Hout, Michael

Social Change Report (SC) 64

This research compares period and cohort trends across many variables at once to assess what aspect of American social life changed the most in the last fifty years. It also catalogues the biggest racial, gender, educational, and geographic gaps in social behaviors and attitudes in those years. Exploiting the consistent measurement in the General Social Survey since 1972, I analyze its “core” items that repeat with every survey and other repeating items that occur regularly but not in every survey

GSS years: 1972-2018

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Smith, Tom W.; Son, Jaesok

Social Change Report (SC) 63

This report explores the trends in public opinion on government spending in various areas from health to foreign aid.

GSS years: 1973-2018

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Davis, Jim; Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Reports

(no abstract provided)

1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Smith, Tom W.; Son, Jaesok

Social Change Report (SC) 61

This report explores the trends in public opinion on government spending in various areas from health to foreign aid.

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 9, 2011

Two generations (1972-1976 and 2006-2008) are compared using 43 replicated attitudes in the NORC General Social Survey. The report describes the generational changes (primarily liberal) weighs the causal impact of rising educational levels (liberal), cohort replacement (liberal) and period effects (mildly conservative). It argues that this long term causal mechanism is slowly eroding. 

GSS years: 1972-2010

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 6, 2011

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2010

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 8, 2010

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2010

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2006

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC, 2009

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2008

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 8, 2009

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2008

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 2008

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1973-2006

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC, 2008

Family structure and family values have undergone tremendous changes over the last generation. The basic structure of the family has been reshaped and family values and related attitudes have also undergone paradigmatic shifts. Families are smaller and less stable, marriage is less central and cohabitation more common, the value of children and values for children have altered, and within marriages gender roles have become less traditional and more egalitarian in both word and practice. Collectively the alterations mark the replacement of traditional family types and family values with the emerging, modern family types and a new set of family values. Moreover, as important as the changes in family structure and family values are own their own, they take on added significance because they are tied to political attitudes and behaviors. First, family structure relates to political participation. The married and the widowed, for example, are more likely to vote in presidential elections. Second, those living in traditional families structures and those holding traditional family values are more likely to vote for Republican presidential candidates and to identify as Republican and conservative rather than Democratic and liberal. In general, the currently married and parents lean to the right and most non-married groups (the never married, separated, and divorced), those never having had children, and single parents tilt to the left. The political role of family structure has increased over time in part because class and family type have come into closer alignment. Traditional family structure have become more associated with the middle class, while non-traditionally organized families have become more closed tied to the working class and poor. It is likely that non-traditional family structures will continue to grow in the future and that family values will further liberalize. The smaller segment of the population living in traditional, family structure naturally means fewer voters from such families. The family values of the 21st century are not our parents’ family values. These changes may undermine static, political appeals to traditional, family values and the changing nature of the family will mean that appeals to family values will also have to evolve to remain effective.

GSS years: 1972-2006

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2006

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 3, 2007

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2004

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC, 2005

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2004

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 4, 2005

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2002

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 4, 2002

This paper explores the "tree ring" hypothesis that reaching young adulthood during certain historical periods raises or lowers attitudes above and beyond the contribution of demographic variables and their long term trends. It examines the deviations from long term linear trends for 28 NORC General Social Survey attitude items in birth cohorts reaching age 16 in the 50's, 60's, and post 60's. Long term trends are estimated from regressions of attitudes on cohorts reaching age 16 from 19 17 to 1950 (net of Year and five demographics). Popular impressions are supported in that "rings" (residuals) are more liberal for Americans reaching age 16 in the 1960's. Conversely, however, those reaching 16 in the 1950's are more liberal then their immediate predecessors not more conservative. Both generalizations conceal quite different patterns among five content clusters: Authoritarianism, Family, Free Speech, Sex, and Race. I argue that with a modified regression setup and proper controls cohort functions can illuminate many historical processes.

GSS years: 1975-2000

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 2002

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-2000

Hout, Michael Fischer, Claude S.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 9, 2002

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1973-2000

Hout, Michael Greeley, Andrew Wilde, Melissa J.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 4, 2004 (revised)

Contemporary American Protestants are less likely to belong to "mainline" denominations and more likely to belong to "conservative" ones than they used to be. Evidence from the General Social Survey indicates that the factor that most of the literature on religious change has focused on-the rate at which persons raised in mainline denominations are converting to the conservative denominations -has played no role in the restructuring. It has not increased in recent years or among recent cohorts. Higher fertility and earlier childbearing among women from conservative denominations explains 76 percent of the observed trend for cohorts born between 1903 and 1973. Quite simply the conservative denominations have grown because an increasing share of Protestant children have been raised in the conservative tradition. Further analysis shows that mainline decline would have slowed in recent cohorts, but a dropoff in conversions from conservative to mainline denominations prolonged the decline. A recent rise in the tendency to give up organized religion (greater among persons raised in a mainline denomination) added a few percentage points to mainline decline.

GSS years: 1972-1998

Hout, Michael

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 9, 1999

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-1998

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 2000

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-1998

Smith, Tom W.

 Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 9, 2000

The generation gap has dwindled on balance since the 1970s. This trend is related to the waning of age gradients in social organization and/or cohort effects.

GSS years: 1972-1974, 1984-1986, 1996, 1998

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1999

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-1996

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 7, 1998

One third of the change in the typical attitude can be explained by appropriate demographics, however demographics can rarely completely account for any particular trend.

GSS years: 1972-1996

DiMaggio, Paul Evans, John Bryson, Bethany

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1997

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1974-1994

Smith, Tom W. Smith, Robert J.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 11, 1996

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1980-1994

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 11, 1994

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1993

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 4, 1994

Examining musical tastes demonstrates the powerful effects of cohorts in social change as well as confirming their distinctive world views, particularly in their favored types of music. In the 20th Century, two generations organized around big band and rock and roll music have been particularly dominant.

GSS years: 1993

Gallup 1989

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1992

While there may have been a sexual revolution and counter revolution concerning premarital sexuality, this imagery inaccurately describes the continual disapproval of extramarital and homosexual relations.

GSS years: 1972-1991

Roper 1937, 1939, 1943, 1959, 1974, 1985; NORC 1950, 1953, 1963, 1970; Gallup 1969, 1973, 1977-1978, 1981-1982, 1985, 1991; Virginia Slims 1970, 1985; Mark Clements Research 1982-1987; LAT 1989-1990; NBC 1965;

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1991

The televangelist scandals of the late 1980s led to negative reactions to religion. People who were Fundamentalists and televangelist audiences changed very little in reaction to these scandals. This decline appeared to be short lived, as about one-third of the negative effects rebounded by 1990.

GSS years: 1973-1990

CBS 1987; LAT 1986-1987; Roper 1985-1987; Gallup 1944-1990; NBC 1985; ABC/WP 1986; SRC 1964-1988; Harris 1980, 1989; NORC 1964-1965; MTF 1975-1989; AF 1966-1990

David, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1992

This paper tracks trends (early 1970s to late 1980s) in US opinion for 42 General Social Survey items with liberal/conservative overtones. The broad question is whether the great "Liberal" shift since World War II has ended; the narrow issue is the relative importance of cohort succession and intra-cohort shifts. Despite common impressions, the overall trend is more liberal than conservative but it conceals opposing "weather" and "climate" processes. Within cohorts ("weather") I find a conservative trend between the early and late 70s and a liberal "rebound" in the 80s. Between cohorts virtually all items show small but cumulative liberalizing produced by cohort succession. These cohort effects are declining in magnitude because the association between year of birth a liberalism is nonlinear. I find a curvilinearity such that Americans born after World War II are not consistently more liberal than their predecessors. This shift is not explained by the lesser schooling of youngest adults or by ceiling effects. Consequently, I predict lessening of the liberalizing "climate" produced by cohort succession. All these propositions are qualified, depending on the topic, and the analysis takes heed of the notorious Age/Period/Cohort identification problem.

GSS years: 1972-1989

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 6, 1992

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972-1990

Alwin, Duane F.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 10, 1991

Conflicting sets of empirical results exist on the question of changing levels of cognitive abilities in the U.S. population in the post-World War II era. Evidence concerning changes in the cognitive skills assessed by IQ tests suggests there have been improvements in abilities over time, whereas results form the College Entrance Examination Board's Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) suggest rather dramatic declines in performance levels of college-bound high school students over the decades of the 1960's and 1970's, with recent upturns in the early 1980's. This paper addresses the question of changing cognitive skills int eh U.S. population via an examination of cohort differences in vocabulary knowledge int eh U.S., assessed in six national NORC-GSS surveys. Consistent with the well-publicized SAT-score decline, cohort differences in vocabulary scores (adjusted for inter-cohort differences in the extent of schooling) are observed, with recent cohorts showing less vocabulary knowledge. The apparent recovery in the 1980's of average SAT scores is not duplicated in the vocabulary score trends reported here. Generally, however, intra-cohort factors are much more important in producing differences in vocabulary knowledge. Family socio-economic factors and amounts of schooling are associated with the largest difference sin vocabulary knowledge. Family size is relatively less important than other family factors, but it affects vocabulary knowledge significantly. The present set of results provides no support for the hypothesis that cohort differences in family size experiences have led to declines in verbal skills in the U.S. population.

GSS years: 1974, 1976, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 6, 1988

This paper compares trends in free speech attitudes during the GSS years (1972-87) with those of the Stouffer Shift (1954-72) in light of Stouffer's prediction that cohort replacement would generate increased tolerance. Cohort replacement appears to have facilitated tolerance to some degree in both periods, but the GSS era saw slight negative intra-cohort trends while the Stouffer shift was buttressed by large intra-cohort increases in tolerance.

GSS years: 1972-1987

Stouffer 1954

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 5, 1989

Overall the post WWII period has been a time of liberal advance. Liberal gains were strongest in areas such as race relations and women's rights. Crime was one topic that showed little or no liberal growth.

GSS years: 1972-1988

Gallup 1936-81; NBC/AP 1978

Alwin, Duane F.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1987

(no abstract provided)

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1983, 1984, 1986

Alwin, Duane F.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1987

Parental orientation to the desired qualities of children increasingly reflects a desire for autonomy, and perhaps even more dramatically, a decreasing desire for conformity to institutional demands.

GSS years: 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984

NORC, 1964

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1988

Jews and Protestants have slowly declined in proportion since the 1940s, while the proportion Catholic has increased slowly. The non-religious dropped in proportion in the 1940s and 1950s, increased in the 1970s before leveling off. Births, deaths, and net migration have driven these changes more so than conversion to or leaving a religious denomination.

GSS years: 1972-1987

Gallup 1947, 1952, 1957, 1962, 1966-67, 1970-72, 1974-76, 1978-86; NORC 1943-46; 1948-54, 1956-57, 1963-65, 1967-68, 1970-74, 1976, 1978-79; ANES 1948-86; CBS 1957; SRC Mental Health 1957; Almond and Verba Five Nations 1959; Gallup 1960; NORC 1964, 1967

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

Americans are increasingly hostile toward international Communism and the Soviet Union. Yet unlike the 1950s, Americans are against U.S. military involvement to deter Communism, and intolerance of American Communists has not risen.

GSS years: 1973-1986

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 7, 1986

Most items in the GSS have changed in the 13 years covered by this paper. This change is due to the fact that either: A) Sociological phenomena track short term economic fluctuations, B) American society is undergoing massification, or C) society changes through cohort replacement.

GSS years: 1975-1986

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC, 1986

On sexual and reproductive issues there has been no resurgence of traditional family values and no notable reversals of the liberal trends of the seventies.

GSS years: 1972-1985

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 11, 1985

Lower support for political feminism resulted from a political reaction to Ferraro among Republicans and Reagan voters who favored a different type of woman candidate than a New York liberal.

GSS years: 1972, 1984, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985

Smith, Tom W. Sheatsley, Paul B. Sheatsley, Paul B.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

Racial tolerance among Americans has increased dramatically in the last forty years. This reflects changes in the three major factors which determine white attitudes toward blacks: birth cohort, education, and cultural background consisting of region, ethnicity, religion, and community background. Still, majorities are opposed to giving special treatment to minorities.

GSS years: 1972-1984

SRC 1972, 1974, 1976, 1980; Gallup 1970, 1971(2); NORC 1942, 1944, 1946, 1956, 1963(2), 1964, 1965(2), 1966, 1970, 1972

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 7, 1984

The gap between Catholic and Protestant attitudes on abortion is closing, due in part to cohort replacement and political activism by Protestant fundamentalist groups. Only 10-12% of Catholics oppose abortion under all circumstances.

GSS years: 1972-1982

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1985

Despite assertions that the 1970's ended in a conservative tide, only two areas 1) spending and taxation and 2) crime, showed conservative trends. A number of issues however slowed their liberal advance or reached a liberal plateau. Reasons for the liberal plateau are examined along with reasons for the misperception of a conservative tide.

GSS years: 1972-1982

Gallup; Harris; NORC; Roper; RAC; ANES 1956-80

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 2, 1983

Being black, being unmarried, and worsening financial state are independently related to unhappiness. However, no other social ties or rank variables such as occupation and education predict happiness. Thus only the economics, not the sociological nor the psychological hypothesis of happiness, receives much support.

GSS years: 1972-1982

Census 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

There is a general liberal advancement with this conservative period marking a slowing of liberal growth rather than by the reversal of liberal trends into a conservative direction.

GSS years: 1972-1984

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 6, 1983

This summary of trends in 111 GSS items indicates that, for the majority of them, change was modest and linear. Substantively, racial attitudes, sex roles and sex norms reflected a liberalizing trend. A structural model involving year, education and prestige explains the stability of the occupational variables, as well as substantial fractions of the change in the most volatile items.

GSS years: 1972-1982

Gallup 1972(3), 1974-80, 1982

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1983

Public dislike for Russia increased dramatically in the second half of the seventies, and support to prevent the spread of Communism increased from 1970 to 1980. However, tolerance toward domestic Communists has remained the same. According to public opinion, we are not in a period of cold war or detente, but in an armed truce maintained by a balance of power.

GSS years: 1972-1982

Gallup 1953, 1954 (2), 1956, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1965 (2) 1966 (2), 1967-69, 1972, 1973 (2), 1974 (2), 1976 (2), 1977-79 1980 (2); Harris 1968 (3), 1970, 1971, 1972 (2), 1973 (2), 1974 (2), 1975, 1976, 1979 (3), 1980; Roper 1971, 1973, 1974 (3), 1975 (3), 1976 (2), 1977 (3), 1978 (3), 1979 (7), 1980 (5), 1981 (5) 1982 (2); CBS/NYT 1978, 1979, 1980 (5), 1981 (2), 1982 (2); NBC/AP 1978 (5), 1979 (7), 1980 (3), 1981 (3), 1982 (2); LAT 1980, 1981; Yankelovich 1974 (2), 1975, 1976 (2), 1981; NORC 1978; NORC/Gallup

Duchon, Millard

 Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1981

GSS items are categorized as demographics, behavioral, attitudinal, or personal evaluations. An explanation of change is now considered using four approaches: the best-fitting model, the proportion, the slope, and the amount of explained variance. Twenty-one percent of models changed their form due to 1980 data and 39 percent of models were constant both in 1978 and 1980. Personal evaluations are the most likely to show change while demographics and behaviors are the least likely.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

Age is negatively related to financial support for education. If a respondent is a teacher or student, had confidence in educational institutions, favors social welfare spending, has more liberal political views, he/she is more likely to favor financial support for education.

GSS years: 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978

Roper 1971 and 1973; Harris 1971, 1972, 1976; Gallup 1975

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 12, 1981

Using five variables: father's education and occupation, number of siblings, size of residence, and mother's work status, a statistical linear model is analyzed to describe large-scale chance in American families.

GSS years: 1972-1982

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 9, 1980

A quarter of the American public supports gun control. This attitude has remained consistent for nearly 20 years.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977

Gallup; SRC; Harris

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 6, 1980

There exists evidence to suggest a long-term climatic trend toward liberalism, but these changes have been clouded over or overshadowed by a short term conservative shift in the weather. Whether this trend to the right continues remains to be seen, though a larger time perspective on trends suggest not.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978

Gallup 1960, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-78; Harris 1960, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-78

Smith, Tom W.

 Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1, 1982

During the post World War II period there has been a shift toward liberal attitudes and behavior. This liberal trend varies in direction by subject area. Limited evidence shows a weakening and reversal of the trend during the seventies. This waning of liberal trends is characterized by an equalization of the number of liberal and conservative trends and a large number of trends showing no net direction.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978

Numerous surveys from the following organizations: Gallup; Harris; NORC; Roper;

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1980

This compendium presents trends in questions asked in the GSS. Only GSS data are used on the demographic questions, but for the non-demographics, other similarly-worded national opinions samples are used as well.

GSS years: 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977

Taylor, D. Garth

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1978

Younger cohorts tend to be more sexually permissive than older cohorts, but the youngest adults are no more permissive than those who became adults during the sixties. While current across-the-board trends are mixed, cohort turnover should continue to push us in a permissive direction.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978

Gallup 1940, 1943 (2), 1945, 1947, 1959, 1962, 1963, 1964 1965 (2), 1969 (2), 1970, 1971, 1973, 1977 (3), 1978; RAC 1970

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 3, 1979

Levels of response to questions of happiness seem to exhibit a seasonal variation and respond to context effects. Measured happiness appears to have risen between the late forties and late fifties, declined in the sixties, and bottomed out in the early seventies.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977

NORC 1962-76 (7); SRC 1957-76 (6); Gallup 1946-70 (14); CNS 1973-74

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 4, 1978

Attitudes that have undergone significant change were examined, and it was found that age was related to these items. It was argued though not proven that this relationship is a result of generational rather than maturational differences between age groups. However, all cohorts changed their opinions in response to period stimuli while maintaining differences between themselves.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

Support for capital punishment declined from the 1930s to the mid 1960s and then rose to record levels by the mid 1970s.

GSS years: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975

Smith, Tom W.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 1976

See 'A Study of Trends in the Political Role of Women, 1936-1974.' in Studies of Social Change Since 1948, Vol. II, James A. Davis (ed.). Tolerant attitudes toward women's role in politics have led the change in objective behavior, both being factors of shifting social and economic conditions.

GSS years: 1972, 1974

Gallup 1936-70 (10)

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC

There is a definite trend away from sex equality in education, especially in college attendance. There has been very little narrowing in race, region, or religious differences in education, until the most recent cohorts where northern white Catholics and southern white Protestants show virtual parity with northern white Protestants.

GSS years: 1972, 1973

ANES 1952-73 (10); Gallup 1953-73 (20)

Davis, James A.

Social Change Report, Chicago, NORC , 11, 1975

There has been an average increase of about 23 percent points in tolerant responses; 4 percent of this increase is due to cohort effects on educational attainment; about 5 percent is due to cohort replacement; about 13 percent due to increasing tolerance among all cohort and education groups; and 1 percent due to increased college attainment not accounted for by cohort.

GSS years: 1972, 1973

Stouffer 1954