10%	9%	10%	9%
American Baptist	2	2	2	2	2
Natl Baptist Church of America	1	2	1	*	*
Natl Baptist Church, USA	*	*	*	*	*
Other Baptist	3	3	3	5	3
Baptist, Don't Know	5	5	5	3	5
United Methodist	7	8	7	7	7
African Methodist Episcopal Zion	*	*	*	*	*
African Methodist Episcopal	1	*	*	*	*
Other Methodist	1	1	1	1	1
Methodist, Don't Know	2	1	1	1	2
American Lutheran Church	2	2	2	2	2
Lutheran Church in America	1	1	1	1	1
Missouri Synod Lutheran	2	2	2	1	1
Other Lutheran	*	1	1	*	*
Lutheran, Don't Know	1	1	1	1	1
Presbyterian	4	3	2	2	4
Episcopalian	2	2	3	2	2
United Church of Christ	2	2	2	2	2
Disciples of Christ	2	NA	NA	2	2
Mormon	1	1	NA	NA	NA
Other Protestant	7	3	2	7	6
Protestant, Don't Know	4	3	5	5	4
Other	1	2	2	4	1
	59	56	57	58	57

*Less than 0.5%.

E. CPS, 1957 (Persons 14 +)

Baptist	19.7%
Methodist	14.0
Lutheran	7.1
Presbyterian	5.6
Other (including Episcopalian)	19.8
	66.2

Table 11

Summary of Trends on Major Protestant Denominations

Average Proportion/Change Per Annum/Model

	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Presbyterian	Episcopalian
SRC/Election (1960-1988)	.212/(-.0006)a/NCNL	.125/-.0021/SLC	.071/-.0009/SLT	.046/-.0007/SLT	.025/-.0004/C
NORC (1963-1989)	.208/(+.0001)/NCNL	.120/-.0015/SLC	.077/-.0006/SLC	.049/-.0006/SLT	.026/-.0003/SLC
Gallup (1967-1989)	.201/-.0005/ SLCb	.108/-.0025/SLT	.064/-.0007/SLC	.040/-.0021/SLC	.024/-.0006/SLC

a Parentheses mean trend is not statistically significant.
b Borderline significance, almost fits constant model.

Table 12

Trends in Fundamentalism/Liberalism

A. NORC/GSS

	1964	1967	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Fundamentalist	26.2%	32.2%	34.1%	33.7%	35.1%	35.8%	35.4%	33.0%

Moderate	43.7	42.1	39.6	39.8	39.7	38.4	38.6	40.7
Liberal	30.1	25.7	26.4	26.5	25.2	25.8	25.9	26.3
None	2.5	3.8	7.3	7.1	6.7	8.0	8.0	7.8
	(1953)	(3092)	(1432)	(1499)	(1473)	(1423)	(1426)	(1491)

B. SRC/ELECTION

	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988
Southern Baptists and Fundamentalists	18.8%	20.5%	18.2%	19.1%	18.9%	20.9%	18.0%	20.5%	23.1%
	(2695)	(2500)	(2867)	(2285)	(1598)	(1402)	(2237)	(2153)	(2026)

Table 13

Religion Raised in By Birth Cohorta
(Excluding people raised in another country)

A. GSS 1972-87

Birth Cohort	Religion					
	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None	
Prior to 1910	78.0%	17.1	2.5	0.2	2.2	(1917)
1910-1919 (1931)b	71.9%	21.7	3.4	0.6	2.4	(2321)
1920-1929 (1941)	70.4%	22.7	3.4	1.0	2.4	(2693)
1930-1939 (1951)	66.9%	25.8	3.6	0.7	2.9	(2678)
1940-1949 (1961)	63.4%	29.5	3.3	0.7	3.1	(3717)
1950-1959 (1971)	62.6%	30.9	2.4	0.5	3.6	(4027)
1960+	60.4%	32.4	1.2	0.7	5.4	(1118)

B. GSS 1984-87

Religion

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None	
Prior to 1910	77.2%	17.0	1.9	0.5	3.4	(265)
1910-1919 (1931)	73.7%	21.5	2.0	0.6	2.1	(526)
1920-1929 (1941)	70.9%	20.3	5.4	0.9	2.4	(780)
1930-1939 (1951)	71.1%	24.0	2.2	0.6	2.1	(848)
3940-1949 (1961)	63.0%	29.1	3.3	1.1	3.4	(1139)
1950-1959 (1971)	66.7%	27.6	2.3	0.4	3.1	(1378)
1960+	59.6%	33.0	1.1	0.6	5.7	(1006)

a Weighted by number of adults in household and reciprocal of number of children in parent's family.

b Number in parenthesis is year in which a person born in middle of cohort turned 16.

Table 14

Summary of Trends on Religion Raised
in Across Cohortsa (1972-1987 GSS)
(Excluding people raised in another country)

Religion	Modelb	Slope	r2
Protestants	SLT	-.0027	.965
1951-1981	SLT	-.0020	.942
Catholics	SLT	+.0024	.984
1951-1981	SLT	+.0021	.938
Jews	SLC	-.0003	.239
1951-1981	SLT	-.0009	.941
Others	C	(+.0001)c	(.140)
1951-1981	C	(-.0000)	(.067)
Nones	SLT	+.0004	.750
1951-1981	SLT	+.0007	.823

a Based on Table 12.
b Models explained in note 1. SLT = Significant linear trend.
SLC = Significant linear component. C = Constant.
c Not significant in parentheses.

Table 15

Religion Raised in by Birth Cohort
Major Denominations/Religions
(Excl. people raised in another country)

(GSS 1984-1987)

Birth Cohort	Major Denominations/Religions										
									Other Protestants		
	SBC	UM	LUa	PRb	EP	I-D	DC	LDS	FUND	MOD	LIB
Prior to 1910	6.7%	12.9	2.3	3.6	2.7	3.2	3.7	0.7	24.6	7.9	8.8
1910-1919 (1931)	8.4%	9.3	2.7	3.1	3.7	2.4	3.3	1.4	23.0	6.6	9.6
1920-1929 (1941)	8.3%	9.1	3.7	2.9	2.8	1.8	2.6	1.1	24.2	4.7	9.7
1930-1939 (1951)	11.9%	10.0	2.1	4.3	3.6	2.1	2.9	1.6	23.1	3.1	6.0
1940-1949 (1961)	11.5%	10.0	2.9	3.5	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.8	18.7	2.6	8.3
1950-1959 (1971)	9.8%	9.2	3.0	3.7	3.0	2.3	1.9	2.0	22.0	3.8	5.9
1960+	8.9%	6.2	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.1	21.5	4.1	5.0

a American Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in America.
b Presbyterian Church in the United States and United Presbyterian Church.

Table 16

Religion Raised in by Birth Cohort
Fundamentalism/Liberalism
(Excluding people raised in another country)

(GSS 1984-1987)

Birth Cohort	Fundamentalism/Liberalism

	Fundamentalists	Moderates	Liberals	
Prior to 1910	32.2%	36.3	31.6	(258)
1910-1919 (1931)	33.0%	38.5	28.5	(516)
1920-1929 (1941)	33.9%	34.4	31.7	(775)
1930-1939 (1951)	36.8%	36.4	26.7	(830)
1940-1949 (1961)	32.3%	39.3	28.4	(1107)
1950-1959 (1971)	34.0%	39.9	26.0	(1341)
1960+	32.8%	45.7	21.4	(982)

Table 17

Percent Belonging to "Church" Group

Mental Health - 1957	14.7%a
Five Nations - 1959	15.1%b
AIPO - 1960	35.0%c
SRS/NORC - 1964	20.1%d
Political Part. - 1967	6.2%e
SRC/Election - 1972	50.3%
GSS - 1974	42.1%
GSS - 1975	40.1%
GSS - 1977	38.7%
GSS - 1978	36.2%
GSS - 1980	30.5%
GSS - 1983	37.7%
GSS - 1984	33.8%
GSS - 1986	40.0%
GSS - 1987	30.5%
GSS - 1987	14.0%f
GSS - 1988	34.6%
GSS - 1989	32.7%

a Sum of mentions of church group on first, second, or third mention. This might include double counts for people who named more than one church group and/or undercounts from people mentioning a church group as a fourth or later mention.

b Sum of mentions of church group on first, second, third, or fourth mentions. This might count more than once

people who named
more than one church group. Since no church groups were recorded as a fourth mention undercounts are not likely.

c Category defined as "Church: Ladies Aid, Bible Clubs, Holy Name, Rosary Society, etc. (Any mention of a church or missionary
group)".

d Category defined as "Church groups (including groups connected with the church, Bible Study groups, etc.)".

e Coded from the groups listed in response to "Any organizations not listed?". The list of church-affiliated organizations makes
no reference to the church as a whole. That list includes Church Circle, Women's Christian Society, Women's Christian Service
Club, Religious Writers, Young Fellowships, Holy Name, Catholic Order of Foresters, Bible Study, Missionary Society, Rosary
Society, Fireside Fellowship, Holy Family Rosary Society, Church Choir, Lutheran Church Women, Temple Beth Am Fellowship,
Council of Jewish Women, Catholic Daughters, Stewardess Board of Church, Jr. Mechanics Organization -- Church group, Missionary
Society (in church), Altar Guild, Rosary Alter Society, Ladies Aid of Church, Newcomers, Religious Training, Women's Christian
Training Course.

f People who said they belonged to a church-affiliated group were asked, "You said you were a member of a church affiliated
group. Is that group or organization the church (synagogue) itself, or some other group related to the church?" Only those
indicating some group besides the church itself are counted.

WORDINGS

1. SRC/Mental Health (March, 1957)
   Are you a member of any (other) clubs and organizations -- like a lodge, PTA, a community group, or any other kind of
   group? IF YES: What are they?

2. Almond and Verba Five Nation Study - USA (June/July, 1959)
   Are you a member of any organizations now -- trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional
   or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civil or
   religious organizations -- or any other organized group? (Any others?) (If needed:) (Which Ones?)

3. AIPO625 (March, 1960)
   What community organizations or groups, if any, do you belong to, that is, fraternal, social, business, civic, or religious
   groups?

4. SRS/NORC760 (October, 1964)

Do you belong to any organizations or clubs, such as a union, lodge, church group, political organization, or social club?
IF YES: Could you tell me what there are?

5. Verba and Nie Political Participation in America (March-June, 1967)
Now we would like to know something about the groups and organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of
various kinds of organizations. Could you tell me if you belong to any of these kinds? Do you belong to any . . . CODE
YES OR NO FOR EACH.
Fraternal groups? Service clubs? Any Veteran groups? Any political groups? Any labor unions? Any sport groups? Any
youth groups? Any school service groups? Any hobby or garden clubs? Any school fraternities or sororities? Any
nationality groups? Any farm organizations? Any literary, art discussion or study clubs? Any professional or academic
societies? Any organization not listed? (PLEASE WRITE IN.)

6. SRC/Election (October/November, 1972)
Here is a list of some kinds of organizations to which people may belong. Just tell me the letter on the card of any type
of organization that you belong to. If you belong to any that are not on this list, tell me about those too. Fraternal
lodges/Business groups/Professional groups/Farm organizations/Church or religious groups/Neighborhood associations/Social
or card-playing groups/Athletic clubs or teams/Cooperatives/Political clubs or organizations/Charity or social-welfare
organizations/Veteran's organizations/Civic groups (Including PTA, Board of Education)/Special-Interest groups or
lobbies/Ethnic, Racial, or nationality associations/Labor unions/Other.

7. General Social Surveys 1974-1989
We would like to know something about the groups and organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various
kinds of organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of each type? (READ EACH ITEM. CODE ONE FOR
EACH).

Fraternal groups/Service clubs/Veterans groups/Political clubs/Labor unions/Sports groups/Youth groups/ School service
groups/Hobby or garden clubs/School fraternities or sororities/Nationality groups/Farm organizations/ Literary, art
discussion or study groups/Professional or academic societies/Church-affiliated groups/Any other groups?

Table 18

Percent Belonging to Church Groups by Mentioning

of Groups and Breath of Coverage

Religious Groups	Coverage: Restricted (No General Membership)	Probably More Uncertain	Inclusive
Not Mentioned	6.2% (Pol. Part.)	14.7% (Mental Hlth.)	
Mentioned			
No Separate Query		15.1% (5 Nations)	20.1% (SRS/NORC) 35.0% (AIPO)
Specific Query	14.0% (GSS-87)		36.7% (GSS 73-87) 50.3% (SRC/Elec.)

Table 19

Church Membership

Year	Study	% Members			
		ALL	Protestants	Catholics	Jews
1943	NORC210a	79.0%	__	__	__
1943	NORC216	80.0%	__	__	__
1944	NORC223	80.3%	__	__	__
1967	Pol. Part.b	74.3%	__	__	__
1988	GSSc	61.1%	67.0	67.2	50.0
1937	Gallupd	73%	__	__	__
1938	Gallup	73%	__	__	__
1939	Gallup	72%	__	__	__
1940	Gallup	72%	__	__	__
1942	Gallup	75%	__	__	__
1944	Gallup	75%	__	__	__

1947	Gallup	76%	__	__	__
1952	Gallup	73%	75%	87%	50%
1965	Gallup	73%	75%	90%	62%
1975	Gallup	71%	73%	83%	34%
1976	Gallup	71%	71%	80%	__
1977	Gallup	70%	__	__	__
1978	Gallup	68%	__	__	__
1979	Gallup	68%	73%	78%	37%
1980	Gallup	69%	72%	80%	51%
1981	Gallup	68%	73%	79%	__
1982	Gallup	67%	__	__	__
1983	Gallup	69%	73%	80%	45%
1984	Gallup	68%	72%	80%	58%
1985	Gallup	71%	__	__	__
1986	Gallup	69%	72%	81%	44%
1987	Gallup	69%	__	__	__
1988	Gallup	65%	72%	72%	__
1989	Gallup	69%	__	__	__
1990	Gallup	69%	71%	81%	__

a For NORC studies in 1943 and 1944 the wording was "Are you a member of a church?"
b "Are you a member of a church? (IF JEWISH: Are you a member of a synagogue?)"
c "Are you, yourself a member of a church or synagogue?"
d Wording for Gallup studies are not individually documented. For 1937-1948 it was "Are you a member of a church? In some or all later years it was "Do you happen to be a member of a church or synagogue?" Gallup data reported in Gallup Reports Nos. 184, 222, 236 and 259; RIA, 1990; Gallup and Jones, 1989; and Emerging Trends, 12 (Oct., 1990).

Table 20

Changes in Religious Preferences and Memberships, 1952-1985
(Gallup)

	Preferences			Memberships		
	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
1952	69.8%	26.0%	4.2%	68.0%	29.3%	2.7%
1965	70.8%	26.0%	3.1%	67.7%	29.8%	2.4%
1975	67.8%	30.0%	2.2%	65.9%	33.2%	0.9%
1985	65.5%	32.2%	2.3%	63.5%	34.9%	1.6%

Table 21

% Attending Church Last Week[a]

A. Gallup

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish
1958	44	74	--
1964	38	71	--
1965	38	67	--
1966	38	68	--
1967	39	66	--
1968	38	65	--
1969	37	63	--
1970	38	60	--
1971	37	57	--
1972	37	56	--
1973	37	55	--
1974	37	55	--
1975	38	54	20
1976	40	55	23
1978	40	52	27
1979	40	52	--
1980	39	53	25
1981	40	53	--
1982	41	51	--
1983	39	52	32
1984	39	51	--
1986	41	49	20
1987	38	52	--
1988	45	48	--
1989	40	50	--

SOURCE: Gallup Reports Nos. 130, 145, 145, 184, 236, 222, 259, RIA, 1979-80, Emerging Trends, 12 (June, 1990).

B. NORC/GSS

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None
1972	44	61	14	47	04
1973	42	49	14	29	02

1974	42	53	15	19	04
1975	44	47	22	33	03
1976	41	46	10	36	05
1977	41	52	20	36	05
1978	41	51	14	27	04
1980	42	50	19	22	03
1982	41	45	19	35	04
1983	45	49	21	35	01
1984	45	50	19	39	04
1985	43	48	19	34	03
1986	46	48	19	24	03
1987	42	46	23	32	05
1988	42	45	19	36	02
1989	41	47	20	41	04

SOURCE: General Social Surveys, 1972-1989

a We converted the NORC categories into probabilities of attending church in a given week, comparable to the way Gallup collects church attendance. While these two different methods of measuring church attendance should not necessarily yield similar estimates, on average they do. Across 64 Gallup surveys from 1974 to 1984, the average proportion attending church was .412. For the 1972-1987 GSSs, the average was .415.

Table 22

Comparison of Religious Affiliators
and Church Goers
1984-87

Affiliators	Church Goers

A. Major Religious

Protestant	62.8%	66.1%
Catholic	26.5	31.1
Jewish	1.9	1.0
Other	1.7	1.3
None	7.9	0.6

B. Protestant Denominations

Southern Baptist	8.9%	9.1%
United Methodist	7.7	7.3
Lutheran	2.9	2.9
Presbyterian	2.7	2.9
Episcopalian	2.2	1.9
Interdenominational	3.6	3.0
Disciples of Christ	1.9	1.9
Mormon	2.5	4.2
Fundamentalist	22.6	27.0
Moderate	3.4	3.1
Liberal	4.2	2.5

C. Fundamentalism/Liberalism

Fundamentalist	34.6%	40.9%
Moderate	40.2	43.9
Liberal	25.3	15.2

Table 23

Changes in Reported Church Membership
by 5-Year Intervals, 1950-1985a
(Percentage Change During 5-Year Interval)

	1950-55	1955-60	1960-65	1965-70	1970-75	1975-80	1980-85
Liberal Churches							
United Church of Christ	7.0	5.9	-7.6b	-5.3	-7.2	-4.5	-3.0
Episcopal Church	15.0c	17.6c	4.1c	-3.4c	-13.0	-2.5	-1.7
United Methodist	3.9	6.1	4.0	-5.0	-6.1	-3.5	-3.7d
Moderate Churches							
Disciples of Christ	7.3	-5.1	6.5	-25.7	-8.6	-9.5	-5.2
Presbyterian Church, USA	15.3	12.4	-4.3	1.5	-12.6	-4.9	-9.3

Roman Catholic	16.6	26.1	9.8	4.3	1.4	3.2	4.4
Lutheran Church in America	15.2	10.6	2.9	-1.1	-3.9	2.1	-0.9
American Lutheran Church	20.4	17.3	13.3	0.0	-5.0	-2.6	-0.9
Reformed Church in America	12.3	11.0	8.8	-4.7	-3.4	-2.7	-0.9
Fundamentalist Churches							
Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod	19.7	19.3	12.6	3.6	-0.9	-5.0	0.1
Southern Baptist	19.6	14.9	10.7	8.0	9.5	6.8	6.5
Church of the Nazarene	19.4	13.7	11.6	11.6	15.1	9.8	7.8
Mormon	10.7	20.9	20.3	15.9	12.7	23.3	37.3
Jehovah's Witnesses	--	33.6	32.1	17.8	44.2	0.8	29.2
Seventh-Day Adventist	16.9	14.7	14.7	15.3	17.9	15.2	14.1
Church of God (Cleveland, TN)	22.5e	19.3	20.7	32.5	26.1	26.7	20.3e
Assemblies of God	25.6	27.1	12.5	9.2	--	35.5	95.7

a From Jacquet, 1987. For slightly different figures for 1950-1975 see Doyle and Kelly, 1979.
b Some of this drop is due to congregational secession following merger.
c Estimated from 1956 and 1966 figures.
d Estimated from 1984.
e Estimated from 1951 and 1984.

Table 24

Fertility Indicators

	# of Children in Family of Origina	Ideal # of Childrenb	Total Number of Children Expectedc	Children Expected (R less than 36)
A. Major Religions				
Protestant	3.44	2.76	2.36	1.89
Catholic	3.65	3.01	2.33	1.98
Jewish	2.45	2.61	2.04	1.68
Other	3.85	2.73	2.09	1.62
None	3.19	2.55	1.63	1.49
Source: GSS, 1984-1987				
B. Major Religions and Protestant Denominations				
Mormon	4.46	3.93	3.58	2.83
Other	3.85	2.55	2.08	(1.69)a
Fundamentalistb	3.78	2.69	2.59	1.68
Catholic	3.65	2.74	2.33	1.56
Interdenominational	3.61	2.36	1.92	1.22
Southern Baptist	3.53	2.53	2.23	1.35

a Number of siblings + 1 weighted for multiplicity of reports, religion raised in rather than current religion used.
b CHLDIDEL with mentions of "as many as you want," coded to 3.5.
c Number of children ever born (CHILDS) + number of additional children expected (CHLDNUM/CHLDMORE).

Moderate	3.52	2.66	2.20	1.25
Disciples of Christ	3.26	2.67	2.05	1.31
Lutheranc	3.24	2.25	2.16	1.37
United Methodist	3.21	2.45	2.25	1.46
None	3.19	2.38	1.63	1.17
Liberal	3.03	2.33	2.07	1.42
Presbyteriand	2.69	2.42	2.23	(1.22)
Episcopalian	2.64	2.36	2.04	(1.68)
Jewish	2.45	2.51	2.04	(1.30)

a Figures in parentheses based on less than 50 cases.
b For classification of Fundamentalist, Moderate, and Liberal see Smith, 1987.
c American Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in America.
d Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.

C. Fundamental/Liberal Categories

Fundamentalist	3.80	2.73	2.57	1.70
Moderate	3.51	2.65	2.24	1.48
Liberal	3.05	2.40	2.01	1.33

Table 25

Number of Children in Family of Origin by Birth Cohort

(GSS 1984-1987)

	Birth Cohorts						
A. Major Religions	Pre 1910	1910-1919	1920-1929	1930-1939	1940-1949	1950-1959	1960+
Protestant	4.4	3.9	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.4
Catholic	4.2	4.0	4.2	3.5	3.4	3.8	3.4
Jewish	__a	__	2.0	__	2.0	__	__
Other	__	__	__	__	__	__	__
None	__	__	__	__	3.2	3.1	3.3
B. Fundamentalism/Liberalism							
Fundamentalist	4.9	4.5	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.6
Moderate	4.2	3.7	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.5
Liberal	4.0	3.3	2.8	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.0

a Too few cases.

Table 26

Mean Age of Major Religions and Denominations

(1984-1987 GSS)

Religion/Denomination	Mean Age
None	36.7
Other	40.2
Interdenominational	41.2
Mormon	41.4
Catholic	42.5
Disciples of Christ	43.1
Moderate	44.2
Southern Baptist	44.3
Episcopalian	45.2
Fundamentalist	45.3
Lutheran	46.3
Liberal	46.8
United Methodist	47.4
Presbyterian	47.4
Jewish	48.1

Table 27

Immigrant Status of Major Religions and Denominations

	Immigrant Status (Generations)						
	First (Adult)	First (Child)	Second	Third	Partly Fourth	Fourth +	All
A. Major Religions							
Protestant	28.6%	30.8%	29.6%	39.8%	51.4%	79.1%	63.0%
Catholic	44.4	50.7	52.8	45.0	37.8	13.6	26.4
Jewish	5.2	5.2	9.1	5.1	2.2	0.3	2.1
Other	12.3	4.7	3.2	1.7	0.8	0.6	1.5
None	9.6	8.6	5.2	8.3	7.8	6.4	7.0
B. Major Protestant Denominations							
Southern Baptist	0.9%	0.5%	0.3%	1.2%	3.2%	14.3%	9.1%

United Methodist	1.8	4.4	2.4	5.1	7.6	9.6	7.9
Lutheran	1.6	0.0	4.4	5.0	4.0	2.0	2.8
Presbyterian	2.7	0.5	0.7	2.5	4.7	2.4	2.7
Episcopalian	2.5	0.0	2.5	1.5	4.1	1.8	2.2
Interdenominational	1.6	0.0	2.2	2.7	2.9	4.3	3.5
Disciples of Christ	0.0	2.0	0.3	0.2	1.5	2.7	2.0
Mormon	0.0	2.0	0.8	1.3	3.2	3.0	2.5
Fundamentalist	8.4	15.1	9.3	11.7	13.2	29.5	22.1
Moderate	2.7	2.5	3.7	2.3	2.7	3.8	3.4
Liberal	2.0	3.0	3.9	3.7	4.6	4.4	4.2
C. Fundamentalism/Liberalism							
Fundamentalist	11.1	17.9	10.8	14.5	19.8	47.2	34.4
Moderate	64.8	55.6	66.6	58.3	50.4	28.8	40.2
Liberal	24.1	26.4	22.6	27.2	79.8	24.0	25.4

Source: GSS 1984-1987

Table 28

% Switching Religions

(1984-1987 GSS)

Five Major Religions	13.7%
Three Fund./Liberal Categories	21.0%
All Separately Coded Religionsa	31.9%
Ever Switched (1988)b	35.7%

a All codes on RELIG, DENOM, and OTHER are used except for the collapsing of codes that actually represent the same denomination. For example, on OTHER the codes LDS (59), LDS-Mormon (60), LDS-Jesus Christ; Church of Jesus LDS (62), and Mormon (64) were all collapsed together.

b I'd like to go over your religious preferences since you were raised as a ____. Have you ever had another religious preference besides being ____?

Table 29

Indicators of Religious Mobility

	% Stable	Gain/Losses	Net Change (Base = 100%)
A. Major Religions			
Protestant	90.4%	.705	97.2%
Catholic	82.3	.562	92.3
Jewish	86.6	1.000	100.0
Other	70.5	1.720	121.2
None	45.4	3.133	215.0
B. Major Protestant Denominations			
Southern Baptist	71.8	.677	90.9
United Methodist	63.0	.902	96.4
Lutheran	80.0	1.633	112.7
Presbyterian	56.7	1.156	106.7
Episcopalian	71.6	1.257	107.3
Interdenominational	47.1	2.292	168.3
Disciples of Christ	63.9	.884	95.8
Mormon	90.8	3.270	120.3
Fundamentalist	73.7	.889	97.1
Moderate	57.0	.600	82.8
Liberal	46.4	.450	70.5
C. Fundamentalism/Liberalism			
Fundamentalist	80.3	.825	96.3
Moderate	81.9	.683	94.5
Liberal	71.6	2.020	128.2

Table 30

% Switching Religions by Birth Cohort

(1984-1987 GSS)

	Major	Fund./	All

	Religions	Liberal	Religions
Prior to 1910	7.7%	24.3%	32.6%
1910-1919	8.7	20.7	27.6
1920-1929	10.7	24.7	31.9
1930-1939	12.6	23.2	32.4
1940-1949	17.2	24.0	33.1
1950-1959	17.0	20.0	28.0
1960 +	14.8	13.9	21.8

Table 31

Probabilities of Parents Attending Church Services
by Religion Respondent Raised In

(Average of Mother/Father)

A. Major Religions

Protestant	.551
Catholic	.619
Jewish	.318
Other	.461
None	.061

B. Major Protestant Denominations

Southern Baptist	.565
United Methodist	.541
Lutheran	.572
Presbyterian	.509
Episcopalian	.572
Interdenominational	.388
Disciples of Christ	.448
Mormon	.620
Fundamentalist	.599
Moderate	.547
Liberal	.432

C. Fundamentalism/Liberalism

Fundamentalist	.591
Moderate	.589
Liberal	.426

Source: GSS 1984-1987

Table 32
Levels of Religious Inter-marriage
for Religious of Origin and Current Religion
by Religious Three Classifications

(% with Spouse of a Different Religion)

A. Religions of Origin	
Major Religions	26.8%
Fundamentalism/Liberalism	39.2%
All Religions	60.1%
B. Current Religions	
Major Religions	15.3%
Fundamentalism/Liberalism	18.5%
All Religions	39.6%

Table 33

% of Respondents Raised in a Different Religion
Than Their Spouse was Raised In
by Birth and Marital Cohorts
(1984 - 1987)

	Birth Cohorta		First Marriage
	All Married	Never Divorced	Cohortb
A. Major Religions			
Prior to 1910	17.9%	17.1%	*
1910 - 1919	19.1	19.6	*
1920 - 1929	21.8	20.9	14.6%
1930 - 1939	24.9	23.7	18.0
1940 - 1949	28.7	27.7	20.4
1950 - 1959	31.6	33.2	24.2
1960 - 1970	33.5	34.7	28.6
1970 +	--	--	36.1

	Birth Cohort		First Marriage
	All Married	Never Divorced	Cohort

B. Fundamentalism/Liberalism			
Prior to 1910	43.9%	42.9%	*
1910 - 1919	31.5	33.5	*
1920 - 1929	38.9	36.9	43.7%
1930 - 1939	35.8	33.5	35.9
1940 - 1949	42.6	41.4	36.4
1950 - 1959	41.1	40.5	34.5
1960 - 1970	39.4	39.9	39.8
1970 +	--	--	41.3

	Birth Cohort		First Marriage
	All Married	Never Divorced	Cohort
C. All Religions			
Prior to 1910	61.4%	60.6%	*
1910 - 1919	55.9	56.9	*
1920 - 1929	60.9	59.4	63.5%
1930 - 1939	56.6	54.6	59.1
1940 - 1949	63.8	62.6	58.5
1950 - 1959	61.7	61.3	56.1
1960 - 1970	64.9	66.2	61.0
1970 +	--	--	64.0

a All currently married respondents included in "All Married". "Never divorced" excludes currently married respondents who have been divorced and thus are not in their first marriage.

b Covers currently married respondents who have never been divorced.

Table 34

Religious Trends for Major Religions, 1972-1989 (GSS)a

	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Other	None
1972	66.7%	24.6	3.1	1.2	4.5
1973	66.3%	23.7	2.8	1.4	5.8
1974	66.9%	23.3	3.1	0.6	6.1
1975	66.2%	23.7	2.2	1.2	6.7
1976	64.0%	25.6	2.8	0.9	6.8
1977	64.9%	26.0	2.1	1.1	5.9
1978	63.1%	26.3	1.9	1.1	7.6
1980	63.9%	25.3	1.9	2.0	6.8
1982	63.9%	25.7	2.1	1.2	7.1
1983	60.3%	28.2	2.5	1.5	7.5
1984	62.5%	27.4	1.8	1.5	6.8
1985	62.8%	26.5	2.1	1.4	7.2
1986	61.2%	27.4	2.5	2.0	6.9

1987	64.9%	24.7	1.3	2.0	7.1
1988	60.4%	27.1	2.0	2.8	7.7
1989	62.3%	26.2	1.5	2.1	7.8

Religion	Model	Slope
Protestant	SLT	-.0030
Catholic	C	(+.0017)
Jewish	SLT	-.0007
Other	SLT	+.0008
None	SLT	+.0013

a The full-probability samples have been weighted for number of adults. The block quota samples have been adjusted to make them comparable to weighted full-probability samples (see notes 7). 1972 and 1973 have been adjusted for miscodes between Other and Protestant. Slope in parentheses is not statistically significant.

Endnotes

1 The statistical trends tested are described in Taylor, 1975. In brief, a series of models are fitted to the time series. If there is no significant variation from the pooled or average proportion, a constant model is accepted. If there is no significant variation from the best linear line, a linear model is accepted. If the best linear fit is significantly better than the constant fit, but there is still significant variation, then a linear component model is accepted. If the linear model is not a significant improvement over the consistent model and there is significant variation in both cases, then the time series is judged to be non-constant, non-linear. For the NORC and SRC/Election series, we employ each data point individually using true N to calculate yearly estimates were available. For calculation purposes, we assigned each an N of 5,000. This naturally makes Gallup modeling less precise.

2 Gallup's definition of Protestant denominations is unclear and apparently changes over time. Documentation is also internally inconsistent (e.g. RIA, 1982, pp. 23, 26). Prior to the adding of "Mormon" to the basic religion question in 1983 Mormons were at least sometimes included in the Protestant total. After the explicit mentioning of Mormons in 1983, they seem to be counted among Others rather than Protestants. At least one survey explicitly lists Jehovah's Witnesses as Protestants.

3 McCourt and Taylor (1976) report on a sample of Catholics that was drawn

from the April through November 1973 samples of the Continuous National Survey. They find that 5% (45 cases) of those identified as Catholic on the CNS ("What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholics, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?") were not Catholics on the follow-up survey conducted in February, 1974 ("What is your present religion?"). They credit the inconsistencies to 1) people raised as Catholic who are out of grace with the church because of their marital status, 2) people married to a Catholic and perhaps intending to become one, and 3) confusion with the Greek Orthodox faith. They conclude that "asking the present religion rather than religious preference seems to be more precise in its ability to elicit religious affiliation, at least among Catholics in the United States." They however overlook two alternatives explanations. First, on average six months lapsed between the initial interview and the reinterview and some religious conversions could have occurred within this span. It is hard to judge how many this might cover, but over the approximately 30 years between current religion and the religion one was raised in, the proportion of Catholic changing faith was 17.7% (see Mobility section below). To prorate this over a six-month period (a very simplistic expedient), we get an expected shift of 0.3%. This suggests that true change is not a likely explanation. Simple random measurement error might be however. Test-retest measures of religion over a six-week period on the 1972 and 1978 GSSs showed that almost 5% of respondents (not just Catholics) reported different religions in response to the identical question 3.3% in 1972 and 5.7% in 1978). Thus a modicum of true change plus simple measurement variation without any consideration of differences in question wording could readily account for the observed 5% shift.

Secondly, their Orthodox hypothesis is tenuous. They found that 2 of their 45 lapsed Catholics reported being Greek Orthodox. First, while a few small orthodox churches do incorporate "Catholic" as part of their title (American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East, and Eastern Orthodox Catholic Church in America), they contain well less than a 100,000 adherents and make up only a small share of the total Orthodox faith. While the two Greek Orthodox cases make up 4% of the switchers, this is only a little over a single case more than what one would have predicted by chance and is neither significant nor notable.

More notable is the fact that 31% (14) of the switchers reported no religion on the second interview. Given that the CNS's averaged about 5.2% None, this is almost six times as many as expected. As the distribution from other NORC surveys with a time reference indicates, focusing on the present increases the proportion saying they have no religion by counting people who have stopped practicing their earlier religion while in many cases still retaining some identification with and preference towards. Mccourt and Taylor identify one group, those marital status puts them at odds with the Catholic church, which tends to fall into this lapsed group.

Similarly, Roof (1980) found that 2.4% of those who gave Catholic as their religious preference, reported membership in a Protestant church (and 0.7 of Protestants belonged to the Catholic Church). He found that the

preference-membership discrepancy for Catholics was related to 1) having weak ties to local community, 2) low church attendance as a child, 3) having a Protestant spouse, and 4) favoring "new moral values" (acceptance of sexual freedom, marijuana usage, abortion). He failed to find current status having any relationship to the preference/membership disagreement. His results do however confirm McCourt and Taylor about inter-marriage and Roof's finding that Catholics who hold liberal moral positions at odd with the Catholic church are most likely to be members of other denominations is consistent with the lapsed or non-practicing argument made above.

4 One other possible measurement variation is mode administration (Telephone vs. personal). Since only the 1979 NORC point is a telephone survey, we excluded it from analysis. This point appears to be an outlier however. In particular, while the question and wording and the exclusive of non-phone household should have tended to reduce the proportion None (Smith, 1987), this survey shows a higher than normal proportion None. One hypothesis is that telephone survey increase Nones because there is less on a social desirability effect operating to pressure respondent to "be something" (Smith, 1984). We have no evidence on this point however and do not pursue mode of administration differences in this paper.

5 Table 2 lists 120 data points, 97 from NORC, 22 from SRC/Election, and 1 from the Current Population Survey of the Census. The multivariate analysis was generally based on 113 data points, 91 from NORC, 21 from SRC/Election, and 1 from CPS. Three NORC points dealing with church memberships, one on which the Other and None were collapsed together, one telephone survey, and one with on documentation on the wording of the religion question were eliminated (NORC210, 216, 223, 228, 4294, 143). Likewise, one SRC/Election point that covered heads of households or their spouses were dropped. (SRC1960, 10/1960).

6 Many different variants of these variables were tried. Because of the smaller number of cases involved and the categorical nature of several of the independent variable, some of the relationships are liable, appearing significant in some models, but not in others. The basic relationships, such as the association between time and the religious preferences, were quite robust however. The models presented here represent overall the best ways of modeling data.

7 This is also supported by the fact that when all NORC studies are adjusted to approximate full-probability surveys, the estimates of the slopes move more in line with the SRC and Gallup estimates. the Adjusted slopes are Protestant -.0026, Catholic +.0016, and None +.0017. The experimental comparisons between full-probability and probability with block quotas conducted on the GSS in 1975-76 were used to construct weights to adjust the proportions from the block quota surveys into estimates of what weighted, full-probability surveys would have yielded. The adjustment takes into consideration both the number of adults in the household and sampling

technique. We developed both a ratio adjustment factor and a percentage difference factor. After trying both we decided that 1) there were usually little difference between the two methods and 2) the ratio adjustment was a little more accurate than the percentage difference adjustment. Adjustments were calculated for Protestants, Catholics, and Nones. No adjustments were created for Jews and Others because of variability in the estimates for these small religious groups. The adjustments increased the proportion Protestant on block quota samples by 1.027 and decreased the Catholic and None shares by .911 and .848 respectively. These adjustments were applied to all block quota samples. For the probability samples number of adult weights were employed.

8 Because of the confounding of time and coding on the SRC/Election studies, we have not attempted to adjust the time series by controlling for the latter.

9 Pooling all GSS years together and looking at the percent Nones by single age groups shows that Nones peak at 13-14% for those 23-26. Nones then fall to 10% by 29-30, 8% by 38-39, 6% by 43-46, 4% by 50-54. The pooling across years minimizes, but does not eliminate the impact of cohort on these age differences.

10 Because of the shift to more detailed coding of Protestant denominations starting in 1984, we can consistently apply certain codes only after that point. For details on this matter, see Smith, 1990b.

11 This is probably also the cause of the instability of membership levels reported in the GSS. The swings from 1980 to 1983, 1984 to 1986, and 1986 to 1987 are much greater than those for other groups and quite large compared to other GSS items. Some respondents report their general church membership, while other do not and the ratio between the two groups apparently varies across surveys. One of the sources for these variation appears to be context. Variation in question order across years appears to account for a 6-7 percentage point difference in reported membership (Smith, 1990a).

12 On the 1988 GSS 7% of those with no religious preference reported that that they were members of a church.

13 Considerable discussion (Hout and Greeley, 1987; Chaves, 1989; Hout and Greeley, 1990; Chaves, 1990) has devoted to the issue of whether there are cohort effects in church attendance and whether such effects indicate that secularization is occurring. Since it appears that church attendance varies both across age as a life cycle effect and across cohorts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate these two factors.

14 The most common critiques of church membership statistics are:

1. Coverage

Not all denominations are covered in the compilations and the

coverage of denominations has varied over time (Newman and Halvorson, 1982; Demerath, 1968; Glock and Stock, 1965; Jacquet, 1985; Roozen and Carroll, 1979). The total number of members across churches thus has little meaning.

2. Definition of Members

Denominations define members differently. For example, Catholics and most Lutherans tend to count all baptized people as members, thereby including many children, while most other denominations count only confirmed members who are usually 13 or older (Doyle and Kelly, 1979; Roozen and Carroll, 1979; Wolf, 1959; Newman, Halvorson, and Brown, 1977; Landis, 1959; Demerath, 1968; Kelley, 1977; Newman and Halvorson, 1982; Jacquet, 1985). The Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches (Jacquet, 1985) reports both "Inclusive membership" and "Full, Communicant, or Confirmed Members," but the latter is missing for many denominations and the terms are not under in the same manner by the reporting denominations. While membership definitions tend to remain fixed over time (but see Demarath, 1968, p. 354), changes in age structure due primarily to fluctuations in the birth rate will effect the relative growth rates of denominations. For example, during the Baby Boom of 1946-1960 Catholic membership immediately began to show increases from the infant baptisms, but churches that counted only confirmed or adult members would not show the boost until the Baby Boom was actually over.

3. Reliability

The data quality of church statistics varies widely among denominations and probably over time as well. Few churches rely on rigorously executed censuses. For a number of denominations the reported numbers are educated guesses, often rounded to the nearest hundred thousand or even half million (Jacquet, 1985 and Newman, Halvorson, and Brown, 1977). It is sometimes claimed that the reports of smaller, periphery churches tend to be less accurate than those of the larger, mainline denominations (Kelley, 1977). For some denominations, total membership figures depend on the voluntary reporting of their individual congregations and these are frequently not forthcoming. Figures are perhaps most commonly distorted by the failure to purge church rolls of former members who have died, moved, or disaffiliated (Bouma, 1979; Stark and Glock, 1968; Kelley, 1977; Glock and Stark, 1965; Demarath, 1968; Landis, 1959; Jones, 1979; Roozen and Carroll, 1979). One list sample of church members found that 14% were no longer actually members (Glock and Stark, 1965) and an audit by the Southern Baptists turned up a 25% overcount (Stark and Glock, 1968). The number of ex-members carried on the books will depend on the diligence of the denominational record keepers, on how lapses are defined, and by the level of turnover (especially disaffiliations). It is sometimes argues that these factors will lead to greater overcounts among the smaller and more fundamentalist denominations (Stark and Glock, 1968). The overcount may also vary over time (Demarath, 1968; p. 356), although some research discounts this as a major factor (Glock and Stark, 1966, p,. 277; Roozen and Carroll,

1979).

4. Individual Denominations

Following trends for particular denominations is complicated by mergers and schisms (Newman and Halvorson, 1982; Newman, Halvorson, and Brown, 1977; Jacquet, 1985; Roozen and Carroll, 1979). Simple accounting procedures can usually remedy these problems, if the former and subsequent constituents parts are all reporting. At times the trackkeeping get a little complicated. When the Congregational and the Evangelical and Reformed Churches merged to form the United Church of Christ, a number of local Congregational churches rejected the merger and most of these joined the National Association of Congregational Christian Churches. A related problem is that individual congregations may affiliate with more than one denomination (Roozen and Carroll, 1989). In most cases, however, attention to the denominational history of churches and some simple adjustments will keep counts comparable.

Some of the difficulties enumerated above can be dealt with by careful attention to the data and simple adjustments (e.g. coverage and mergers/splits). Others such as unreliable estimates and dated information can be minimized by the exclusion of the problematic cases (Jacquet, 1985; Doyle and Kelly, 1979). That still leaves a number of serious difficulties such as overcounting from the inclusion of former members and definitional differences in membership that can not be easily eliminated from the figures. Investigators often deal with such difficulties by assuming that the biases are constant either across time, across organizations, or both (Kelley, 1977; and Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). We have pointed out in regards to the baptized vs. confirmed membership distinction and the overcount problem that the biases may well interact with time.

15 The relative growth of fundamentalist denominations compared to moderate-to-liberal denominations was noted at least as early as the 1950s (Wolf, 1959 and Hudson, 1955). The reported absolute declines of moderate-liberal churches in the 1960s, especially as summarized and explained by Dean M. Kelley's 1972 book, Why Conservative Churches are Growing: A Study in the Sociology of Religion (1977), heightened awareness and concern over the growth differentials. While Kelley's analysis of church membership trends has been generally accepted (as opposed to his explanations for the differential), the way he (and others) present the statistics can leave in the reader's mind the impression that the changes are more massive than they have been. (We will set aside the issue dealt with in note 11 of the accuracy of church membership statistics.) This misimpression emerges not because of any willful distortion on Kelley's part or even because of misapplication of church membership statistics, but because of the way the statistics are presented in graphs 1) accent recent declines in mainline churches and 2) emphasize the growth of fundamentalist churches. Three examples will illustrate. First Figures 1-5 contrast the historical growth of

American Lutherans, Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists with recent slowings and declines. The shift appears dramatic and certainly the recent declines are unprecedented. The shift is made to seem greater than it actually was, however, by plotting absolute numbers rather than the percent of the population belong to these denominations. The main (although not only) reason that these faiths showed sustained growth from 1800 to 1960 was the rapid increase in the total American population. This has of course slowed in recent decades and the slopes of the absolute membership graph could flatten out out while the denomination's percent of the population actually increased. Second, Figure 6 shows that the Southern Baptists overcame the United Methodists in 1967. While the graph is accurate, it is misleading. Visually it shows that Methodists led Baptists by 6:1 in 1958 only to fall behind them 1:4.5 by 1975. In actuality, the approximate ratios changed from 1.1:1 to 1:1.3. The shift in relative standing is of course real, but the magnitude of that switch has been grossly exaggerated by the truncation of the graph's base line at 9.2 million. Third, Figures 9-14 compare the proportionate increase of pairs of "liberal" and "conservative" churches from the same denominational families. In every case the conservative church shows more rapid growth that its liberal mate. These charts are actually very helpful in comparing relative growth rates over time. However, emphasizing the proportionate membership growth rates without reference to the absolute number of adherents creates the false impression that "liberal" churches have fallen behind their "conservative" counterparts. In several of these comparisons the liberal church is actually substantially larger than its conservative mate, even at the end of the period after many years of relative gain by the conservative church. Growth differentials are an important fact, but so are current differences in membership levels.

16 For a consideration of the impact of age structure and fertility on church growth see Perrin, 1989.

17 Using the 1988 GSS Roof (1989) found that of those who had switched religions one-third had switched 2 or more times.

18 The gain and lose we refer to here is just that sub-set from religious mobility. Some have noted differences in religious mobility and membership growth patterns (Stark and Glock, 1968) without considering other factors that determine net growth (Newport, 1979, p. 536).

19 Early studies of religious mobility found a pattern of liberal gains and conservative losses (Glock and Stark, 1966; Stark and Glock, 1968). These results were largely restricted to Glock and Stark's Northern California sample (Stark and Glock, 1968). Their national only compared changes for whites within major Protestant denominations, excluding non-Protestants, Protestant sects, and cases for whom father's religion was unknown (Hadaway, 1978) and this gave a very limited examination of mobility along the theological dimension. Most later research (hadaway, 1978a; 1978b; 1979;

Newport, 1979; Roof and Hadaway, 1977; Rook and McKinney, 1987; Smith, 1984) has concluded that mobility and net gain does not follow a simple fundamentalist/liberal pattern. Also, all later studies contradict Stark and Glock's finding that Nones suffer net losses (Stark and Glock, 1968). Some see the intergenerational gain of Nones as evidence of secularization (Roof and Hadaway, 1977). Studies that examine the particular origin and destination of switchers include Kluegel, 1980; Newport, 1979; and Roof and McKinney, 1987.

20 If Nones for both religion raised in and current religion are excluded from the religious mobility tables, the net gain of the liberal groups falls from highest to lowest. The net gain with Nones excluded are Fundamentalist 99.5%, Moderate 102.8%, and Liberal 95.2% - compare to Table 29.

21 From 1984 to 1987, there has been a marginally significant (.022) increase in mobility when all denominations are utilized.

22 Previous studies generally found that inter-marriage has increased (Bumpass, 1970; Alston, McIntosh, and Wright, 1976; Glenn, 1982; McCutcheon, 1984; Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick, 1983), but Greeley (1970) argues that little change has occurred.

23 For our purposes, it would be preferable to have the religion of origin of ever married respondents and their first spouse. Instead, we have the religion of currently married respondents and their present spouse. We can largely identify currently married respondents who are in a second or later marriage and can eliminate these remarriages from our first marriage cohort analysis. We cannot, however, include first marriages that have terminated, since we have no information on religion of origin of ex-spouses. Thus, we can look at either intact marriages or current marriages, but have only incomplete and biased coverage of the religious mix of all first marriages.

24 Most investigations of religious mobility have ignored the role of inter-marriage. For exceptions see, Newport, 1979 and Stark and Glock, 1968.

25 Nor has any other research been able to fully describe church growth and decline by a complete demographic model. Among those studies that do consider the approximate contributions of natural increase migration, and mobility (switching) are Bouma's (1979) comparison of the Christian Reformed Church and the Reform Church in America, Jones' (1979) analysis of the Southern Baptist Church, Newport's (1979) investigation of religious mobility in general, and Roof and McKinney's (1987) consideration of mainstream Protestantism. All of these studies (like the present study) are only partial accountings. In particular migration is either ignored (Roof and McKinney, 1987), or covered in a descriptive manner with little statistics (Bouma, 1979).

26 In addition, the extremely low church attendance rates for Jews suggest that many Jews are ethnic rather than religious Jews.

27 This accepts the NORC and SRC constant fits and discounts the Gallup series.

28 Except for our discussion of "future" fertility, we have not examined future trends. Most researchers predict further Catholic growth (Gallup and Castelli, 1987; Rook and McKinney, 1987; Hadden, 1987), but Hoge (1987) sees decline coming from assimilation and affluence and Kelley (1977) foresees a decrease due to liberalizing of the Post-Vatican Council Church.

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