

Changes in the Generation Gap, 1972-1998

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Introduction

Generational division and conflict have always been part of human society. The Bible recognized that often sharp disagreements existed across generations characterizing one as "a stubborn and rebellious generation (Psalms 78:8)" and another as "a very froward generation, children in who is no faith (Deuteronomy 32:30)." But while always present, generational conflict does not appear to be constant in intensity and impact, but seems to wax and wane across time.

As Esler (1984) has noted, "The most recent wave of awareness of the generation gap goes back to the 1960s." Articles about the "generation gap" were at that time widespread in both the mass media and academic journals. As Appendix 1 details, usages of "generation gap" were at a high point in the New York Times in the late 1960s and early 1970s and crested in social science journals in the early 1970s.

Moreover, many social observers and social scientists saw the generational conflict of the late 1960s and early 1970s as especially intense and disruptive. Educator Harold Taylor noted in a June, 1968 commencement address, "I know of no time in our history when the gap between generations has been wider or more potentially dangerous (Conlin, 1984)." Also in 1968 anthropologist Margaret Mead remarked that there was "a deep, new, unprecedented, worldwide generation gap (quoted in Brunswick, 1970)." Likewise, psychiatrist Shepard Ginandes (1969) wrote of a "deep gulf" between generations and a "cultural revolution" underway. Looking back over this period from the 1990s Robinette (1994) agreed that "the phenomenon of the 'generation gap' reached its apex as a macro-level social problem in the 1960s..."¹

After the early 1970s general and scholarly discussion of the "generation gap" quickly waned. Articles in the New York Times dropped sharply after 1971 to an average of less than one per annum in the early 1980s. Academic uses fell after 1976 to a low point of 1.8 per annum in 1985-89. Similarly, Esler (1984) found only 44 works examining generational conflict in the United States during 1946-1959, 182 covering 1960-1971, and 41 dealing with 1972-1983 (or annual rates of respectively 3.1, 15.2, and 4.1).

There was then a small rebound of interest in the generation gap in the 1990s with New York Times cites of "generation gap" moving up to 3.6 per annum in 1990-1994 and to 5.4 in 1995-1999 and academic usages also showing a modest increase to 2.4 per annum in 1990-94. However, most academic references involved tangential mentions or analysis of other countries. There was not one major, published piece focusing on the generation gap in the US during the

¹Others who subscribed to what Thomas (1974) called the "great gap hypothesis" include Friedenber, 1969; Fritz, 1969; Jennings and Niemi, 1975; Klecka, 1971; Payne, 1973.

1990s.²

The sharp shift of journalistic and scholarly attention away from the generation gap means that most discussion of the generation gap is period bound and lacks perspective. The analysis is essential of the generation gap that existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s as seen by contemporaries. To gain a better understanding of the size, content, and nature of generation gaps in general and to examine what happened to the generation gap of the late 1960s/early 1970s in particular, this paper examines generational differences in America from the 1970s to the 1990s.

Data

Analysis uses the General Social Surveys (GSSs) of the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. The GSSs are full-probability samples of adults living in households in the United States. For details on the GSS see Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 1999. This research mainly utilizes 8 of the 22 GSSs conducted between 1972 and 1998. The 1972, 1973, and 1974 surveys are combined to represent the data point referred to as 1973, the 1984, 1985, and 1986 surveys are combined for the 1985 point, and the 1996 and 1998 surveys for the 1997 point.

Defining the Generation Gap

The concept "generation gap" is used in many different ways. The differences sometimes revolve around how "generation" is defined and other times concern the way "gap" is used.³ Generation variously refers to 1) ascending and descending lineage (i.e. grandparents, parents, children), 2) immigration and nativity status (i.e. immigrants as first generation, post-immigration children of immigrants as second generation, etc.), 3) birth cohorts such as the Baby Boomers born between 1946 and 1964 and Generation X following after them, 4) life stages (e.g. infants, children, adolescents, adults, the elderly), and 5) historical periods (e.g. the Roaring Twenties, Great Depression, etc.).

In looking at gaps there are three elements of comparisons: 1) time (same/different), 2) groups (equivalent/different), and 3) connection (directly linked/unlinked). When time is the same and groups are equivalent, there is no generational differentiation by any definition. When time is different and the groups equivalent, the comparison is how the "same" groups differ across time (e.g.

²Since JSTOR.ORG has a five-year lag in coverage, analysis was also done using Sociological Abstracts from 1980-1999. It showed no rise of uses in the 1990s and no major research that focused on the generation gap in the US either in the 1990s or earlier.

³On the concept of generations and their role in social changes see Friedenbergr, 1969; Kertzer, 1983; Laufer and Bengtson, 1974; Mannheim, 1952; and Roberts and Lang, 1985.

first- year college students in 1975 and 1995 or voters in 1948 and 1992). When time is the same and the groups different, the comparison is how groups differ at a given point in time (e.g. first- and fourth-year college students, parents and children, or birth cohorts in a given year). When both groups and time differ there are multiple comparisons, across groups at time1, across groups at time2, within equivalent groups across times, and across groups and times (e.g. first- and fourth-year college students in 1975 and 1995 or birth cohorts tracked across time).

Overlaying the time/group distinction are connections - whether there are direct or only general links between members of groups. If a study of parents and children consists of intra-familial samples of children and their own parents, the samples are linked, while a sample of adults with children and a separate sample of children would be an unlinked sample. Similarly, a study of birth cohorts across time using replicating cross-sections would be unlinked (so-called synthetic cohorts), while a panel design that reinterviewed individuals would be linked. Some definition of generations are open to direct linkage studies (e.g. lineage, immigration, life stages), while others are not (birth cohorts and, in most cases, historical periods). In addition, there can be double-linked studies such as intra-familial samples followed over times in a panel (e.g. the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics).

Studies of the generation gap of the late 1960s/early 1970s were generally based on the same time/across groups approach. Most used unlinked samples, but some were intra-familial samples of parents and children.⁴ This paper uses an across-group, across-time design in which six age groups (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+) are examined at three time points (1973, 1985, 1997). Generation gap is defined as the difference between the 18-24 age group (the "young") and the 65+ age group (the "old") at each time point.⁵ Attention is also given to changes between equivalent age

⁴On the generation gap of the late 1960s/early 1970s see Both, 1976; Borelli, 1971; Brunswick, 1970; Cutler, 1977; Cutler, and Kaufman, 1975; Erskine, 1972-73; Friedman, et al., 1972; Fritz, 1969; Ginandes, 1969; Holsti and Rosenau, 1980; Jeffries, 1974; Jennings and Niemi, 1975; Keeley, 1976; Klecka, 1971; Markides, 1978; Mauss and Garland, 1971; Payne, 1972; Roskin, 1974; Starr, 1974; Thomas, 1971; 1974; Wright, 1972; and Zey-Ferrell, et al., 1978.

⁵With the six age groups used in this report, there are 15 possible "generation gaps" that could be looked at (age1 vs. age2, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, 4 vs. 5, 5 vs. 6, 1 vs. 3, 1 vs. 4, 1 vs. 5, 1 vs. 6, 2 vs. 4, 2 vs. 5, 2 vs. 6, 3 vs. 5, 3 vs. 6, 4 vs. 6). While some attention is given to several of these comparisons, the standard measure of the generation gap used here is the youngest to oldest comparison (18-24 to 65+). While for some variables in some years alternative comparisons show larger differences (particularly when curvilinear relationships appear), on average this youngest to

groups at different points in time, but these are not considered generation gaps.

Measuring the Generation Gap

As Table 1 shows there are 101 trends covering all three time points, plus an additional 52 trends for 1985 and 1997 for a total of 153 trends overall. These have been sub-divided into 20 topics (abortion, civil liberties, confidence in institutions, crime, family, firearms, gender roles, government spending and taxes, intergroup relations, misanthropy, miscellaneous, politics, religion, sex, sexually-explicit material, socializing, social welfare, suicide and euthanasia, well-being, and work and finance). These 20 topics contain from 2 to 16 variables.

Overall the generation gap has narrowed over the last three decades (Table 2). In 1973 the average generation gap was 19.4 percentage points.⁶ This fell to 16.7 percentage points in 1985 and 15.2 in 1997. Looking at variables appearing in 1985 and 1997 only, their generation gap declined slightly from 14.3 to 13.8 percentage points. Accompanying this over decline was a sharp reduction in large or defining generation gaps. In 1973 12 of 101 items had gaps of 40 percentage point or more. In 1985 and 1997 there were only 3 items with gaps this large.

Of the trends at all three time points 66.4% showed convergence (i.e. a smaller generation gap in 1997 than in 1973). 34.7% had a monotonic decline. 11.9% showed a wider gap in 1985 and then a narrowing in 1997 for a net convergence from 1973 to 1997 and 19.8% had a narrower gap in 1985 with a widening from 1985 to 1997 and a net convergence across the three time points. 33.7% of the trends showed divergence (17.8% with monotonic increases and 15.9% with a mixed pattern, but a net divergence).

The pattern of change was quite different across topical areas. Showing declines across all three time points were items relating to abortion, civil liberties, crime, gender roles, sex and sexually explicit materials, and socializing. For the three of these topics that also had additional trends for 1985 and 1997 (civil liberties, gender roles, and sex), each also had a decline in the generation gap for the added items. Similarly, among topics with items asked only during the two most recent time points declines occurred for social welfare and suicide/euthanasia. Five topics (confidence, government spending and taxes, intergroup relations, well-being, and work and finance) had an increase in the generation gap from 1973 to 1985 followed by a decline from 1985 to 1997. Most of the changes were small and in each case the 1985-97 decline exceeded the 1973-1985 gain. Four topics (family, misc.,

oldest comparison represents the maximum difference across age groups.

⁶The generation gaps are averages of the absolute differences across age groups.

politics, and religion) had drops in the generation gap from 1973 to 1985 and increases thereafter. The changes were typically small and the gains after 1985 were larger than the prior declines. Only one topic (misanthropy) unambiguously showed the opposite pattern of a widening generation gap across all three periods.⁷

Table 3 shows age group differences for the 153 variables. Items are grouped into the 20 topics introduced above. First items with three time points are presented and then those from only 1985 and 1997. For each variable the item is briefly described and then in parentheses the GSS mnemonic for the variable and the category that the proportions represent are given for each age group and time point. For example, the first variable under abortion deals with approving of abortions when a fetus has a serious birth defect, its GSS mnemonic is ABDEFECT, and the proportions presented are how many think such abortions should be legal (e.g. .855 of those 18-24 in 1973).⁸

The changes across time and the differences across age groups are as follows:

Abortion: The generation gap fell from 11.7 in 1973 to 6.2 in 1985 and then to 4.9 in 1997. Those 18-24 (the "young") were generally the most for abortion rights in 1973 (on five of the six items), but in later years were the most pro-abortion on only two items (for rape in 1985 and 1997, for a birth defect in 1985, and for poverty in 1997). The generation gap declined mostly because of joint convergence. The young became less supportive of abortion rights (on all but abortions resulting from rape), while those 65+ (the "old") generally showed little change or a small rise in support for abortions.

Civil Liberties: The generation gap dropped from 43.1 in 1973 to 30.0 in 1985, and 23.9 in 1997 for the items on free speech, college teaching, and books in libraries for the anti-religious, Communists, and homosexuals. The generation gap for civil liberties for racists and militarists fell from 20.9 to 16.3 from 1985 to 1997. The young were generally the most for civil liberties in 1973 and 1997, but were mostly towards the middle in 1985. Their net change from 1973 to 1997 was typically quite small except for views on homosexuals. Support for the rights of homosexuals rose by 6.5 to 13.9 percentage points on the three measures from 1973 to 1997 and by 14.7 to 16.8 percentage points from 1985 to 1997. The convergence came mostly from gains in tolerance among the old or, for items on homosexuals, from even larger gains in tolerance among the old than among the young.

Confidence: The generation gap changed little from 1973 (8.7)

⁷The single item in the firearms topic asked at each time point (gun in the household) showed an increasing generation gap, but the two other items (personal ownership of a gun and hunting) had a decline from 1985 to 1997 as did the combined three items.

⁸The full wording of the items can be found in Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 1999 or at www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss99

to 1985 (9.0), then fell to 4.9 in 1997. The one added item, confidence in banks, had gaps of 5.2 and 5.9 in 1985 and 1997. In 1973 the young generally had middling confidence (most confident on two, least confident on three, and intermediate on seven). But in 1985 and 1997 their relative position notably shifted with them being most confident on 9 or 10 and least confident on none. The generation gap narrowed after 1985 for two reasons. First, a curvilinear relationship developed with the young and the old being first or second in confidence on 10 of the 13 institutions. For example, 39.0% of the young had a great deal of confidence in education, followed by 32.9% of the old with the least amount of confidence (19.2%) among those 35-44. Second, on eight institutions, the difference between the young and old switched direction from 1973 to 1997. The young were less confident than the old in 1973, but more confident than them in 1997 regarding business, the armed forces, education, the executive, and labor and for a lesser degree for television, the Supreme Court, and Congress. This pattern mostly occurred because the old lost more confidence over time than the young did. In recent years, the biggest changes among the young were their dropping confidence in the Supreme Court (% great deal -15.3 percentage points), the executive branch (-14.5), the Congress (-14.2), the press (-11.3), and science (-10.5).

Crime: The generation gap declined from 12.1 in 1973 to 6.5 in 1985 and 5.7 in 1997. The young tended to be the least punitive age group in 1973 (on 6 of 9 items) and in 1997 (on 4 of 9), but not in 1985 (on 1 of 9). Across periods the young were the most punitive in 1985 (on 7 of 9). For example, 61.0% of the young thought courts were too lenient in 1973, this rose to 81.5% in 1985, and then fell to 78.1% in 1997. The narrowing of the modest generation gap came mostly from the young moving towards the more punitive position of the old in 1985.

Family: The generation gap has changed little over the years from 21.0 in 1973 to 19.5 in 1985 and back to 21.6 in 1997. For the added items on children the gap was 5.3 in 1985 and 6.7 in 1997. The young have been the age group most supportive of elderly parents living with their children and of easier divorce laws and their views on both have become more traditional over time. Since the old did not change their low level of support for elderly parents living with their children, the generation gap on this almost doubled from 17.5 to 32.6. On values for children the generation gap is largest regarding the importance of obedience. In both 1985 and 1997 the young were least likely to rank this as the most important trait for children, while the old were the most likely to do so. The young were also the least supportive of spanking children in 1997, but the age differences were small. Moreover, support for obedience and spanking both dropped among the young from 1985 to 1997. However, the young are not uniformly for "modern" values for children. From 1985 to 1997 mentions of hard work as the most important trait for children rose from 14.0% to 24.2% among the young and in 1997 the young were the age group most likely to mention this traditional value.

Firearms: For the sole item appearing in all three years, having a gun in the household, there was virtually no generation gap in 1973 and 1985 (respectively 1.2 and 1.7) and a moderate gap in 1997 (10.9). For the added measures on personal gun ownership and hunting the generation gaps were 16.3 in 1985 and 10.6 in 1997. The young are the least likely to personally own a gun, but the most likely to hunt. The generation gap slightly increased on gun ownership, but markedly declined for hunting. All gun-related behaviors have declined among the young.

Gender Roles: The generation gap has steadily closed from 28.2 in 1973 to 25.2 in 1985 and to 14.2 in 1997. Likewise, for the added measures the generation gap declined from 37.0 in 1985 to 32.9 in 1997. The young are generally more supportive of modern or egalitarian gender roles than older age groups are and have generally become more modern over time (on 7 of 8 items), but their modern edge is declining mostly because older age groups have moved toward the modern perspective even more than the young have and thus closed the generation gap. For example, 26.1% of the young in 1973 agreed that women should stay home and men should run the country as did 60.2% of the old for a generation gap of 34.1. By 1997 agreement among the young fell to 11.8% while among the old it declined to 33.1% for a generation gap of 21.3.

Government Spending/Taxes: The generation gap has never been large and has changed little over time (10.5 in 1973, 12.6 in 1985, and 9.4 in 1997). The added items also show moderate differences and little change (11.8 in 1985 and 12.0 in 1997). The one large difference (near to or above 30.0 in all years) is on the environment with the young being more favorable than the old towards more spending. The generation gaps on most items have shown no consistent direction across the three time periods. Only the generation gap for the environment and drugs have fallen across each time interval. The young are the age group most for increased spending for the environment and foreign aid and the least for increased spending against drugs at all three time points.

Intergroup Relations: The generation gap has been moderately large and has changed little (23.5 in 1973, 23.8 in 1985, and 21.6 in 1997). The added items show a smaller generation gap and more of a decline (13.3 in 1985 and 9.5 in 1997). The young have been the age group most supportive of racial equality and integration on almost all items in all years. On most measures (11 of 14) the young have become more egalitarian across time. The average generation gap has not altered much in part because the old and young moved in a parallel direction. The modest overall change in the generation gap was also a result of off-setting trends by different items. Items on school busing, Blacks not pushing for integration, having a neighbor of another race, and school integration had four of the 11 largest increases in generation gaps (+8.9 to +14.7), but items on Whites maintaining segregated neighborhood, racial intermarriage laws, and voting for a Black for President showed three of the largest 13 declines in generation gaps (-16.2 to -20.7). On specific items on which there were notable narrowings of the generation gap (interracial marriage,

voting for a Black for president, keeping segregated neighborhoods) the closure occurred because the old converged towards the young.

Misanthropy: The generation gap has grown over time from 11.9 in 1973 to 13.4 in 1985 and 24.6 in 1997. Not only did the generation gap grow absolutely, but its relative place increased appreciably. As Table 4 indicates, misanthropy moved from having the 14th largest generation gap in 1973 to having the second largest in 1997. The young have always been the most misanthropic. The biggest change has been a drop in judgments that people are trustworthy, helpful, and fair from 1985 to 1997. This decline was almost perfectly inversely related to age with the largest drops among the young and the smallest among the old.

Misc.: The generation gap was stable in 1973 and 1985 (respectively 16.8 and 16.3) and then grew (21.6 in 1997). Likewise, the generation gap for the added items increased from 3.5 in 1985 to 14.2 in 1997. The biggest change was in newspaper readership. Daily newspaper reading has been lowest among the young. Across time newspaper readership has fallen for all age groups, but furthest among the young and least among the old. This increased the generation gap from 27.3 in 1973 to 51.2 in 1997. Support for the legalization of marijuana also showed large changes. The young have generally been the most in favor of legalization. The generation gap dropped from 38.4 in 1973 to 17.2 in 1985 as support fell among the young while gaining among the old. Then the generation gap widened again in 1997 as support among the young rebounded even more than the continued rise in backing among the old.

Politics: The generation gap changed little from 1973 to 1985 (respectively 19.3 and 17.6), then rose moderately to 24.0 in 1997. With most topics showing declines however this was enough to move politics up from 8th place in 1973 to 4th largest in 1997 (Table 4). The political leanings of the young have shown some notable zigzags. In 1973 they were the age group least likely to identify as Democratic or Republican and the most independent, the most likely to self-identify as liberal, and the most likely to vote Democratic in the 1972 election. In 1985 they were again the least likely to be Democratic, tied with those 25-34 as most independent, and more Republican than most other age groups. They were second, behind those 25-34, in identifying as liberals, but least likely to vote Democratic in the 1984 election.⁹ In 1997 the young were again the least Democratic or Republican and the most independent on party identification, the most liberal, and the most likely to have voted Democratic in the 1996 election. They have been the age group least likely to have voted and the generation gap has widened as

⁹They were referred to at the time as the "Reagan generation". See Smith, 1989.

the old increased their voting rate and the young dropped theirs.¹⁰

Religion: The generation gap has varied little over time (15.5 in 1973, 14.0 in 1985, and 16.2 in 1997 and 11.0 in both 1985 and 1997 for the added items). On almost all items the young have been the least religious. With one notable exception the young became less religious between 1985 and 1997. For example, the young now attend weekly religious services less often (-7.1 percentage points), are less likely to identify with a religion (-10.9 percentage points), and are less likely to believe that the world reflects God's goodness (-10.1 percentage points). The exception is a rise among the young in belief in an afterlife from 69.9% in 1973 to 79.5% in 1985 and to 82.3% in 1997. This increase also moved them from being 15.0 percentage points less likely to believe in life after death than the old in 1973 to 2.0 more likely in 1997. This is the only item on which the young are more religious than the old.¹¹

Sex and Sexually-Explicit Material: The generation gap on sex fell from 32.0 in 1973 to 23.7 in 1985 and 21.7 in 1997. Likewise, the generation gap on the added items declined from 35.5 in 1985 to 29.3 in 1997. Similarly, the generation gap on sexually-explicit material dropped from 51.3 in 1973 to 41.9 in 1985 and to 41.0 in 1997. This was the largest generation gap for any topic at all three time points (Table 4). Between 1973 and 1997 the young became less permissive regarding extramarital sex, watching x-rated movies, legalizing pornography, and premarital sex (and between 1985 and 1997 on teenage sex and birth control for teens). More permissive positions were taken on sex education in schools and after 1985 on homosexuality. The young have been the most permissive or modern age group in their sexual attitudes and behaviors for most items. The moderate decrease in the generation gap has come about from several distinctive paths. On attitudes towards extramarital sex the generation gap virtually disappeared (falling from 29.9 in 1973 to 1.6 in 1997) mostly because the young moved towards the less accepting position of the old. The generation gap on approval of sex education narrowed as the positions of both the young and old liberalized, but the old moved more and began to catch up with the young. The generation gap on approval of homosexuality showed a third pattern. It narrowed in

¹⁰Voting levels among the young are especially sensitive to the interval between the last election and survey and to how ineligibles are handled. Looking at a constant two-year interval the generation gap in reported voting was largest after the 1996 election compared to all presidential elections from 1972 to 1996 (53.4 with ineligibles retained and 41.4 with them excluded). Only 38.3% of those eligible to vote in 1996 reported doing so. This was the lowest level across these elections, but only slightly lower than the levels in 1976 (39.3%) and 1988 (40.4%).

¹¹On trends in belief in an afterlife see Greeley and Hout, 1999.

1985 as the young increased their disapproval and moved towards the old. Then the trend reversed with all age groups becoming less disapproving with the greatest change among the young. On watching x-rated films the narrowing came from joint convergence - a rise in watching among the old and a decline in viewing among the young.

Socializing: The generation gap on socializing has moderately decreased over time (from 33.4 in 1973 to 27.2 in 1985 and to 24.3 in 1997). The young almost always report the highest level of all forms of socializing (i.e. visits to bars and with friends, neighbors, and relatives). The generation gaps are especially large regarding going to bars and seeing friends. Among the young visiting bars, neighbors, and relatives showed declines, while visits with friends had a small increase. On visits to bars the declining generation gap came from the young and old moving in opposite directions towards the middle.

Social Welfare: The generation gap changed little from 1985 to 1997 (respectively 10.8 and 9.0). The young tend to be more supportive of government social welfare policies than other age groups are. Among the young support slightly increased for health care and slightly decreased for assistance to the poor and equalizing wealth. The one large change was the drop from 44.2% saying that the government should do more in 1985 to 25.7% saying so in 1997. This shift virtually converged the position of the young to that of the old and reduced the generation gap from 22.8 to 3.4.

Suicide and euthanasia: The generation gap declined moderately from 12.2 in 1985 to 8.6 in 1997. The young tend to be the age group most approving of suicide and euthanasia (on three of five measures in both years). The decline in the generation gap occurred mostly due to the old moving towards the more accepting position of the young on suicides and euthanasia involving incurable diseases. Regarding suicides relating of bankruptcies, dishonorable conduct, and being tired of living there are small generation gaps and little shift in attitudes over time.

Well-being: The generation gap changed little over time (from 14.9 in 1973 to 15.3 in 1985 and to 13.9 in 1997). The generation gap widened for financial satisfaction and narrowed for job satisfaction and excitement in life. The young have been consistently the most negative age group in their evaluations of general happiness and job satisfaction and generally (but not always) the most likely to rate their health as excellent and their lives as exciting. Marital happiness has tended to be lowest among the middle-aged (35-54). The generation gap between the young and old has been small, but has flipped direction with the young being slightly happier in 1973 and 1985 and the old happier in 1997. Over time the young have changed little in their ratings of general happiness, health, or job satisfaction. There was a small decline among the young in financial satisfaction (- 4.2 percentage points) and larger decreases for excitement (-7.3 percentage points) and marital happiness (-8.3 percentage points).

Work and Finance: The generation gap showed no clear trend across time. Across all years it rose from 14.7 in 1973 to 16.3 in

1985 and then fell to 11.2 in 1997. However, the added items experienced an increase in the generation gap from 18.5 in 1985 to 29.0 in 1997. In terms of finances the old are the most likely to see themselves as above average with the middle-aged the least likely. However, the old are the least likely to report a recent improvement in their financial situation. Those 25-34 report the most gains, followed by the young. In terms of job security, those 55-64 are least likely to think they might lose their job (relatively few of those 65+ are still in the workforce), while the young see the least job security. However, when it comes to thinking whether one could find as good a job if one did become unemployed, optimism is highest among the young and least among the old or those 55-64. On work values the young are the age group most likely to say they would continue working even if they became rich while the old are the least likely to say they would stay in the workforce. On whether one gets ahead in life mainly by hard work the young are most likely to endorse this idea, but the age differences are quite small. There have been few notable changes among the young over time in their work and financial outlooks. They have gained more faith in the utility of hard work (+6.4 percentage points), are more positive about their financial condition (+ 8.1 percentage points in feeling above average), and have mixed judgments on job security since 1985 (-6.3 percentage points in not likely to lose their job, but +9.5 percentage points in saying it would be easy to find an equally good job).

The Generation Gap of the 1970s

The generations gap was greater in the 1970s than in succeeding decades and consisted of more large, defining differences. The general pattern was that the young were more liberal than the old on social and political issues.¹² However, the difference was not primarily between the enter cohort of adults (i.e. the "rebellious" youth of the sixties) and all older cohorts, but spread out across all age groups. The differences between adjacent age groups were about of the same magnitude with the largest gap between those 25-34 and those 35-44 (Table 5).

The differences were largest on topics related to various "revolutions" and social movements (civil rights and feminism) of the 1960s. These included sex and sexual materials, gender roles, intergroup relations, and, in the miscellaneous category, the legalization of marijuana. It is likely that these represent topics on which there had been large social changes during the 1960s (Brunswick, 1970), but this is not systematically tested here.¹³

Differences on military-related matters were not a primary

¹²On what constitutes liberal vs. conservative positions see Smith, 1982; 1990.

¹³On the general pattern of social changes see Mayer, 1992; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Smith, 1982; 1990; and Stimson, 1991.

contributor to the generation gap in the early 1970s. On defense spending the young were only slightly less pro-military than the old (4.6 percentage points). There was a larger gap on confidence in military leadership (11.0), but this was much smaller than the average gap and only the fifth largest difference in institutional confidence out of 12 institutions. While neither of these measures directly touch the two dominant military issues of the period (the draft and the war in Vietnam), studies on such matters have not uniformly found large generation gaps.¹⁴

The Generation Gap in the 1990s

The generation gap declined from the 1970s to the 1990s and large, defining differences became rare. Moreover, the drop was generally greatest for topics that had most differentiated across age groups in the 1970s. The largest declines in generation gaps were for civil liberties (-19.2), gender roles (-14.0), and sex and sexual materials (-10.3). Underneath the headline that the generation gap is smaller in the 1990s than the 1970s are three import sub-leads regarding how the entering adults of the 1990s differ from both their earlier counterparts and from older contemporaries.¹⁵

First, the young are more disconnected from society. They are less likely to read a newspaper, attend church, belong to a religion or a union, or vote for president or identify with a political party than previously and lowest among all age groups. Moreover, on all of these measures the generation gap increased from 1985 to 1997.

In addition, another indication for disconnection comes from an analysis of giving Don't Know (DK) responses to opinion questions. A scale was created using 100 items that appeared in all years and counted how many DK responses were given. The general pattern is for DKs to be low among those under 65 and to increase markedly among those 65+. For those 18-24 in 1973 20.1% gave 2 or more DKs (to the 100 items), this fell to 17.3% in 1985, and rose to 27.4% in 1997. For those 65+ the DKs levels were 40.1% in 1973, 32.9% in 1985, and 40.3% in 1997. The generation gap thus closed from 20.0 in 1973 to 15.6 in 1985 and to 12.9 in 1997. Thus, the

¹⁴Finding little age differences were Erskine (1972-73) and Holsti and Rosenau (1980). Finding more division on nuclear war issues was Jeffries (1974) and on one item on military service Roberts and Lang (1975).

¹⁵On cohort differences in the 1990s in general and the alphabet generations (Gens X, Y, and Z) in particular see Barkley, 1993; Barnes, 1991; Coupland, 1996; Carr, 2000; Epstein, 1998; Gardyn, 2000; Howe, 1993; Howe and Strauss, 2000; Mitchell, 1999; Ortner, 1998; Sacks, 1996; Sberna and Gay, 2000; Shepherdson, 2000; Strauss, 1998; Strauss and How, 1991; Wellner, 2000; and Williams et al., 1997.

young are less opinionated in 1997 than previously and their edge over the old has declined.

This growing disconnectedness among the young is consistent with arguments about declining social capital (Putnam, 2000, but see also Ladd, 1999.)

Second, the young are more cynical or negative about people than previously. This shows most clearly in the decline in believing people are trustworthy, helpful, and fair and in the ideas that humans are naturally good and that the world reflects God's goodness. It may also show up in the greater expectation of a world war. In all of these cases the decline since 1985 are greatest among the young and the young are the most negative age group.

The young have also lost confidence in institutions (a net decline from 1973 to 1997 on 10 of 13), but decreases also occurred across most age groups. The generation gaps are neither large nor increasing for most confidence items and it is usually a middle-aged group that has the least confidence in institutions.

Nor does negativism extend to personal evaluations of well-being. Only financial satisfaction showed both a monotonic decline in optimism and a widening generation gap across time. Job satisfaction and financial position both had the opposite trend with assessments more positive and the generation gaps down. Happiness and other measures showed a mixed pattern involving mostly small changes.

Thus, the young have become especially negative about people and human nature, have, along with others, lost confidence in most institutions, but are not generally more pessimistic about their personal lives either among age groups or across time.

Third, on balance the young have moved in a liberal direction (e.g. for civil liberties, modern gender roles, racial equality, and secularism). Of 100 trends that could be classified as tapping the liberal/conservative dimension, 71 moved in a liberal direction and 29 had a conservative shift. For the 65 trends covering the whole period from 1973 to 1997 the shift from 1973 to 1985 was mostly in the conservative direction (45 conservative to 20 liberal), but from 1985 to 1997 liberal trends predominated (15 conservative to 50 liberal). Thus, as noted in the previous topic-by-topic discussion (e.g. on politics and civil liberties) the young veered to the right from 1973 to 1985 and then moved back to the left thereafter. Overall, the young have generally been the most liberal age group (on two-thirds of the items in 1973, half in 1985, and three-fifths in 1997). However, the liberal shift of the young was not distinctive since most age groups also moved in the same direction as the young did.

Thus, the young tend to be liberal and to continue moving in a liberal direction, but the age differences have not changed much over time.

While these are important changes that distinguish the current entering generation from past generations and other age groups, the young are not more distinctive than in the past nor are the young especially distinctive among age groups. First, as Table 4 showed,

the generation gap is smaller in 1997 than in 1973 or 1985. Second, the differences between the young and those 25-34 are also smaller in 1997 than in previous years (Table 5). Third, the difference between the young and those 25-34 has never been the largest gap between adjoining in age groups (Table 5). In both 1985 and 1997 the gap between the two youngest age groups was in the middle compared to differences between other adjoining age groups. Thus, while the young are distinctive from other adults, the differences are not more pronounced than those that exist between other age groups.

Summary

On average the generation gap has narrowed from the 1970s to the 1990s (1973: 19.4, 1985: 16.7, 1997: 15.2). Two-thirds of the trends show declining generation gaps. Of those showing convergence 69% resulted from the young and old moving in the same direction (but at different rates) and 31% came from the young and old moving in opposite directions towards one another. When the convergence came from both age groups moving in the same direction, the young showed the greater change in 70% of the cases. That is, both the young and old moved in the same direction, but the youth moved more thereby closing the gap with the old. When the narrowing resulted from movement in opposite directions, the young had the larger change in 43% of the cases. That is, when the young and old moved towards each other, the old showed the greater shift a little more often than the young did. Overall, the young showed bigger changes than the old in 61% of the cases involving convergence.

On the one-third of the items that diverged, 71% came from both the old and the young moving in the same direction (but at different rates) and 29% from the young and old moving in opposite directions away each other. When the divergence came from both moving in the same direction, the young showed the larger change in 29% of the cases. When the divergence resulted from movement in opposite directions away from each other, the young and old each had the greater change in half the cases. Overall, the young showed the larger movement in 35% of the cases involving divergence.

Thus, the changes in the generation gaps involve a notable amount of movement among both the young and the old. Convergence came more from the movement of the young and divergence was more associated with larger changes among the old. The generation gap therefore narrowed through a series of different mechanism that involved changes among both the young and the old.

Today's entering cohort of adults differs less from older age groups than their counterparts in 1970s and 1980s. Declines in the generation gap have been largest and most sustained within the areas of abortion, civil liberties, crime, gender roles, sex and sexually explicit materials, and socializing. Smaller and/or shorter-term declines have occurred for confidence in institutions, government spending, intergroup relations, social welfare, suicide/euthanasia, well-being, and work and finance. Countering these were increases since the 1980s for family, miscellaneous,

politics, and religion, and across all years for misanthropy.

Generation gaps are created by a combination of life-cycle and cohort effects. Associated with aging the young and old differ on many traits (e.g. health, the presence and age of children, job seniority, etc.) and related attitudes. They also differ in many ways related to cohort differences in historical experiences and socialization. Generation gaps are greatest on items in which the cohort effects augment the life-cycle effects. The size of generation gaps in general will be greatest when social systems accentuate the natural differences related to aging (e.g. in societies with sharp and rigid age hierarchies) and when cohort effects are larger due especially to age-differentiated historical events and social change. If age gradients in social organization decline and/or cohort effects diminish, then generation gaps will narrow as occurred in the US over the last three decades.

Table 1

Variables by Topics and Time Intervals

Topics	Number of Variables		Total
	Three Points	Two Points	
Abortion	6	0	6
Civil Liberties	9	6	15
Confidence	12	1	13
Crime	9	0	9
Family	3	6	9
Firearms	1	2	3
Gender Roles	4	4	8
Govt. Spending/Taxes	11	5	16
Intergroup Relations	9	5	14
Misanthropy	3	0	3
Misc.	4	2	6
Politics	4	0	4
Religion	6	8	14
Sex	4	2	6
Sexually-Explicit Mat.	2	0	2
Socializing	4	0	4
Social Welfare	0	4	4
Suicide/Euthanasia	0	5	5
Well-being	6	0	6
Work/Finances	4	2	6
TOTAL	101	52	153

Table 2

Mean Generation Gap by Topics by Year by Number of Data Points

Topics	Years		
	1973	1985	1997
Abortion			
All	.119	.062	.049
Two	----	----	----
Civil Liberties			
All	.431	.300	.239
Two	----	.209	.163
Combined	.431	.264	.209
Confidence			
All	.087	.090	.049
Two	----	.052	.059
Combined	.087	.086	.050
Crime			
All	.121	.065	.057
Two	----	----	----
Family			
All	.210	.195	.216
Two	----	.053	.067
Combined	.210	.100	.117
Firearms			
All	.012	.017	.109
Two	----	.163	.106
Combined	.012	.114	.107
Gender Roles			
All	.282	.252	.142
Two	----	.370	.329
Combined	.282	.311	.235
Govt. Spending/Taxes			
All	.105	.126	.094
Two	----	.118	.120
Combined	.105	.123	.102
Intergroup Relations			
All	.235	.238	.216
Two	----	.133	.095
Combined	.235	.200	.173
Misanthropy			
All	.119	.134	.246
Two	----	----	----
Misc.			
All	.168	.163	.216
Two	----	.035	.142
Combined	.168	.121	.191
Politics			
All	.193	.176	.240
Two	----	----	----

Table 2 (continued)

Topics	Years		
	1973	1985	1997
Religion			
All	.155	.140	.162
Two	----	.110	.110
Combined	.155	.123	.132
Sex			
All	.320	.237	.217
Two	----	.355	.293
Combined	.320	.276	.242
Sexually-Explicit Material			
All	.513	.419	.410
Two	----	----	----
Socializing			
All	.334	.272	.243
Two	----	----	----
Social Welfare			
All	----	----	----
Two	----	.108	.090
Suicide/Euthanasia			
All	----	----	----
Two	----	.122	.086
Well-being			
All	.149	.153	.139
Two	----	----	----
Work/Finances			
All	.147	.163	.112
Two	----	.185	.290
Combined	----	.170	.171
All Topics			
All	.194	.167	.152
Two	----	.143	.138
Combined	.194	.155	.148

Source: GSS

Table 3

Generation Gap on Attitudes and Behaviors, 1973-1997

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
A. Abortion							
Abortion if Defect (ABDEFECT/Legal)							
1973	.855	.855	.853	.812	.779	.761	4425
1985	.823	.807	.812	.767	.777	.756	2902
1997	.782	.806	.785	.790	.781	.804	3652
Abortion if No More Children Wanted (ABNOMORE/Legal)							
1973	.538	.483	.440	.464	.387	.354	4394
1985	.373	.459	.474	.423	.355	.322	2904
1997	.428	.466	.452	.471	.359	.387	3626
Abortion if Mother's Health Endangered (ABHLTH/Legal)							
1973	.945	.928	.908	.906	.880	.843	4463
1985	.923	.900	.929	.890	.881	.846	2918
1997	.914	.925	.882	.897	.875	.865	3646
Abortion if Too Poor (ABPOOR/Legal)							
1973	.594	.551	.515	.529	.465	.452	4372
1985	.458	.477	.493	.440	.381	.383	2899
1997	.490	.471	.448	.465	.368	.381	3619
Abortion if Raped (ABRAPE/Legal)							
1973	.845	.849	.836	.821	.807	.805	4371
1985	.852	.822	.804	.756	.788	.795	2872
1997	.861	.858	.804	.788	.797	.793	3638
Abortion if Doesn't Want to Marry (ABSINGLE/Legal)							
1973	.543	.489	.468	.484	.438	.403	4376
1985	.412	.442	.478	.435	.372	.365	2905
1997	.398	.431	.444	.466	.379	.402	3637
B. Civil Liberties							
Public Speech by Atheist (SPKATH/Allow)							
1973	.827	.897	.738	.728	.488	.372	4527
1985	.703	.759	.757	.664	.620	.477	2963
1997	.812	.807	.788	.762	.713	.573	3750
Atheist Teach in College (COLATH/Allow)							
1973	.692	.615	.445	.339	.238	.198	4413
1985	.608	.643	.563	.380	.301	.215	2897
1997	.692	.654	.656	.611	.513	.357	3616
Atheist's Book in Library (LIBATH/Allow)							
1973	.815	.751	.682	.591	.450	.396	4463
1985	.711	.731	.726	.634	.555	.432	2925
1997	.822	.778	.724	.722	.673	.524	3667

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Public Speech by Communist (SPKCOM/Allow)							
1973	.768	.702	.649	.559	.435	.343	4457
1985	.650	.681	.675	.571	.528	.434	2916
1997	.674	.724	.710	.705	.609	.518	3705
Communist Teach in College (COLCOM/Allow)							
1973	.620	.520	.428	.345	.229	.242	4285
1985	.613	.614	.551	.414	.350	.243	2844
1997	.639	.713	.621	.639	.536	.439	3555
Communist's Book in Library (LIBCOM/Allow)							
1973	.748	.708	.655	.571	.418	.362	4423
1985	.705	.712	.707	.581	.492	.375	2887
1997	.754	.741	.712	.715	.621	.530	3634
Public Speech by Homosexual (SPKHOMO/Allow)							
1973	.782	.781	.696	.647	.530	.339	2867
1985	.719	.781	.770	.683	.644	.514	2895
1997	.887	.882	.850	.825	.774	.713	3712
Homosexual Teach in College (COLHOMO/Allow)							
1973	.707	.670	.646	.483	.360	.259	2855
1985	.698	.730	.692	.539	.478	.345	2888
1997	.846	.840	.813	.797	.670	.682	3676
Homosexual's Book in Library (LIBHOMO/Allow)							
1973	.736	.676	.630	.558	.409	.304	2891
1985	.654	.710	.677	.593	.495	.327	2911
1997	.801	.776	.749	.746	.662	.538	3662
Public Speech by Militarist (SPKMIL/Allow)							
1985	.635	.711	.645	.528	.471	.316	2936
1997	.739	.710	.703	.682	.596	.481	3725
Militarist Teach in College (COLMIL/Allow)							
1985	.557	.583	.508	.310	.244	.183	2898
1997	.549	.590	.561	.546	.448	.342	3617
Militarist's Book in Library (LIBMIL/Allow)							
1985	.648	.722	.703	.550	.461	.354	2930
1997	.764	.748	.708	.685	.620	.512	3650
Public Speech by Racist (SPKRAC/Allow)							
1985	.520	.642	.659	.611	.524	.444	2926
1997	.616	.631	.672	.653	.607	.548	3270

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Racist Teach in College (COLRAC/Allow)							
1985	.441	.492	.486	.386	.313	.332	2891
1997	.454	.499	.494	.507	.486	.402	3640
Racist's Book in Library (LIBRAC/Allow)							
1985	.623	.652	.726	.668	.592	.500	2912
1997	.702	.679	.658	.681	.646	.559	3659
C. Confidence in Institutions							
Confidence in Major Companies (CONBUS/Great Deal)							
1973	.240	.241	.310	.359	.423	.372	2841
1985	.300	.244	.285	.259	.300	.317	2353
1997	.289	.280	.222	.252	.309	.264	3643
Confidence in Organized Religion (CONCLERG/Great Deal)							
1973	.335	.348	.361	.400	.504	.535	2900
1985	.266	.268	.251	.243	.309	.369	2353
1997	.317	.232	.216	.244	.300	.399	3642
Confidence in Education (CONEDUC/Great Deal)							
1973	.399	.396	.399	.414	.502	.526	2943
1985	.390	.258	.222	.259	.300	.335	2391
1997	.390	.231	.192	.215	.259	.329	3750
Confidence in Executive Branch of Fed. Govt. (CONFED/Great Deal)							
1973	.168	.175	.196	.225	.285	.288	2921
1985	.286	.183	.200	.173	.204	.228	2376
1997	.141	.109	.090	.112	.129	.129	3675
Confidence in Organized Labor (CONLABOR/Great Deal)							
1973	.196	.123	.131	.172	.231	.255	2886
1985	.133	.110	.052	.063	.048	.109	2340
1997	.180	.136	.086	.104	.079	.154	3493
Confidence in the Press (CONPRESS/Great Deal)							
1973	.265	.255	.209	.225	.259	.258	2944
1985	.269	.181	.157	.193	.159	.177	2388
1997	.156	.098	.090	.079	.088	.116	3699
Confidence in Medicine (CONMEDIC/Great Deal)							
1973	.705	.627	.554	.543	.522	.504	2947
1985	.649	.519	.455	.461	.395	.470	2404
1997	.568	.475	.435	.416	.432	.446	3740
Confidence in TV (CONTV/Great Deal)							
1973	.254	.181	.178	.181	.222	.255	2948
1985	.229	.145	.102	.126	.139	.147	2399
1997	.169	.118	.072	.088	.093	.115	3720

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Confidence in Supreme Court (CONJUDGE/Great Deal)							
1973	.343	.301	.336	.350	.318	.346	2873
1985	.537	.332	.299	.271	.260	.299	2350
1997	.384	.303	.280	.302	.290	.349	3609
Confidence in Congress (CONLEGIS/Great Deal)							
1973	.202	.163	.231	.208	.232	.221	2899
1985	.259	.149	.119	.112	.135	.162	2377
1997	.117	.091	.086	.076	.079	.103	3670
Confidence in the Armed Forces (CONARMY/Great Deal)							
1973	.326	.306	.375	.348	.433	.436	2907
1985	.398	.351	.253	.320	.369	.403	2370
1997	.472	.341	.350	.337	.443	.468	3684
Confidence in Scientific Community (CONSCI/Great Deal)							
1973	.488	.480	.418	.431	.490	.422	2687
1985	.489	.482	.455	.447	.353	.362	2299
1997	.384	.303	.280	.302	.290	.349	3510
Confidence in Banks (CONFINAN/Great Deal)							
1985	.328	.215	.178	.247	.209	.380	2381
1997	.390	.245	.198	.213	.259	.331	3705
D. Crime							
Courts (COURTS/Not Harsh Enough)							
1973	.610	.740	.852	.799	.849	.833	3486
1985	.815	.859	.868	.911	.875	.899	4279
1997	.781	.822	.831	.810	.847	.820	5331
Afraid to Walk At Night (FEAR/Yes)							
1973	.365	.412	.401	.421	.452	.467	2961
1985	.338	.404	.335	.381	.427	.514	2961
1997	.362	.412	.395	.361	.382	.490	3764
Capital Punishment (CAPPUN/Favor)							
1973	.475	.593	.647	.667	.694	.674	4312
1985	.751	.775	.767	.798	.767	.555	4222
1997	.746	.771	.753	.749	.783	.732	5309
Police Permit Before Buying Gun (GUNLAW/Favor)							
1973	.756	.756	.725	.722	.723	.797	4489
1985	.737	.768	.692	.699	.714	.743	2835
1997	.804	.840	.830	.847	.800	.821	3727

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Police Hitting Person (POLHITOK/Disapproves)							
1973	.336	.212	.254	.270	.239	.318	1469
1985	.292	.228	.234	.284	.289	.377	2835
1997	.340	.283	.293	.259	.315	.372	3633
Police Hitting Attacker (POLATTAK/Disapproves)							
1973	.026	.107	.205	.025	.022	.072	1074
1985	.023	.029	.023	.007	.024	.043	2046
1997	.026	.019	.017	.013	.011	.009	2527
Police Hitting Murder Suspect (POLMURDR/Disapproves)							
1973	.980	.967	.928	.888	.888	.837	1060
1985	.941	.948	.934	.922	.893	.840	2021
1997	.960	.965	.956	.962	.963	.893	2497
Police Hitting Escapee (POLESCAP/Disapproves)							
1973	.121	.086	.108	.111	.107	.183	1060
1985	.157	.184	.167	.160	.112	.143	1996
1997	.207	.198	.168	.154	.140	.150	2442
Police Hitting Verbal Abuser (POLABUSE/Disapproves)							
1973	.905	.844	.834	.741	.659	.649	1061
1985	.869	.908	.880	.848	.808	.788	2020
1997	.970	.927	.944	.912	.925	.829	2500
E. Family							
Care for Elderly Parents (AGED/In Children's Homes)							
1973	.422	.357	.360	.276	.280	.247	1493
1985	.599	.544	.504	.465	.353	.276	2907
1997	.591	.537	.544	.444	.386	.265	3738
Divorces (DIVLAW/Make Easier)							
1973	.526	.456	.281	.232	.227	.248	1409
1985	.324	.320	.294	.227	.190	.165	2867
1997	.390	.289	.262	.264	.177	.169	3621
Ideal Number of Children (CHLDIDEL/3+)							
1973	.466	.452	.603	.550	.610	.644	2993
1985	.449	.381	.355	.429	.475	.552	2929
1997	.398	.347	.386	.361	.390	.500	3710
Child Value: Obeying (OBEY/Most Important)							
1985	.183	.190	.195	.184	.396	.319	737
1997	.142	.156	.161	.146	.243	.312	3745
Child Value: Popular (POPULAR/Most Important)							
1985	.000	.000	.007	.013	.005	.005	737
1997	.006	.003	.007	.012	.004	.108	3745

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Child Value: Think for Self (THNKSELF/Most Important)							
1985	.524	.497	.623	.598	.370	.408	737
1997	.442	.483	.551	.561	.524	.393	3745
Child Value: Work Hard (WORKHARD/Most Important)							
1985	.140	.148	.091	.126	.136	.108	737
1997	.242	.213	.150	.167	.146	.149	3745
Child Value: Help Others (HELPOTH/Most Important)							
1985	.152	.165	.984	.079	.193	.160	737
1997	.167	.146	.131	.114	.083	.128	3745
Spanking Children (SPANKING/Agree with)							
1985	.836	.838	.831	.830	.860	.815	1454
1997	.724	.729	.739	.741	.779	.762	3785
F. Firearms							
Gun in Household (OWNGUN/Yes)							
1973	.433	.504	.504	.521	.511	.421	2970
1985	.414	.414	.520	.597	.558	.431	2984
1997	.310	.328	.400	.475	.507	.419	3797
Personally Owns Gun (ROWNGUN/Yes)							
1985	.175	.224	.298	.376	.353	.299	2978
1997	.146	.201	.234	.294	.350	.297	3787
Hunts (HUNT/Yes)							
1985	.274	.210	.197	.202	.142	.059	2989
1997	.184	.160	.153	.153	.167	.105	3800
G. Gender Roles							
Women Stay Home, Men Run Country (FEHOME/Agree)							
1973	.261	.221	.298	.381	.447	.602	1435
1985	.135	.151	.200	.278	.313	.466	2898
1997	.118	.103	.134	.120	.202	.331	3725
Men Better at Politics than Women Are (FEPOL/Agree)							
1973	.377	.354	.444	.530	.534	.602	694
1985	.309	.282	.345	.390	.440	.586	2871
1997	.228	.176	.182	.192	.262	.380	3632
Vote for Woman for President (FEPRES/No)							
1973	.163	.163	.193	.253	.316	.338	2969
1985	.112	.090	.110	.164	.186	.298	2901
1997	.048	.052	.048	.055	.083	.127	3726

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Wife Works if Husband Can Support Her (FEWORK/Disapproves)							
1973	.181	.210	.286	.322	.409	.569	3028
1985	.104	.120	.138	.182	.181	.318	2919
1997	.150	.148	.139	.164	.194	.272	3779
Working Mother As Close to Child (FECHLD/Agree)							
1985	.665	.710	.715	.585	.524	.433	2964
1997	.762	.710	.701	.653	.617	.528	4266
Wife Give Priority To Husband's Career (FEHELP/Disagree)							
1985	.819	.781	.752	.592	.449	.324	2890
1997	.865	.876	.849	.855	.759	.518	4182
Preschoolers Suffer if Mother Works (FEPRESCH/Disagree)							
1985	.582	.607	.533	.394	.327	.295	2932
1997	.654	.657	.566	.531	.479	.360	4185
Better if Wife Takes Care of Family (FEFAM/Disagree)							
1985	.711	.678	.635	.439	.337	.244	2934
1997	.774	.750	.667	.662	.539	.323	4201
H. Government Spending/Taxes							
Spending for Space (NATSPAC&NATSPACY/Too Little)							
1973	.094	.070	.105	.080	.051	.048	2867
1985	.140	.138	.146	.124	.062	.045	3791
1997	.139	.139	.122	.153	.102	.058	5281
Spending for Blacks (NATRACE/Too Little)							
1973	.401	.392	.355	.332	.256	.304	2788
1985	.413	.375	.342	.360	.330	.311	1805
1997	.395	.390	.416	.332	.299	.290	2563
Spending on the Environment (NATENVIR&NATENVIY/Too Little)							
1973	.825	.748	.626	.608	.506	.451	2806
1985	.774	.691	.666	.571	.526	.443	3747
1997	.732	.720	.658	.629	.540	.438	5420
Spending on Health (NATHEAL&NATHEALY/Too Little)							
1973	.620	.720	.681	.667	.623	.553	2878
1985	.511	.606	.636	.633	.578	.542	3818
1997	.647	.690	.689	.723	.677	.586	5507
Spending on Big Cities (NATCITY/Too Little)							
1973	.641	.633	.558	.550	.503	.489	2595
1985	.569	.505	.483	.488	.461	.351	1729
1997	.593	.595	.568	.644	.502	.481	2526

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Spending on Halting Crime (NATCRIME/Too Little)							
1973	.644	.676	.690	.718	.768	.688	2818
1985	.741	.669	.623	.703	.741	.600	1869
1997	.663	.687	.667	.648	.667	.651	2749
Spending Against Drugs (NATDRUG/Too Little)							
1973	.612	.687	.654	.675	.719	.685	2808
1985	.568	.625	.644	.707	.647	.601	1864
1997	.581	.600	.609	.622	.621	.603	2722
Spending on Education (NATEDUC&NATEDUCY/Too Little)							
1973	.566	.590	.569	.513	.442	.414	2851
1985	.678	.730	.724	.645	.554	.480	3864
1997	.730	.807	.779	.730	.641	.585	5563
Spending of Defense (NATARMS&NATARMSY/Too Little)							
1973	.116	.109	.127	.183	.221	.162	2801
1985	.145	.154	.176	.157	.190	.180	3795
1997	.129	.129	.172	.194	.270	.264	5342
Spending on Welfare (NATFARE/Too Little)							
1973	.254	.250	.204	.224	.191	.201	2852
1985	.242	.253	.206	.200	.267	.152	1877
1997	.166	.151	.160	.167	.138	.149	2725
Spending on Foreign Aid (NATAID&NATAIDY/Too Little)							
1973	.076	.043	.043	.029	.025	.021	2847
1985	.128	.084	.050	.039	.037	.019	3792
1997	.085	.065	.056	.048	.038	.035	5379
Spending for Roads and Bridges (NATROAD/Too Little)							
1985	.392	.388	.427	.436	.462	.466	3767
1997	.284	.340	.377	.430	.481	.479	5386
Spending on Social Security (NATSOC/Too Little)							
1985	.585	.641	.565	.565	.471	.439	3800
1997	.537	.597	.594	.556	.542	.466	5338
Spending on Parks and Recreation (NATPARK/Too Little)							
1985	.403	.366	.339	.282	.252	.232	3791
1997	.397	.417	.362	.317	.292	.264	5433
Spending on Mass Transit (NATMASS/Too Little)							
1985	.240	.323	.359	.348	.336	.339	3580
1997	.259	.301	.375	.414	.370	.360	5056

Table 3 (continued)

Federal Income Taxes (TAX/Too High)							
1985	.611	.673	.674	.714	.523	.509	2911
1997	.642	.648	.712	.737	.705	.544	3648
I. Intergroup Relations^b							
Dinner Guest of Another Race (RACHOME/Had)							
1973	.277	.281	.226	.228	.147	.103	2616
1985	.374	.342	.344	.319	.240	.157	2977
1997	.525	.426	.429	.416	.389	.295	941
School Busing (BUSING/Favor)							
1973	.313	.224	.180	.200	.158	.188	2968
1985	.402	.342	.221	.217	.194	.188	2900
1997	.541	.521	.356	.274	.241	.327	928
Open Housing Law:Non-Blacks (RACOPEN/For)							
1973	.537	.422	.367	.220	.296	.229	1293
1985	.614	.604	.453	.449	.388	.285	2558
1997	.762	.727	.695	.683	.513	.542	840
Vote for Black for President:Non-Blacks (RACPRES/Yes)							
1973	.870	.848	.816	.778	.707	.642	2513
1985	.845	.886	.898	.877	.853	.723	2562
1997	.897	.954	.943	.931	.909	.876	837
Blacks Shouldn't Push:Non-Blacks (RACPUSH/Agree)							
1973	.592	.645	.718	.818	.831	.861	2543
1985	.449	.509	.540	.663	.726	.749	1928
1997	.282	.310	.378	.415	.522	.644	3144
Integrated Schools:Non-Blacks (RACFEW&RACHAF&RACMOST/Not Object)							
1973	.470	.416	.376	.350	.396	.362	2618
1985	.419	.390	.386	.381	.399	.321	2650
1997	.665	.455	.512	.466	.467	.410	843
Has Neighbor of Other Race:Non-Blacks Only (RACLIVE/Yes)							
1973	.427	.410	.442	.351	.347	.323	3822
1985	.566	.488	.472	.449	.431	.387	3810
1997	.730	.697	.617	.625	.594	.517	4671
Black-White Marriages:Non-Blacks Only (RACMAR/Make Illegal)							
1973	.186	.236	.326	.400	.463	.623	3876
1985	.131	.180	.153	.358	.371	.517	2596
1997	.035	.068	.067	.117	.198	.269	3230
Whites Keep Segregated Neighborhoods:Non-Blacks Only (RACSEG/Agree)							
1973	.225	.296	.401	.397	.511	.583	1240
1985	.145	.189	.191	.318	.322	.439	2617
1997	.063	.073	.105	.088	.188	.259	809

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Discrimination Cause of Racial Differences (RACDIF1/Yes)							
1985	.522	.469	.447	.402	.412	.435	2886
1997	.393	.348	.369	.385	.368	.432	3614
In-born Ability Cause of Racial Differences (RACDIF2/Yes)							
1985	.117	.113	.138	.228	.288	.404	2871
1997	.047	.060	.078	.088	.132	.207	3707
Education Cause of Racial Differences (RACDIF3/Yes)							
1985	.512	.554	.568	.497	.512	.503	2920
1997	.432	.423	.453	.448	.456	.478	3693
Motivation Cause of Racial Differences (RACDIF4/Yes)							
1985	.455	.522	.577	.633	.692	.717	2851
1997	.456	.464	.446	.466	.556	.618	3555
Special Efforts to Help Blacks (HELPBLK/Oppose, 4,5)							
1985	.473	.530	.542	.518	.505	.494	2820
1997	.451	.539	.518	.579	.511	.522	3649
J. Misanthropy							
People Trustworthy (TRUST/Yes)							
1973	.364	.464	.533	.508	.481	.421	3090
1985	.355	.376	.492	.484	.488	.422	2920
1997	.202	.254	.373	.465	.492	.372	4224
People Fair (FAIR/Yes)							
1973	.431	.573	.640	.621	.648	.588	3080
1985	.515	.571	.650	.675	.708	.695	2913
1997	.338	.430	.534	.566	.618	.606	3744
People Helpful (HELPFUL/Yes)							
1973	.340	.443	.526	.510	.476	.483	3075
1985	.467	.481	.566	.562	.591	.623	2914
1997	.318	.361	.438	.490	.562	.602	3777
K. Misc.							
Cooperation with Interview (COOP/Friendly & Interested)							
1973	.771	.867	.841	.850	.831	.771	2968
1985	.783	.823	.823	.815	.804	.796	4423
1997	.661	.710	.725	.743	.722	.691	5671
Legalize Marijuana (GRASS/Yes)							
1973	.445	.261	.145	.150	.007	.061	1469
1985	.276	.293	.214	.124	.117	.104	2835
1997	.370	.316	.293	.313	.177	.150	3760

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Newspaper Reading (NEWS/Every Day)							
1973	.470	.593	.777	.804	.780	.743	2928
1985	.260	.396	.538	.641	.698	.708	2988
1997	.205	.244	.381	.521	.600	.717	3850
Union (UNION/Doesn't Belongs to)							
1973	.800	.734	.685	.640	.660	.814	1493
1985	.893	.804	.745	.746	.751	.873	3572
1997	.945	.847	.803	.744	.801	.844	3771
Watches TV (TVHOURS/Less than 3 Hours a Day)							
1985	.453	.478	.586	.567	.465	.385	2979
1997	.512	.577	.616	.593	.486	.364	4309
Expect World War (USWAR/Yes)							
1985	.464	.506	.409	.482	.493	.462	2122
1997	.556	.466	.450	.386	.440	.421	3519
L. Politics							
Party Identification (PARTYID/Democratic)							
1973	.351	.379	.448	.500	.463	.498	4553
1985	.302	.342	.369	.396	.452	.455	4477
1997	.265	.280	.299	.350	.367	.440	5714
Political Ideology (POLVIEWS/Liberal)							
1973	.427	.394	.267	.224	.220	.259	1416
1985	.280	.287	.252	.191	.178	.206	4271
1997	.298	.291	.279	.267	.196	.197	5424
Presidential Vote (PRES72&PRES84&PRES96/Democratic Vote)							
1973	.538	.477	.344	.348	.297	.361	2002
1985	.314	.392	.332	.398	.349	.424	2001
1997	.704	.563	.465	.531	.498	.554	1692
Presidential Vote (VOTE72&VOTE84&VOTE96/Voted)							
1973	.469	.663	.741	.740	.792	.750	2970
1985	.417	.599	.737	.730	.800	.784	2921
1997	.271	.525	.658	.716	.791	.805	2748
M. Religion							
Religion (RELIG/None)							
1973	.131	.088	.042	.038	.032	.034	4583
1985	.117	.089	.089	.042	.034	.032	4441
1997	.226	.173	.129	.103	.068	.050	5686

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Religion (FUND/Fundamentalist)							
1973	.267	.268	.273	.286	.293	.284	4596
1985	.301	.312	.313	.367	.345	.365	4461
1997	.277	.301	.285	.313	.323	.300	5730
Church Attendance (ATTEND/Weekly+)							
1973	.212	.262	.358	.346	.364	.378	4575
1985	.231	.250	.323	.356	.437	.438	4443
1997	.140	.177	.264	.271	.308	.395	5606
Religious Attachment (RELITEN/Strong)							
1973	.284	.321	.449	.403	.508	.511	1465
1985	.304	.358	.400	.424	.518	.564	4269
1997	.274	.307	.308	.384	.418	.526	5451
Life After Death (POSTLIFE/Believes In)							
1973	.699	.771	.770	.739	.776	.849	1362
1985	.795	.837	.804	.813	.805	.812	2715
1997	.823	.807	.838	.830	.812	.803	3832
Ban on School Prayer (PRAYER/Approves)							
1973	.539	.368	.292	.230	.216	.267	722
1985	.533	.502	.437	.380	.332	.327	2179
1997	.564	.514	.416	.410	.328	.317	3678
Bible (BIBLE/Word of God)							
1985	.380	.307	.334	.351	.431	.510	1679
1997	.290	.291	.294	.295	.361	.385	4232
Pray (PRAY/Daily)							
1985	.421	.478	.519	.594	.638	.715	2953
1997	.393	.435	.592	.586	.574	.717	2431
God Like Master/Spouse (MASTERSP/Spouse, 5-7)							
1985	.128	.089	.091	.092	.126	.124	3765
1997	.094	.113	.076	.087	.116	.102	2324
God Like Judge/Lover (JUDGELUV/Lover, 5-7)							
1985	.146	.144	.148	.158	.221	.247	3777
1997	.182	.167	.145	.173	.177	.169	2335
God Like Friend/King (FRNDKING/Friend, 1-3)							
1985	.469	.434	.432	.420	.440	.446	3806
1997	.394	.333	.319	.341	.317	.418	2354
God Like Mother/Father (MAPA/Mother, 1-3)							
1985	.059	.053	.044	.074	.068	.114	3801
1997	.059	.078	.060	.089	.057	.058	2349

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
World Reflects God's Goodness (WORLD1/Agree, 5-7)							
1985	.468	.473	.573	.590	.538	.612	1504
1997	.367	.480	.535	.604	.574	.616	4292
Human Nature is Good (WORLD4/Agree, 1-3)							
1985	.620	.641	.684	.709	.635	.713	1501
1997	.435	.530	.535	.634	.576	.599	2425
N. Sex							
Extramarital Sex (XMARSEX/Always Wrong)							
1973	.569	.632	.708	.753	.807	.868	2953
1985	.663	.696	.681	.726	.829	.857	2954
1997	.805	.777	.792	.773	.834	.821	3742
Premarital Sex (PREMARSEX/Not Wrong at All)							
1973	.497	.410	.256	.199	.164	.149	2962
1985	.500	.544	.489	.413	.263	.191	2899
1997	.479	.527	.474	.488	.330	.184	3728
Homosexual Sex (HOMOSEX/Always Wrong)							
1973	.551	.604	.732	.728	.829	.881	2859
1985	.695	.668	.693	.803	.849	.890	2892
1997	.449	.506	.615	.582	.701	.787	3534
Sex Education in Schools (SEXEDUC/For)							
1973	.888	.904	.863	.854	.743	.585	1438
1985	.927	.910	.897	.862	.776	.677	2906
1997	.948	.919	.881	.878	.834	.731	3756
Contraceptives for Teenagers (PILLOK/Agree)							
1985	.719	.660	.599	.527	.465	.421	1426
1997	.692	.682	.599	.594	.456	.411	3720
Teenagers Having Sex (TEENSEX/Always Wrong)							
1985	.449	.547	.663	.731	.836	.860	1438
1997	.545	.617	.716	.748	.813	.850	3800
P. Sexually-Explicit Material							
Pornography (PORNLAW/Illegal to All)							
1973	.153	.257	.421	.492	.606	.650	1468
1985	.199	.320	.324	.490	.583	.695	2893
1997	.215	.260	.328	.389	.501	.645	3755
Seen X-rated Movies (XMOVIE/Yes)							
1973	.551	.346	.276	.198	.118	.022	1488
1985	.400	.311	.298	.209	.123	.057	2916
1997	.460	.370	.261	.209	.160	.070	3770

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Q. Socializing							
Go to Bar (SOCBAR/Never)							
1973	.308	.323	.509	.551	.700	.890	1462
1985	.341	.307	.410	.536	.727	.878	2982
1997	.416	.316	.409	.536	.639	.801	3837
Spend Evening with Friends (SOCFRIEND/Several Times a Week+)							
1973	.505	.290	.163	.135	.125	.098	1481
1985	.441	.271	.190	.152	.127	.112	2987
1997	.533	.278	.215	.140	.113	.153	3827
Spend Evening with Neighbor (SOCOMMUN/Several Times a Week+)							
1973	.439	.355	.260	.201	.262	.268	1479
1985	.422	.271	.199	.203	.180	.268	2986
1997	.326	.227	.171	.163	.136	.238	3839
Spend Evening with Relative (SOCREL/Several Times a Week+)							
1973	.521	.370	.298	.407	.376	.346	1484
1985	.420	.397	.330	.338	.366	.353	2981
1997	.461	.390	.329	.354	.268	.343	3845
R. Social Welfare							
Equalize Wealth (EQWLTH/Favors - 1,2)							
1985	.332	.330	.265	.313	.353	.369	2880
1997	.303	.259	.266	.257	.245	.255	3711
Government Should Do More (HELPNOT/Agree, 1,2)							
1985	.442	.307	.233	.259	.207	.214	2756
1997	.257	.275	.257	.225	.215	.223	3594
Government Should Help Sick (HELPSICK/Agree, 1,2)							
1985	.556	.518	.474	.436	.341	.426	2835
1997	.576	.519	.503	.477	.442	.385	3680
Government Should Help Poor (HELPPOOR/Agree, 1,2)							
1985	.330	.333	.280	.285	.261	.290	2834
1997	.296	.294	.254	.239	.239	.210	3650
S. Suicide and Euthanasia							
Right to Suicide if Has Incurable Disease (SUICIDE1/Yes)							
1985	.609	.610	.543	.447	.384	.302	2887
1997	.614	.702	.639	.653	.601	.517	3667
Right to Suicide if Bankrupt (SUICIDE2/Yes)							
1985	.077	.084	.072	.065	.056	.050	2951
1997	.115	.111	.096	.079	.099	.058	3780

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Right to Suicide if Dishonored Family (SUICIDE3/Yes)							
1985	.088	.084	.070	.060	.041	.046	2936
1997	.129	.121	.089	.079	.101	.055	3775
Right to Suicide if Tired of Living (SUICIDE/Yes)							
1985	.162	.145	.153	.116	.090	.129	2932
1997	.209	.200	.148	.146	.154	.141	3720
Euthanasia (LETDIE/Approves of)							
1985	.759	.743	.720	.590	.621	.559	2895
1997	.745	.758	.694	.722	.691	.609	3663
T. Well-Being							
Happiness (HAPPY/Very Happy)							
1973	.243	.347	.346	.391	.376	.381	4580
1985	.279	.292	.320	.330	.376	.407	4412
1997	.224	.337	.306	.320	.403	.387	5689
Marital Happiness (HAPMAR/Very Happy)							
1973	.719	.680	.646	.657	.724	.692	2217
1985	.720	.591	.590	.600	.641	.671	2828
1997	.636	.681	.580	.576	.676	.687	3210
Health (HEALTH/Excellent)							
1973	.388	.455	.376	.281	.197	.138	4586
1985	.394	.362	.363	.336	.281	.159	4412
1997	.393	.376	.338	.313	.273	.174	5231
Life is...(LIFE/Exciting)							
1973	.555	.479	.445	.419	.398	.376	2928
1985	.566	.485	.490	.467	.450	.381	2971
1997	.482	.492	.503	.482	.488	.420	3765
Satisfaction with Job (SATJOB/Satisfied)							
1973	.756	.818	.865	.914	.922	.950	3326
1985	.781	.844	.848	.881	.868	.940	3659
1997	.783	.868	.864	.856	.916	.931	4645
Satisfaction with Finances (SATFIN/Satisfied)							
1973	.294	.237	.270	.346	.400	.399	4584
1985	.272	.209	.240	.302	.414	.432	4437
1997	.252	.212	.260	.302	.358	.445	5716
U. Work and Finances							
Financial Position (FINRELA/Above Average)							
1973	.225	.223	.176	.212	.245	.338	4556
1985	.280	.268	.222	.264	.282	.314	4430
1997	.306	.296	.252	.250	.267	.341	5697

Table 3 (continued)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	N
Continue to Work if Rich (RICHWORK/Yes)							
1973	.751	.725	.707	.658	.532	.500	1669
1985	.807	.798	.738	.681	.570	.511	1965
1997	.765	.740	.696	.629	.582	.594	2709
Getting Ahead (GETAHEAD/By Hard Work)							
1973	.645	.606	.661	.586	.643	.630	2996
1985	.687	.715	.635	.649	.661	.646	2965
1997	.709	.705	.687	.668	.644	.697	3760
Financial Situation (FINALTER/Better)							
1973	.472	.515	.439	.405	.372	.263	4528
1985	.490	.498	.453	.386	.294	.208	4431
1997	.467	.559	.447	.406	.368	.236	5697
Likely to Lose Job (JOBLOSE/Not Likely)							
1985	.636	.660	.643	.690	.761	.685	1823
1997	.573	.617	.618	.658	.712	.690	2647
Get a Job if Lost Job (JOBFIND/Not Easy)							
1985	.271	.343	.373	.457	.660	.591	1821
1997	.176	.231	.380	.444	.560	.638	2632

Source: GSS

^bSome figures are based only on non-Blacks because the items were not asked of Blacks in early years.

Table 4

Changes in the Relative Ranking of the Generation Gap by
by Topics for 1973-1997

1973	1985	1997
Sexual Mat. (51.3)	Sexual Mat. (41.9)	Sexual Mat. (41.0)
Civil Liberties (43.1)	Civil Liberties (30.0)	Misanthropy (24.6)
Socializing (33.4)	Socializing (27.2)	Socializing (24.3)
Sex (32.0)	Gender Roles (25.2)	Politics (24.0)
Gender Roles (28.2)	Intergroup (23.8)	Civil Liberties (23.9)
Intergroup (23.5)	Sex (23.7)	Sex (21.7)
Family (21.0)	Family (19.5)	Misc. (21.6)
ALL (19.4)	Politics (17.6)	Family (21.6)
Politics (19.3)	ALL (16.7)	Intergroup (21.6)
Misc. (16.8)	Misc. (16.3)	Religion (16.2)
Religion (15.5)	Work/Finance (16.3)	All (15.2)
Well-Being (14.9)	Well-being (15.3)	Gender Roles (14.2)
Work/Finance (14.7)	Religion (14.0)	Well-being (13.0)
Crime (12.1)	Misanthropy (13.4)	Work/Finance (11.2)
Misanthropy (11.9)	Govt. Spending (12.6)	Firearms (10.9)
Abortion (11.7)	Confidence (9.0)	Govt. Spending (9.4)
Govt. Spending (10.5)	Crime (6.5)	Crime (5.7)
Confidence (8.7)	Abortion (6.2)	Abortion (4.9)
Firearms (1.2)	Firearms (1.7)	Confidence (4.9)

Table 5

Mean Differences Between Adjacent Age Groups

Age Groups	1973	Year 1985	1997
18-24 to 25-34			
All	.057	.049	.048
Two	-----	.040	.036
25-34 to 35-44			
All	.061	.038	.041
Two	-----	.043	.038
35-44 to 45-54			
All	.040	.049	.028
Two	-----	.057	.026
45-54 to 55-64			
All	.055	.046	.051
Two	-----	.065	.046
55-64 to 65+			
All	.049	.058	.060
Two	-----	.053	.063

Source: GSS

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108.

Appendix 1: Analysis of the Use of "Generation Gap" in
 Historical, Political Science, and Sociological Journals
 and the New York Times

Year	Number of Articles	
	Academic Journals	New York Times
Pre-1965	1	NA
1965	0	NA
1966	0	NA
1967	0	NA
1968	1	NA
1969	9	16
1970	8	12
1971	8	12
1972	12	3
1973	11	4
1974	8	4
1975	8	4
1976	9	0
1977	3	5
1978	4	2
1979	3	3
1980	5	0
1981	3	0
1982	0	1
1983	4	0
1984	2	2
1985	3	4
1986	1	2
1987	2	3
1988	1	5
1989	2	6
1990	3	6
1991	4	3
1992	2	5
1993	2	1
1994	1	3
1995	0	6
1996	NA	8
1997	NA	4
1998	NA	2
1999	NA	7
Total	120	133

NA=Not available

Source: Academic Journals - JSTOR.ORG; New York Times - Dow Jones
 Interactive