

Economic- Versus Race-Targeted Policy:

Public Opinion on the New Liberal Welfare Agenda

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ABSTRACT

Some poverty analysts have called for a shift toward universalistic policies that do not target blacks and other minorities for assistance. Several assumptions about public opinion as a source of the vulnerability of race-targeted and welfare policies motivate this change. Using a survey based experiment from the 1990 General Social Survey, we test the assumptions that race- as compared to economically-targeted policies: (1) are less popular with the American mass public; (2) attract a smaller and weaker political coalition of support; (3) contradict values of individualism and increase the impact of prejudice on welfare related policy attitudes; and (4) do not compete effectively against new conservative reform proposals. The results show a tendency among whites to favor economically- over racially-targeted programs, but little difference among blacks. But two of the three policies examined achieve high absolute levels of support even when targeted on blacks. When a policy is targeted by race it is mainly white, male, and poorly educated respondents who fall out of a possible coalition of support. Prejudice is related to both economic- and race-targeted policy, suggesting that the image of the poor is already heavily color-coded. Other aspects of beliefs about inequality, including the perception of structural limits to economic opportunity and perceptions of racial discrimination shape policy attitudes. We discuss whether it is necessary to abandon race-targeting in order to fashion politically viable welfare policy reform strategies.

After a long period of inattention welfare policy and the plight of the ghetto poor are again central policy questions. Unlike much of the poverty research of the 1960s, however, contemporary analysts explicitly aim to formulate reform proposals that resonate with traditional American values (Ellwood 1988; Heclo 1986; Mead 1986; Murray 1984; Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988; Wilson 1987). For example, Skocpol argued that: "New policies must speak with a consistent moral voice to all Americans who would be recipients and taxpayers. The policies should reinforce fundamental values such as rewards for work, opportunity for individual betterment, and family and community responsibility for the care of children and other vulnerable people" (1991, pp. 428-429). This new emphasis reflects a recognition that public resistance to welfare spending and race-targeted policies (i.e., affirmative action) contributed to the political vulnerability of these policies.

The linkage of social values and policy planning has arisen with special force in diagnoses of ghetto poverty. The ghetto poor, or urban underclass, probably represent less than 10% of all those in poverty (Ricketts and Sawhill 1988). Yet, this totals some 2.5 million people who "are visible enough and troubled enough to justify special consideration" (Ellwood 1988, p. 195). This group has become the most prominent symbol of the welfare poor (Ellwood 1988). They are likely to suffer from longer lasting and deeper poverty, suffer greater isolation from mainstream institutions and values than the nonghetto poor, and are disproportionately associated with problems of crime and juvenile delinquency (Wilson 1987).

It is perhaps ironic that in approaching the problems of the underclass liberal and conservative analysts agree on several basic assumptions. First,

there is agreement that welfare policy must be reformed; second, that race-targeted policies cannot solve the underlying problems faced by the ghetto poor; and third, that any reform must be consistent with traditional American value orientations. Specific conservative approaches have called for sharp reductions in welfare provisions (Murray 1984) or called for imposing work requirements on those receiving welfare (Mead 1986). Both approaches rest on assumptions about American values of individualism, self-reliance, hard-work, and personal responsibility.

In an effort to reclaim the policy-making agenda, liberal analysts have called for "universalistic policies" focused on creating employment opportunities, assuring adequate wage rates, child and family support, and improved educational programs (Ellwood 1988; Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988; Wilson 1987). Wilson has argued for pursuing a "hidden agenda." Accordingly, "the hidden agenda for liberal policy makers is to improve the life chances of the truly disadvantaged groups such as the ghetto underclass by emphasizing programs to which the more advantaged groups of all races and class backgrounds can positively relate" (Wilson 1987, p. 155, emphasis in original). In short, the goal is to "help the poor by not talking about them" (Hecllo 1986, p. 325). These new policies aim to create a framework in which people can support themselves.

The call for a shift from race-targeted to more "universalistic" anti-poverty approaches, in our judgment, rests on several assumptions about public opinion. First, proponents of what we will call the new liberal welfare agenda assume that race-targeted policies are less popular than policies of a more general economic nature. Second, the difference in popularity is seen as reflecting the differing interests and relative sizes of the potential

beneficiaries for the two types of policies. Third, the new liberal welfare agenda assumes that policies of a more general economic nature, as compared with race-targeted policies, are more consistent with American values of individualism and less likely to elicit opposition based in anti-black prejudice. Fourth, the new liberal policy agenda is seen as mustering a popular appeal that may rival that of conservative policy approaches.

Each of these assumptions is plausible but previous research has not been able to directly test these claims. Sociological research on poverty issues has focused heavily on the causes and consequences of ghetto poverty (Wilson 1987 and 1991), on sociohistorical and comparative analyses of the development of the welfare state (see essays in Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1989), or both (see essays in Danziger and Weinberg 1986 and Jencks and Peterson 1991). Few sociological examinations of public opinion on these issues are available (Coughlin 1979; Feagin 1975; Kluegel and Smith 1986), and none of these deal in-depth with how or why race-targeted policies appear more vulnerable than policies of broader scope.

To this point, most research relied upon in reaching assumptions about the new liberal welfare agenda involved simple comparisons of marginal distributions for a wide array of survey questions dealing with race- and welfare-policy (DeBoer 1983; Shapiro et al., 1987; Shapiro and Smith 1985) and a few aggregate trend analyses (see Shapiro and Young 1988). Yet, straightforward interpretation of such comparisons is risky because of the many different surveys involved, different times and modes of administration, and variations in questionnaire context. In this paper we present research that uses large-scale survey-based experiments (Schuman and Bobo 1988; Schuman and Presser 1981) to test these assumptions about public opinion. We analyze

data from the 1990 General Social Survey (Davis and Smith 1990) which contained, first, a set of experimentally controlled questions that pitted economically-targeted policies against race-targeted policies; and second, assessed popular support for the two main conservative welfare reform proposals.

Below we review the research on public opinion toward race-targeted policies and toward welfare. This review provides a more complete substantiation of the assumptions/hypotheses discussed above. We then report the experimental results and examine models of support for conservative policy solutions and traditional liberal policies.

BACKGROUND

Race-targeted policies: There are solid grounds for assuming that race-targeted social policies face opposition. Racial attitudes have improved, deteriorated, or gone unchanged, depending upon which type of question one examines. Where traditional prejudice is concerned whites' racial attitudes have undergone a sweeping positive transformation. Widespread support among whites for segregation and open discrimination as principles that should guide black-white relations have yielded to increasing support over the last 50 years for principles of equality (Jaynes and Williams 1989; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1988). For example, national surveys show that support for integrated schooling rose from 42% in 1942 to 95% in 1983 (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1988). Yet, overwhelming majorities of whites in national surveys opposed special government economic assistance to blacks and opposed school busing and other government efforts to enforce school desegregation. As recently as 1988 just a bare majority of whites favored legislation to prevent racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing

(Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1988).

In addition, support for racial policy questions typically exhibits weaker associations with respondent education, age, and region than occurs for racial principle questions. These patterns leave little grounds for anticipating positive change in the future. Also important to note is that black-white polarization on many racial policy questions is substantial. Majority support among blacks is often matched by clear majority opposition among whites.

To be sure, whites' opposition to race-targeted policies is not monolithic. Lipset and Schneider (1978) emphasized that most white Americans support "compensatory" racial policies. Race-targeted job training or special education programs often drew majority support. However, "preferential" race policies, such as job hiring or college admission quotas, elicited widespread opposition. Kluegel and Smith (1986) reported that 76% of whites in their 1980 national survey agreed that "affirmative action programs that help blacks and other minorities get ahead should be supported" as compared with only 51% who agreed that "employers should set aside a certain number of places to hire qualified blacks and other minorities" (Kluegel and Smith 1986, pp. 202-203).

Welfare policies: The American public seems to be of at least two minds on welfare and poverty related policy. On the one hand, almost everyone is against welfare. As Ellwood observed:

Everyone hates welfare. Conservatives hate it because they see welfare as a narcotic that destroys the energy and determination of people who already are suffering from a shortage of such qualities.... Liberals hate it because of the way it treats people. [Recipients hate it because] the current system offers modest benefits while imposing a ridiculous array of

rules that rob recipients of security and self-esteem. Recipients are offered no real help and have no real dignity (1988, p. 4).

Kluegel and Smith (1986) found that welfare spending was less popular than government job guarantees. A number of studies suggest that welfare and welfare recipients are viewed negatively (Coughlin 1979; Feagin 1972; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Williamson 1974). From the late sixties to 1980 public opinion shifted in an anti-welfare direction. "Compared to 1969," according to Kluegel and Smith, "the public is now more likely to agree that we are spending too much money on welfare and to deny that people on welfare try to find work to support themselves" (1986, p. 154).

On the other hand, policy analysts (Ellwood 1988; Heclo 1986; Lowi 1986) and public opinion studies (Coughlin 1979; Shapiro and Young 1988) strongly suggest that most Americans care about helping the poor. Direct evidence on this point comes from experiments conducted in the 1984 and 1985 General Social Surveys. A question calling for spending on, in one case, "welfare" was experimentally pitted against, in the other case, "assistance to the poor". Only 19% said "too little" money was being spent on welfare as compared to 65% who thought too little was being spent on assistance to the poor (Smith 1987).

Three types of factors may account for the difficulty faced by race-targeted and Great Society/War on Poverty era welfare state policies. Such policies may contradict widely held values; they may run counter to the interests of large segments of the population; and they may face rejection by those prejudiced against minorities.

Influence of Values: Traditional American values and beliefs about inequality shape both attitudes toward race-targeted and welfare-policies

(Kluegel and Smith 1986; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1988). Insofar as individuals attribute socioeconomic success or failure to personal causes (e.g., ability or effort) and view the opportunity structure as open and fair, *ceteris paribus*, they are unlikely to feel that government should intervene to help those less fortunate. A normative commitment to equity notions (e.g., reward according to contribution and merit) also provides grounds for objecting to both race-targeted and welfare policy actions (Kluegel and Smith 1986).

However, values and beliefs about social responsibility are also major dimensions of popular thinking about inequality. Such beliefs are consistent correlates of policy preferences (Bobo 1991; Katz and Hass 1988; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Those who see class background or other societal factors (e.g., limited job opportunities) as constraining socioeconomic attainments tend to support race-targeted and welfare policies. Structural thinking of this kind differs from individualistic beliefs in that the former has a much stronger inverse connection to the individual's own socioeconomic status.

Influence of Self-Interest: Simple individual- and group-self-interest may account for the vulnerability of policies that deliver benefits to specific subgroups of the population. Data at the individual level show a durable negative relationship between income and support for such welfare spending. Similarly, blacks are consistently more supportive of both race-targeted and welfare such policies than whites (Bobo 1991; Kluegel and Smith 1986).

Wilson (1987, pp. 118-120) suggested that policies targeted by income or race are not likely to develop a wide coalition of support since many people would have no stake in them. The weak base of support would become an acute vulnerability "when the national economy is in a period of little growth, or

decline. Under such economic conditions, the more the public programs are perceived by members of the wider society as benefiting any certain groups, the less support those programs receive" (Wilson 1987, p. 118). Both Wilson and Skocpol credit growing white middle class frustration with paying taxes to support welfare state programs of no benefit to them, during a period of economic stagnation, as fueling a split in the Democratic party coalition and the electoral success of Ronald Reagan.

Influence of Prejudice: Part of the political weakness of "Great Society" welfare programs may result from a perception that the programs are of disproportionate benefit to blacks (Wright 1977). The available survey data shows that those with negative attitudes toward blacks as a group are also less likely to support race-targeted and some welfare policies (Bobo 1991; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Sears 1988). Research has shown negative racial attitudes to increase opposition to school busing (Bobo 1983; Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979), to affirmative action (Kluegel and Smith 1986), and to other government economic policies to assist blacks (Bobo 1988; Kluegel 1990). A number of competing theories have attempted to explain these associations, such as traditional prejudice (Weigel and Howes 1986), symbolic or modern racism (Sears 1988), and group conflict models (Bobo 1988). Several additional influential determinants of racial policy attitudes have been noted (e.g., Schuman and Bobo 1988). Yet, there is little disagreement that prejudice of some type is often an important influence on the racial policy attitudes of many white Americans.

A key complexity is the role of beliefs about the causes of racial inequality (Apostle et al., 1983; Sniderman and Hagen 1985). A particular configuration of racial beliefs may be essential in order to obtain white

support for strong race-targeted policies. Many white Americans are low in traditional prejudice (i.e., neither favor segregation nor believe that blacks are innately inferior to whites). Yet, the absence of traditional prejudice does not logically require a person to believe that racial discrimination constitutes a major structural impediment to black advancement (Kluegel 1990). Structural attributions for racial inequality are, furthermore, an empirically distinct dimension of racial attitudes quite different from prejudice per se. Thinking in terms of such "racial structuralism", however, appears to be a near pre-condition of support for race-targeted economic policies (Kluegel and Bobo 1990). Recent analyses of modes of explaining racial inequality by demographic factors (i.e., age, education) and over time indicate that the decline in traditional prejudice has not been accompanied by an increase in racial structuralism. Also, small effects of education and of age on structural attributions for race inequality leave little grounds for anticipating movement in this direction in the future (Kluegel 1990). These patterns obtain despite compelling evidence of the persistence of discrimination (Feagin 1991).

In sum, the underlying assumptions about public opinion contained in the new liberal welfare agenda have merit. Many race-targeted and welfare policies have proven to be unpopular. Individualism, self-interest, and attitudes of anti-black prejudice have been contributors to this political vulnerability. However, these patterns do not give us very precise information on how costly race-targeting may be; on who falls out of a coalition of support when a policy is race-targeted; on the relevant mix of ideological and attitudinal factors that shape opinion; or on the viability of new liberal reform proposals as compared to an expressly conservative

reform agenda. Below we attempt to provide answers to these questions.

DATA AND MEASURES

The data come from the 1990 General Social Survey (Davis and Smith 1990). The GSS is a full probability sample of English speaking adults living in households in the continental U.S. There were a total of 1372 respondents with a response rate of 73%. Our analyses primarily are based on data for the 1150 white respondents to the survey. Further details on sample design may be obtained from Davis and Smith (1990).

RESULTS

New Liberal Policy Attitudes

Proponents of a new liberal welfare agenda maintain that race-targeted policies are politically vulnerable as compared to policies of a more general economic nature. We tested the hypothesis experimentally by developing three parallel questions that differed in whether the target of the policy was the poor in general or blacks in specific.¹ The questions are given in Table 1. We asked about the policies referred to in these questions because each involved steps government could take to ameliorate poverty, as Ellwood put it, "in which the government's role is to help people make it on their own" (1988, p. 10). Consistent with a liberal emphasis on government activism and responsibility, the policies call for government intervention to help those in need. And yet, consistent with the dictates of American individualism, the policies create circumstances wherein people can do a better job of providing for themselves. One policy aims to increase the availability of job opportunities (Enterprise Zones). The other two aim to improve the human capital of individual's by increasing educational opportunities (Special School Funds and College Scholarships).

-- Table 1 here --

Our experiment allows us to make a comparison that has not been considered heretofore; namely, race-targeted policies that do not challenge traditional values of individualism. There has been a tendency to treat universalistic policy as the only alternative to traditional race-targeted approaches such as affirmative action (Wilson 1987; Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988). However, it is not clear that completely abandoning race-targeting is necessary to achieve political viability. Pursuing this type of comparison should provide a better test of how much race-targeting per se matters.

Table 1 gives responses to the paired questions concerning new liberal agenda policy by race. Because the policies addressed in these questions are consistent with prevalent beliefs and values, overall they elicit wide support. Economic-targeted policy concerning educational opportunity has the backing of about 90 percent of the population. The proposed "enterprise zone" policy for poor areas gets about 70 percent support. Parallel race-targeted policies with the exception of the proposed race-targeted enterprise zone (favored by about 40% of respondents) also are favored by majorities. Consistent with the claims of proponents of the new liberal welfare agenda, however, whites show substantially more support for all three economic-targeted policies than for the parallel race-targeted ones. The percent of support among whites averages about 22% higher for economic-over race-targeted policy.

It also should be noted that there are no significant differences by race in support for economic-targeted policies. The differences by race for all three race-targeted policies, by contrast, are statistically significant (at the .01 level). In addition, black respondents equally favor each of the

economic- and race-targeted alternatives. The relative lack of white support for race-targeted policy is distinctive, and cannot be attributed to factors that equally influence white and black policy attitudes.

In subsequent analyses we treat these questions as alternative indicators of a single underlying trait that we shall refer to as the New Liberal Policy factor. We view each set of three items--the economic-targeted and race-targeted--as indicators of respondents standing on this factor in the respective random halves of the survey. Tests for the equivalence of the factor structure between the two halves, and the weights used to create factor scores are given in the Appendix.

SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFERENCES

The simple self-interest of different socioeconomic groups may explain why economic-targeted policy receives more support from whites than race-targeted policy. In particular, some groups of whites may see themselves or others like them as beneficiaries of more global economic-targeted policies, but not of race-targeted ones.

We examine potential socioeconomic differences in the basis of support for economic- vs. race-targeted policy along several dimensions. Because New Liberal Agenda policies benefit lower income people, self-interest predicts greater support for economic-targeted policy among lower income white respondents than higher income ones. If we attend strictly to the status dimension of education, we get a similar prediction regarding education: Support for economic-targeted policy should be higher among respondents with lower levels of education. Greater support for economic-targeted policy also may be found among younger relative to older people, since policies to promote opportunity generally have greater direct benefit to the young (or their

children). Self interest considerations argue, however, that we should find among whites no differences by age, income or education level in support for race-targeted policy. The higher level of support for economic-targeted over race-targeted policy may be due to greater support for economic-targeted policy among younger, lower income, and lower education whites.

Self-interest also may have a group basis. Women may see themselves as potential beneficiaries of gender-targeted policies to promote their opportunity, and thereby support race-targeted policies as an expression of support for the principle of targeting policy to specific groups. The proportionately higher concentration of blacks in the South may motivate greater opposition to race-targeted policies among Southerners out of a greater sense of potential threat to their self-interest. Lesser support for race-targeted policy among whites from rural areas or small cities and towns may derive from a perceived lack of benefit from it, since the proportion of blacks in such places may be too low to qualify for assistance under race-targeted policy. Because there is no or little difference between these respective groups in expected benefit, self-interest should play no role in shaping attitudes toward economic-targeted policy. In sum, the higher level of support for economic-targeted over race-targeted policy also may be due to lesser support for race-targeted policy among white males, among white southerners, and among whites who live in small cities, towns, and rural areas.

-- Table 2 here --

Table 2 presents results of regression analyses testing for the above proposed differences in the effects of socioeconomic variables on the New Liberal Policy factor.² Column I gives regression results that correspond to

the simple t-test for the difference between means of the New Liberal Policy factor for the random halves of whites who alternatively answered the economic-targeted or race-targeted policy questions. The single variable in this equation, labeled "Form," is coded "0" for respondents answering the economic-targeted policy questions and "1" for those answering the race-targeted alternatives. The regression coefficient gives the difference in means for the New Liberal Policy factor between respondents in the economic-targeted (i.e. the value of the "Constant" in column I) and race-targeted conditions. Consistent with findings in Table 1, the mean of New Liberal Policy is substantially lower for the race-targeted condition, and the difference is statistically significant.

Column II gives regression coefficients for the additive effects only of socioeconomic variables and question form on New Liberal Policy. The respective coefficients for the effect of Form are essentially the same in Column I and II. This reflects, the random equality of respondents on all characteristics other than question form for the new liberal policy items. In other words, there are no composition differences to account for in the analyses of economic- vs. race-targeted effects.

The results of principal interest are presented in Column III. The additive (main) effects in the Column III equation are the partial effects of socioeconomic variables on New Liberal Policy for the economic-targeted condition. To get the corresponding effects for the race-targeted condition we add the coefficients for the multiplicative (interaction) effects to the coefficients for the additive effects.

Three effects are consistent with a differential simple self-interest interpretation. Gender, age, and Southern residence affect New Liberal Policy

attitude in the predicted directions. Men and Southerners, respectively, give significantly less support to race-targeted policy than do women and non-Southerners. There are no statistically significant differences by race or gender in support for economic-targeted policy. Support for economic-targeted policy, as expected under simple self-interest, decreases with increasing age; but, age has no effect on race-targeted policy attitude.

Rural-urban location equally effects support of economic- and race-targeted policy (urban residents are more supportive), so it cannot account for the lower support of race-targeted policy. The effects of income and education are opposite those predicted under differential simple self-interest. Neither variable has a statistically significant effect on support for economic-targeted policy. Net of other factors, increasing income is associated with decreasing support for race-targeted policy. Increasing education, other factors constant, leads to increasing support for race-targeted policy.

Figure 1 provides a graphical summary of the differences among socioeconomic groups implied in Table 2. Here predicted means on the New Liberal Policy factor are arrayed for four typical clusters of socioeconomic variables, or "status groups." They are ordered in Figure 1 according to the socioeconomic status level implied by the combination of income and education, and categorical statuses are varied to show expected means on the Liberal Policy factor for typical high and low clusters for respondents in the race-targeted and economic-targeted conditions separately. The "Low" cluster mean is for white males, from the rural south, with a family income of between \$10,000 and \$12,500 (in 1990), and who have 11 years of formal education. "Medium 1" is composed of white males, from the urban north, with family incomes between \$22,500 and \$24,999, and 12 years of education. "Medium 2: is

composed of white females, from the urban south, with family incomes between \$17,500 and \$19,999, and 14 years of education. The "High" cluster mean is for white females, from the urban north, with a family income of \$60,000 or more, and who have 18 years of education.

-- Figure 1 here --

The overall pattern shown in Figure 1 is one of little to no differences among groups in the overall high level of support for economic-targeted policy, coupled with large differences in support for race-targeted policy among groups. This pattern is consistent with the claims of proponents of the new liberal agenda that there are different constituencies for economic- and race-targeted policy. But, on the whole the pattern in Figure 1 does not well fit a simple self-interest interpretation.

ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND RACIAL ATTITUDES

The pattern in Figure 1, however, does fit an explanation stressing the differential affect of economic ideology and racial attitudes on support for economic- and race-targeted policy. We know from prior research that traditional racial prejudice decreases and that overall there is a modest tendency for racial attitudes to become more liberal in general with increasing education (Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1988). We also know that adherence to aspects of American stratification ideology varies significantly by education and income (Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Of most relevance to our concerns, we know that attributions for poverty become less individualistic with increasing education, and that structural attributions for poverty are made substantially less often by higher income persons. As noted earlier, New Liberal Agenda proponents claim that race-targeted policies garner less support than economic-targeted policy, because the former challenge prevalent

American economic beliefs and values, while the latter do not. In addition, New Liberal Agenda proponents claim that race-targeted policies, because of the direct identification with race, elicit opposition on the basis of prejudice and other racial beliefs and attitudes, while economic-targeted policies face little or no opposition on racial grounds per se.

Operationally, these claims imply interaction effects such that aspects of economic ideology and racial attitudes have substantial impact on support for race-targeted policy, but no influence on support for economic-targeted policy. If such interaction effects exist, then the patterns observed in Figure 1 follow from what we know about the relationships of education and income to economic ideology and to racial beliefs and attitudes. Table 3 gives results from regression equations testing the proposed differential effects of economic ideology and racial attitudes on New Liberal Policy. We employ five indices, three concerning economic ideology and two concerning racial beliefs and attitudes. Structuralism and Individualism, involve the attribution of poverty to structural causes and to individual (i.e. personal) causes, respectively. Equity is a measure of the perceived fairness and necessity of income inequality. Prejudice is a measure of racial stereotyping of the kinds commonly included in definitions of "anti-black prejudice." Discrimination is a measure of the perceived degree to which blacks' opportunity for jobs and housing is restricted by discrimination. Question wordings and details of index construction for each measure are given in the Appendix.

Column I of Table 3 gives coefficients from an additive (main) effects only model. Overall, net of the influence of socioeconomic variables, support for New Liberal Policy is shaped by economic ideology and racial attitudes in

expected ways. The greater the importance whites give to structural causes of poverty, the greater the support in general for New Liberal Policy. The partial effects of Individualism and Equity are not statistically significant. Net of all other variables in the equation, prejudiced whites show less support for New Liberal Policy than the non-prejudiced. Of all the economic ideology and racial attitude measures, Discrimination has the largest partial effect. The greater the perceived extent of discrimination against blacks, the greater the support in general for New Liberal Policy.

-- Table 3 here --

Column II in Table 3 gives coefficients for statistically significant interaction effects of socioeconomic and attitude variables with question form on New Liberal Policy, and the corresponding main effects. There is but one statistically significant differential effect of the attitude variables, the interaction between Form and Discrimination. Though the perceived extent of Discrimination significantly influences support for New Liberal Policy among respondents in the economic-targeted condition, it has a much larger influence (three times as large) among those in the race-targeted condition. Among the socioeconomic variables, the interactions of South and Age with Form found in the analyses of Table 2 are no longer statistically significant. However, the interactions with Gender, Income, and Education remain significant, and are approximately the same size in Table 3 as Table 2. The pattern in Figure 1, then, remains, when the differential effects of economic ideology, and racial beliefs and attitudes are controlled.

In summary, findings to this point in our analysis show that Gender, Education, and perceived Discrimination play key roles in producing the higher level of support for economic- over race-targeted policy. Men and the lesser

educated disproportionately join the ranks of the opposition when the focus shifts from universalistic to race-targeted policy. Perhaps surprisingly, this shift does not evoke any greater level of opposition (net of other factors) among the prejudiced. But, it does make whites' perceptions of the extent of discrimination against blacks highly salient.

CONSERVATIVE VERSUS LIBERAL POLICY

To evaluate the claims of New Liberal Agenda proponents that support of universalistic policy to help the poor rivals that of conservative policy, and that such policy resonates better with American economic beliefs and values we examine whites' attitudes toward welfare and toward traditionally liberal policy to help blacks. Here we analyze responses to three questions. The first two include conservative critiques of welfare, respectively invoking a requirement "that people must work in order to receive welfare," and proposing "reducing welfare benefits to make working for a living more attractive." Though they are critiques of the existing welfare system, they have in recent years taken on the status in effect of conservative policy solutions. Proponents of conservative policy often put them forward as solutions to the "welfare mess" that is in turn proposed as a major "cause" of contemporary poverty (Mead, 1986; Gilder, 1981). The third question proposes a traditionally liberal solution of direct intervention by the federal government to help improve the standard of living for black Americans. Though it does not refer to a specific policy, it invokes a "liberal" label by calling for federal government action in a race-targeted manner to improve an outcome, rather than to facilitate opportunity.

-- Table 4 here --

The percentage distributions for white responses to these four questions

(Table 4) provide initial support for certain claims of New Liberal Agenda proponents. The comparison of Table 1 to Table 4 shows that support for economic-targeted policy is of a level equal or higher than that for either a Work Requirement (85% in favor) or for Reducing Welfare Benefits (72% in favor). In contrast, white respondents show little support and substantial opposition to liberal policy. Only a small fraction of whites strongly support Government Assistance for Blacks to improve their standard of living. About 16% unequivocally support for assistance to improve the standard of living for blacks (responses "1" and "2"), and approximately 50% unequivocally oppose it (responses "4" and "5").

-- Table 5 here --

The regressions of these three policy attitudes on sociodemographic variables, and economic ideology and racial belief indices (Table 5) provide further support for New Liberal Agenda claims, and help to place previous findings in a broader context. Two major observations may be drawn from the regression results in Table 5. First, economic ideology plays a stronger role in shaping responses to conservative and traditionally liberal policy than it does regarding new liberal policy. Structuralism has statistically significant effects on all policy attitudes, but in relative terms (judged by the standardized regression coefficients) it has a substantially weaker effect on support of the New Liberal Policy factor than on either conservative or traditionally liberal policy attitudes. Though Equity and Individualism have statistically significant effects on the two conservative policy and the traditionally liberal policy items, neither measure of economic ideology has significant effects on New Liberal Policy. The perceived fairness of income inequality (Equity) significantly affects conservative and traditional liberal

policy, such that those who perceive income inequality to be necessary and fair support conservative, and oppose traditionally liberal policy. Individualism also has a significant effect, such that whites who attribute poverty to individual failings are more likely to favor having a work requirement for receiving welfare benefits and to support reducing welfare benefits. The weaker influence of economic ideology on support for New Liberal Policy supports the claim that it does not challenge American economic beliefs and values while traditional liberal policy does. Second, racial beliefs have a stronger influence on attitudes toward traditional liberal policy than on attitudes toward either conservative or new liberal policy. Relatedly, it is noteworthy that: a) Prejudice has stronger relative effects on traditional liberal policy attitudes than on either conservative or new liberal policy evaluations, and b) the perceived extent of Discrimination has an effect on support of traditional liberal policy rivaling its effect on the race-targeted version of the New Liberal Policy measure.

These findings argue that the effect of racial prejudice is muted when conservative policy is evaluated by whites—even when conservative policy is race-targeted. However, race-targeting makes beliefs about discrimination highly salient regardless of whether it is a conservative or liberal policy that is the focus of the targeting. These findings support the claim of New Liberal Policy proponents that new liberal policy mutes race prejudice, with an important qualification. That is, the simple addition of race-targeting to basic new liberal policy does not make prejudice more salient, but does make the tendency on the part of whites to deny or downplay discrimination highly important.

CONCLUSIONS

Our results have three implications concerning the viability of alternative welfare reform agendas. First, race-targeting does reduce the level of support for public policy. On average we found a drop of twenty-two percentage points when the focus of policy shifted from the poor to blacks. The reasons for the decline in support under race-targeting include self-interest. Ideological factors also contribute to the difference in support. A perception that blacks face current discrimination is a larger factor in support for race-targeted policy than for policy targeted on the poor. When a policy focuses on blacks the potential coalition of support tends to lose white males of low education but high income, and to some extent Southerners. This is not the profile of a highly politically active person. Low education is associated with lower levels of participation. Yet, in terms of absolute numbers this represents a large segment of the electorate, especially those pivotal voters colloquially known as "Reagan Democrats".

Second, despite the above, race-targeting does not invariably reduce the base of policy support to merely a self-interested minority of potential program beneficiaries. Two race-targeted versions of the policies we asked about--Special School Funds and College Scholarships--achieve substantial popularity (around 70% in both cases). This happens, we believe, because such policies blend race-targeting with an affirmation of individualism. Consistent with the speculations of Lipset and Schneider, race-targeted but compensatory policies aimed at improving human capital resources will strike a resonant chord. In addition, such policies appear to mitigate some of the influence of prejudice.

These findings underscore the need to judiciously balance the trade-off

between the political viability of universalistic policy and the direct responsive to the most needy of narrower targeting. If policy goals reach beyond attacking poverty to include reducing or eliminating black-white economic inequality then, judged strictly from the vantage point of public opinion, our results suggest that it makes sense to retain some race-targeting. The one strong proviso is that policy be mindful of cherished values of individualism and thus presumably emphasize improving skills and human capital resources.

Third, whether liberal reform strategies emphasize universalism and down play targeting or pursue the two in tandem, they are likely to face stern competition on the right. Conservative reform agendas appear to have a strong claim on the hearts and minds of most white Americans. Imposing work requirements for welfare and reducing welfare benefits, especially the former, have a remarkably broad appeal. What is more, these reform strategies have exceptionally direct resonance with individualism and closely aligned notions of equity. Among all of the policy variables we considered, the conservative agenda seems to flow most readily from the apparently ungenerous view of individualism now in ascendancy in the U.S.

We wish to emphasize that neither policy making nor public opinion are static processes. Gamson and colleagues (Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1987) have suggested that dynamic issue cultures develop around matters of welfare policy and affirmative action. These cultures consist of competing ways of framing the issues. An issue frame involves devices such as metaphors, catch phrases and other symbols that invoke one interpretative slant on an issue. The longevity and success of a particular frame, they suggested, hinged on the activities of those sponsoring the frame (especially

as they compete with sponsors of alternative frames), related media packaging, and the degree of cultural resonance of frame elements.

Our experiments, in effect, test the mass appeal of different policy frames. The degree of success of any welfare reform frame will hinge in part on public opinion. Equally important ingredients are competition among sponsors of different reform strategies and how the media "frames" the issue for the public at large (Iyengar 1990). It is not possible to forecast the outcome of political competition among the new liberal, the conservative, and the traditional liberal strategies of combatting poverty on the basis of these data. The data do suggest, however, that liberal reforms expressly mindful of individualism, justified on grounds of need and social responsibility—even if race-targeted—may prove to be politically viable.

The experimental items we used allowed us to simulate central aspects of ongoing political debates. It did so in a way that helps identify potential supporters and opponents of specific policies and the cultural resonances (or hurdles) that policy advocates need attend to. A key lesson of these experiments is that there is no single attitude or predisposition toward welfare reform. Different proposals do tend to create different potential coalitions of support. Competing proposals also vary widely in the type and degree of cultural resonance they elicit within the population (Hassenfeld and Rafferty 1980). The nature of these coalitions and resonances can and should be made the subject of direct empirical investigation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Many of the questions analyzed, including those on new liberal policy, are taken from a module on intergroup relations included in the 1990 GSS, constructed by a subcommittee of the General Social Survey Board of Overseers. The first author of this paper chaired this committee, and the second author served on it. The other members are Mary R. Jackman, John Shelton Reed, Howard Schuman, A. Wade Smith, and Tom W. Smith.
2. Questions wordings and response format for these socioeconomic variables are given in Davis and Smith (1990).

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APPENDIX

Index Construction

New Liberal Policy

Polychoric correlations -- generated by using PRELIS (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1986) -- among the New Liberal Policy items are given in Table A1. Results for tests of the equality of factor structures between the economic-targeted and race-targeted items also are presented in this table (bottom panel).

Table A1 here

Model A tests the hypothesis that the loadings only of the respective economic- and race-targeted policy items are equal. Model B tests the hypothesis that both the respective loadings and error variances are equal. Though only the results for Model A are statistically significant (at the .01 level), the Goodness of Fit index for Model B (.993) indicates that a model assuming equal loadings and equal error variances fits quite well. Overall, these results strongly argue that we may treat the sets of economic- and race-targeted items as having the same underlying factor structure, and justify using common weights to produce a summated index.

To produce a set of common weights we fit a model to the correlations among three items for the entire sample, formed by combining responses to parallel economic and race-targeted policy items. The matrix analyzed, in effect, contains the correlations among items concerning support for enterprise zones, for increased spending on schools, and for college scholarships irrespective of economic- or race targeting. The following weights estimated under this model are applied to produce factor scores for New Liberal Policy:

$$\text{New Liberal Policy} = .188 \text{ Enterprise Zone} + .483 \text{ Schools} + .377 \text{ College Scholarships} .$$

Economic Ideology

Table A2 gives the results from a confirmatory factor analysis of items involving economic inequality. Four items concern the rated importance of structural (SCHOOLS and JOBS) and individual (MORALS and JOBS) causes of poverty. Two items concern the justice of economic inequality: the need to have inequality to provide incentive for hard work (INCENTIVE) and to motivate people to acquire advanced education (STUDY). The final item concerns equality of opportunity (OPPORTUNITY). (Exact wordings for all items are available in Davis and Smith (1990).

Table A2 here

Consistent with findings of prior research (cf. Kluegel and Smith, 1986) we hypothesize that three factors are needed to account for the correlations among these items. (Because all these items are ordinal, we use polychoric correlations in all factor analyses.) The three factor model given in Table A2

fits very well (Chi-square with 7 degrees of freedom = 6.57, $p = .475$), and is used to estimate weights respectively for the Structuralism, Individualism, and Equity factors:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Structuralism} = & .296 \text{ SCHOOLS} + .177 \text{ MORALS} + .455 \text{ JOBS} - .205 \text{ EFFORT} \\ & - .038 \text{ INCENTIVE} - .043 \text{ STUDY} + .213 \text{ OPPORTUNITY} , \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Individualism} = & .111 \text{ SCHOOLS} + .467 \text{ MORALS} + .163 \text{ JOBS} - .372 \text{ EFFORT} \\ & + .056 \text{ INCENTIVE} + .063 \text{ STUDY} - .078 \text{ OPPORTUNITY} . \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Equity} = & -.053 \text{ SCHOOLS} + .124 \text{ MORALS} + .177 \text{ JOBS} + \\ & .165 \text{ EFFORT} + .307 \text{ INCENTIVE} + .347 \text{ STUDY} - \\ & .078 \text{ NOCHANCE} \end{aligned}$$

Racial Attitudes

Several items are available in the 1990 General Social Survey that may be used to measure racial prejudice. Two of the commonly used items--attitudes toward legal prohibition of racial intermarriage and toward the right to practice residential segregation against blacks--are only available for two-thirds of the cases. To maximize the power for statistical tests, we employ only those "racial prejudice" items available for all respondents.

Specifically, we employ an item concerning the attribution of the black-white socioeconomic status gap to a lack of "in-born ability to learn" (ABILITY) and five items that form part of a question concerning "characteristics" of groups. The latter five items consist of respondents' ratings of groups' standing on seven point scales with the following endpoints: (1) hard-working vs. lazy (LAZY) (2) violence-prone vs. not violence prone (VIOLENT) (3) unintelligent vs. intelligent (INTELLIGENT) (4) self-supporting vs. live off welfare (WELFARE) (5) patriotic vs. unpatriotic (PATRIOTIC). Because by definition white anti-black prejudice (cf. Pettigrew, 1982) involves attributing less positive characteristics to blacks than to whites, we computed five difference scores by subtracting ratings for blacks from ratings for whites. A high score on the resultant items indicates a perception that whites possess more of a favorable trait than blacks.

We employed three items involving perceived discrimination against blacks. The first item involves agreeing or denying that the black-white socioeconomic status gap is "mainly due to discrimination." The second and third items concern assessments of the amount of discrimination (on a scale from "a lot" to "none at all") faced by blacks in "getting good jobs" (JOB DISCRIM) and in buying or renting "housing wherever they want" (HOUSING DISCRIM).

Table A3 here

Based on previous analyses of the same or similar items (Kluegel and Bobo, forthcoming), we hypothesize that racial prejudice and perceived discrimination items load on two separate factors. Results of a confirmatory factor analysis of all nine racial attitude items (Table A3) support this hypothesis. Factor weights were estimated under the model in Table A3, and used to form indices as follows:

Prejudice = $-.066$ DISCRIMINATION + $.093$ ABILITY + $.004$ JOB DISCRIM
+ $.001$ HOUSING DISCRIM + $.288$ LAZY + $.085$ VIOLENT
+ $.158$ INTELLIGENT + $.396$ WELFARE + $.158$ PATRIOTIC ,

Discrimination = $.116$ DISCRIMINATION + $.000$ ABILITY + $.717$ JOB DISCRIM
+ $.203$ HOUSING DISCRIM - $.001$ LAZY + $.001$ VIOLENT
+ $.000$ INTELLIGENT - $.002$ WELFARE - $.001$ PATRIOTIC .

Table A1. Correlations among New Liberal Policy Items, and Tests for the Equality of Factor Structures Between Race- and Economic-Targeted Items.

Items	1	2	3	4	5	6
Race-Targeted						
1. Giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in largely black areas	1.0					
2. Spending more money on the schools in black neighborhoods, especially for pre-school and early education programs.	.58	1.0				
3. Providing special college scholarships for black children who maintain good grades.	.59	.70	1.0			
Economic-Targeted						
4. Giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in poor and high unemployment areas.	---	---	---	1.0		
5. Spending more money on the schools in poor neighborhoods, especially for pre-school and early education programs.	---	---	---	.49	1.0	
6. Providing special college scholarships for children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds who maintain good grades.	---	---	---	.38	.65	1.0

	Chi-Square	Degrees of Freedom	Goodness of Fit Index	p
Model				
A. Equal Loadings	8.40	2	.997	.015
B. Equal Loadings and Equal Error Variances	15.67	3	.993	.008

Table A2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Economic Ideology Items.

FACTOR LOADINGS			
Items a,b	Structuralism	Individualism	Equity
1. SCHOOLS	.556	.000	.000
2. MORALS	.000	.682	.000
3. JOBS	.645	.000	.280
4. EFFORT	-.438	.709	.000
5. INCENTIVE	.000	.000	.458
6. STUDY	.000	.000	.494
7. OPPORTUNITY	.524	-.243	.000
Correlated Errors			
r _{EFFORT, JOBS} = .085			
Factor Correlations			
	1	2	3
1. Structuralism	1.00		
2. Individualism	.31	1.00	
3. Equity	-.04	.48	1.00

a. The question wording for items 1 through 4 is as follows: "Now I will read a list of reasons some people give to explain why there are poor people in this country. Please tell me whether you feel each of these is very important, somewhat important, or not important in explaining why there are poor people in this country. A. Failure of society to provide good schools for many Americans (SCHOOLS). B. Loose morals and drunkenness (MORALS). C. Failure of industry to provide enough jobs (JOBS). D. Lack of effort by the poor themselves (EFFORT).

b. The question wording for items 5 through 7 is as follows: "Here are different opinions about social differences in this country. Please tell me for each one whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree. A. Only if differences in income are large enough is there an incentive for individual effort (INCENTIVE). B. No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers (STUDY). C. One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance (OPPORTUNITY).

Table A3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results for Racial Attitude Items.

Items a,b,c	FACTOR LOADINGS	
	Prejudice	Discrimination
1. ABILITY	.485	.000
2. LAZY	.712	.000
3. VIOLENT	.451	.000
4. INTELLIGENT	.622	.000
5. WELFARE	.779	.000
6. PATRIOTIC	.551	.000
7. DISCRIMINATION	-.215	.529
8. JOB DISCRIM	.000	.907
9. HOUSING DISCRIM	.000	.712

Correlated Errors

 $r_{\text{ABILITY, INTELLIGENT}} = .161$
 $r_{\text{INTELLIGENT, VIOLENT}} = .141$

Factor Correlation

	1	2
1. Prejudice	1.00	
2. Discrimination	-.14	1.00

a. The question wording for items 1 and 7 is as follows: "On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are ... A. Mainly due to discrimination (DISCRIMINATION)? B. Because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn (ABILITY)?"

b. The question wording for items 2 through 6 is as follows: "Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group are 'rich.' A score of 7 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are 'poor.' A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand."

c. The question wording for items 8 and 9 is as follows: "How much discrimination is there that hurts the chances of blacks to [get good paying jobs (JOB DISCRIM) / to buy or rent housing wherever they want (HOUSING DISCRIM)]. Would you say there is a lot, some, only a little, or none at all?"

Table 1. Percentage Distributions for New Liberal Policy Items by Race.

ENTERPRISE ZONES		SF	F	N	O	SO	N
1A. Giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in largely black areas.	White	7.7	35.5	25.0	24.6	7.2	557
	Black	27.8	41.8	21.5	5.1	3.8	79
	Other	10.7	35.7	14.3	28.6	10.7	28
1B. Giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in poor and high unemployment areas.	White	18.4	52.2	16.2	9.9	3.3	554
	Black	25.7	45.7	14.3	10.0	4.3	70
	Other	17.9	53.6	21.4	7.1	0.0	28
SPECIAL SCHOOL FUNDS							
2A. Spending more money on the schools in black neighborhoods, especially for pre-school and early education programs.	White	17.4	50.8	15.3	12.3	4.3	563
	Black	50.6	43.4	3.6	2.4	0.0	83
	Other	31.0	44.8	6.9	13.8	4.0	29
2B. Spending more money on the schools in poor neighborhoods, especially for pre-school and early education programs.	White	29.4	56.8	7.9	4.5	1.4	555
	Black	45.8	45.8	4.2	2.8	1.4	72
	Other	50.0	40.0	6.7	3.3	0.0	30
COLLEGE SCHOLARSHIPS							
3A. Providing special college scholarships for black children who maintain good grades.	White	16.6	53.1	14.1	11.5	4.8	567
	Black	56.1	39.0	4.9	0.0	0.0	82
	Other	30.0	50.0	13.3	6.7	0.0	30
3B. Providing special college scholarships for children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds who maintain good grades.	White	36.7	54.7	5.7	1.6	1.3	558
	Black	47.2	44.4	5.6	2.8	0.0	72
	Other	54.8	38.7	3.2	3.2	0.0	31

NOTE: SF = strongly favor, F = Favor, N = Neither favor nor oppose, O = oppose, and SO = Strongly Oppose.

Table 2. Regression Results for Effects of Sociodemographic Variables on Support for New Liberal Policy.

	New Liberal Policy		
	I	II	III
<u>Additive (Main) Effects</u>			
Form (1=race-targeted)	-0.544 (-.31)*	-0.543 (-.31)*	-1.121*
South (1=south)		-0.136 (-.07)*	.006
Small City/Town		-0.047 (-.02)	—
Rural		-0.162 (-.06)*	—
Age		-0.002 (-.04)	-0.004
Gender (1=female)		.110 (.06)*	.006
Income		-0.003 (-.02)	.012
Education		.037 (.13)*	.016
<u>Multiplicative (Interaction) Effects</u>			
South x Form			-.278*
Age x Form			.004*
Gender x Form			.218*
Income x Form			-.032*
Education x Form			.047*
Constant	4.273	3.941	4.080
R ²	.10	.14	.16

* = p < .05

NOTES: The values in parentheses are standardized partial regression coefficients. "Form" is a 0, 1 variable, with a value of 1 assigned to respondents who answered the race-targeted questions, and 0 if they answered the economic-targeted questions. "South" is coded 0 for persons from the non-south and 1 for persons currently residing in any of the following states (and the District of Columbia): Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas. Urban-rural residence is represented by three 0, 1 variables for current residence in an SMSA, a small city or town (not in an SMSA, population from 2,500 to 49,999), or a rural area (an area of less than 2,500 population or open country). SMSA is the excluded variable in the regression analyses. "Gender" is coded such that 1 is female and 0 is male. Age and Education are in years. Income is family income coded in 20 categories, from under 1,000 to \$60,000 or more. See Davis and Smith (1990) for detailed information.

Table 3. Regression Results for Effects of Sociodemographic Variables, Economic Ideology and Racial Attitudes on New Liberal Policy.

New Liberal Policy		
<u>Additive (Main) Effects</u>	I	II
South (1=south)	-.063 (-.03)	-----
Small City/Town	-.027 (-.01)	-----
Rural	-.157 (-.06)*	-----
Age	-.001 (-.01)	-----
Gender (1=female)	.093 (.05)*	-.023*
Income	-.001 (-.01)	.020*
Education	.029 (.10)*	.009
Form (1=race-targeted)	-.536 (-.31)*	.236
Structuralism	.179 (.11)*	-----
Individualism	-.099 (-.06)	-----
Equity	.062 (.03)	-----
Prejudice	-.063 (-.08)*	-----
Discrimination	.200 (.19)	.104*
<u>Multiplicative (Interaction) Effects</u>		
Gender x Form	-----	.207*
Income x Form	-----	-.040*
Education x Form	-----	.051*
Discrimination x Form	-----	.208*
Constant	4.235	3.538
R ²	.20	.24

* = p < .05

NOTES: The values in parentheses are standardized partial regression coefficients. See Table 2 and Appendix for definitions of variables.

Table 4. Percentage Distributions for Attitudes Toward Conservative Welfare Proposals (WORK REQUIREMENT and REDUCE WELFARE BENEFITS) and Traditional Liberal Policy (GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR BLACKS).

	Percent	(N)
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR BLACKS		
1. Government should help	6.3	(70)
2.	9.3	(103)
3. Both	33.9	(376)
4.	18.6	(206)
5. No special treatment	31.9	(353)
WELFARE WORK REQUIREMENT		
1. Strongly favor	49.4	(560)
2. Favor	35.4	(401)
3. Neither favor nor oppose	7.6	(86)
4. Oppose	6.2	(70)
5. Strongly oppose	1.5	(17)
REDUCE WELFARE BENEFITS		
1. Strongly favor	35.5	(395)
2. Favor	36.8	(409)
3. Neither favor nor oppose	10.3	(115)
4. Oppose	13.8	(153)
5. Strongly oppose	3.6	(40)

NOTES: The question wordings are as follows: (1) GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR BLACKS, "Some people think that blacks have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to blacks...Where would you place yourself on this scale..."; (2) WELFARE WORK REQUIREMENT, "...requiring that people must work in order to receive welfare."; and (3) REDUCE WELFARE BENEFITS, "...reducing welfare benefits to make working for a living more attractive."

Table 5. Regression Results for Effects of Sociodemographic Variables, Economic Ideology, and Racial Attitudes on Attitudes Toward Welfare and Government Economic Assistance to Blacks.

	<u>Welfare Work Requirement</u>		<u>Reduce Welfare Benefits</u>		<u>Government Help Blacks</u>	
South (1=south)	.04	-.01	.11*	.07*	-.09*	-.03
Small City/Town	.03	-.01	.03	.01	-.03	-.02
Rural	.02	-.02	.03	.03	-.02	-.02
Age	.09*	.06*	.10*	.05	-.01	.05
Gender (1=female)	.02	-.01	-.01	-.04	.05	.02
Income	.12*	.11*	.10*	.07*	-.01	.01
Education	-.06*	.01	-.16*	-.10*	.16*	.09*
Structuralism		-.14*		-.23*		.22*
Individualism		.11*		.14*		-.02
Equity		.09*		.09*		-.09*
Prejudice		.06		.07*		-.22*
Discrimination		-.06*		-.05		.22*
R ²	.02	.08	.05	.17	.04	.23

* = p < .05

NOTES: The values in the body of the table are standardized partial regression coefficients. See Table 2 and the Appendix for definitions of variables.




Figure 1. Predicted Means for New Liberal Policy by Status Group